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Abstract 
The recent financial crisis has raised serious questions about the effectiveness of 
corporate governance (CG) in monitoring management and protecting investors’ 
interests. There is concern that ‘poor’ CG was, to a certain extent, a major cause of the 
current financial crisis. This thesis, therefore, investigates the crucial policy question 
of whether the quality of CG has any effect on financial performance, information 
asymmetry and on block shareholders’ investment decisions. This is achieved and 
presented in the form of three essays on CG practices in UK with a particular focus on 
the periods before and during the 2007/2008 financial crisis. 
 
The first essay aims to investigate the impact of firm-level CG on block shareholders’ 
investment decisions for a large sample of UK non-financial firms over the period 
2005 to 2009. Using a panel data analysis, the results revealed the importance of CG 
for block shareholders’ investment decisions. Furthermore, the study results indicated 
that only institutional block shareholders consider CG to be important criteria for their 
investment decisions. Moreover, when the effect of CG on block shareholdings in both 
periods before and during crisis was examined, a significant difference in results 
appeared: an insignificant positive relationship in the pre-crisis period turned out to be 
significant during crisis. The result thus indicates that block shareholders viewed CG 
as particularly important during the crisis period.   
 
The second essay aims to examine the effect of CG on firm performance before and 
during the financial crisis. It also investigates the mediating effect of agency costs on 
the association between CG and firm performance. The results revealed that CG 
affects firm performance only in the period before the crisis, but no significant effect 
was found during the crisis period. Moreover, agency cost was proved to fully mediate 
the relationship between CG and performance in the pre-crisis period. The results 
point to an important issue, which is the need to re-evaluate CG not only in stable 
periods but also during turbulent times, and to evaluate its ability to perform 
effectively in such different conditions. 
 
The third essay investigates the effect of both CG and block ownership on information 
asymmetry. Further, the effects of CG in lessening the positive association between 
block ownership and information asymmetry is considered.  The results revealed that 
CG affects information asymmetry only in the pre-crisis. In addition, block ownership 
was shown to have a significant and positive effect on information asymmetry during 
crisis periods suggesting that block shareholders benefit from their information 
advantage during crisis period which in turn worsens the information asymmetry 
problem. This suggests that block shareholders engage more in their private benefits 
rather than in efficient monitoring. The results also proved that CG is insignificant 
during turbulent period in lessening the negative effect of block ownership. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, block shareholders, agency cost, firm 
performance, information asymmetry, 2007/2008 financial crisis, UK. 
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2 
Chapter One: 
Introduction and Background to the Thesis 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
The 2007/2008 global financial crisis has led to a further growing awareness and 
need for effective Corporate Governance (CG) especially in the wake of the fact 
that a failure in CG has been identified and indeed blamed as one of the main 
factors that directly led to the global financial crisis (Aebi et al., 2012; Iwasaki, 
2014; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Tarraf, 2011). In the same vein, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report (2009) pointed out that 
deficiencies in CG structure and processes played a significant role in triggering 
the global financial crisis. It is argued that the current CG was unsuccessful to 
protect against unnecessary risk taking and it also failed to offer the appropriate 
control needed by companies to ensure good business practices (Kirkpatrick, 
2009).  In the UK specifically, there were major falls in the stock market, and 
there were major concerns regarding the stability of at least some of its banks. A 
run on Northern Rock for example led to the bank being nationalised (Mallin, 
2013). In response to these events, a range of CG reforms have been undertaken 
by regulators, international organisations, governments, and academics. These 
reforms aimed mainly to develop new CG standards and principles to restore 
investors’ assurance in both capital markets and listed firms (Essen et al., 2013). 
Thus, the global financial crisis raised serious questions about the effectiveness of 
CG to actively monitor management and protect the shareholders’ benefits. 
However, there is a notable lack of empirical evidence on the role of CG in 
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protecting the shareholders’ interests in the period leading to and during the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008. 
Therefore, the principal aim of this thesis is to explore the effects of CG in 
reducing information asymmetry, improving firm performance and attracting 
block shareholders in the UK with particular focus on the periods before and 
during the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. This is achieved and presented in the 
form of three essays on CG practices (Chapters 3, 4 and 5), each essay focuses on 
exact research questions, and, hence, it contributes to further understanding of CG 
in UK and allows the researcher to uniquely shed vital and timely empirical 
insights on CG in the periods before and during the crisis. The three essays 
mentioned above examined a sample of UK FTSE 350 non-financial firms in the 
period that covers the periods before and during the global financial crisis from 
2005 to 2009. These three essays are linked; as firms, in their efforts to attract 
block shareholders, try to improve their CG structure which will reduce 
information asymmetry and agency cost and hence improve their performance 
(see Figure 1.1). 
 
1.2  Research Focus and Motivation 
Although the origin of the financial crisis was in the United States, it became 
worldwide; it spilled over to both developing and developed countries; it affects 
almost all economies of the world (Dullien et al., 2010). This financial crisis 
results in the largest and sharpest drop in global economy. Although this crisis 
started mainly in the financial sector, the disastrous collapse in the financial sector 
had affected other sectors (Beltratti and Stulz , 2010). 
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 During a severe financial crisis a bank might have to reduce its credit exposure; 
therefore affecting its ability to lend. Therefore, other non-financial companies 
might be affected; non-financial companies might be unable to borrow to pay its 
obligations.  As a result, these companies might search for other sources of 
finance (Bernanke, 1983). Therefore, the focus of this thesis will be on the non-
financial companies; it will examine how these companies survive the financial 
crisis. It examines the effect of CG in attracting more block shareholders and 
hence increase firm’s shareholders base. Moreover, it examines the role of CG in 
reducing both agency cost and information asymmetry and finally its role in 
improving firm performance both in pre and during crisis period. 
 
This thesis investigates the influence of CG on block shareholders’ investment 
decisions, firm performance and information asymmetry, using a sample of 139 
UK FTSE-350 non-financial companies for the periods before and during the 
2007/2008 global financial crisis. This is achieved and presented in the form of 
three essays. The first essay, presented in chapter 3 of the thesis, investigates an 
important policy question of whether firm-level CG affects investment decisions 
of block shareholders with particular focus on the periods before and during the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008. Good CG plays a very important function in 
reinforcing the reliability and effectiveness of financial markets. Therefore, well 
governed firms will normally perform better than others and hence will have the 
ability to catch the attention of investors, and this in turn will help to provide 
finance needed for further expansion (See for example; McCahery et al., 2010; 
Starks, 2009). In the same vein, Investor Opinion Survey by McKinsey (2000) 
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indicated that most of investors preferred to invest in a company with good CG. 
But with the global financial crisis and corporate scandals that have done much to 
undermine the investors’ confidence in business and the financial markets, do 
investors still consider CG in their investment decisions? There is a notable and 
growing concern and, indeed criticism, regarding the insufficient empirical 
evidence on the effects of CG on attracting block shareholders in the period 
leading to and during crisis. Moreover, most prior studies have examined the 
effects of CG in attracting shareholders specifically institutional shareholders with 
little attention to other different categories of block shareholders (Chung and 
Zhang, 2011; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Khurshed et al., 2011). Cronqvist and 
Fahlenbrach (2009) also argued that block shareholders have heterogeneous 
beliefs, skills, and preferences. Therefore, the scope of first essay, Chapter 3, is 
extended to analyse different types of block shareholders, rather than just the 
institutional investors.  
 
The second essay, which is chapter 4 of the thesis, aims to study the effect of CG 
on firm performance in the periods before and during the financial crisis as well as 
to empirically explore the mediating role of agency cost as there is a paucity of 
research that examines this relationship. Although the relationship between CG 
and firm performance is extensively examined, past studies have focused mainly 
on non-crisis periods (Black et al., 2006; Veprauskaite and Adams, 2013; Wang et 
al., 2012) and on financial companies during crisis periods and thereby limiting 
our understanding of CG (Cornett et al., 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2009; 
Minton et al., 2010). This is the gap in the literature which provided the 
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motivation for the researcher to consider the association between CG and firm 
performance in both periods before and during the crisis on a sample of UK non-
financial firms. In addition, prior studies argued that good CG reduces agency cost 
and hence improves firm performance. However, there was no study that 
empirically investigated the mediating role of agency cost on the relationship 
between CG and firm performance. Consequently, by examining the mediating 
effect of agency cost, this essay, Chapter 4, offers greater insight into an important 
channel through which CG affects performance. 
 
The third essay, which is chapter 5 of the thesis, aims to examine the influence of 
CG and block ownership on information asymmetry before and during the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008. In addition, it examines the influence of various 
categories of block ownership on information asymmetry. Crucially, it also 
examines CG role in alleviating the expected positive association between block 
ownership and information asymmetry. Whilst a number of prior studies have 
documented the negative relationship between CG and on information asymmetry 
(Anglin et al., 2011; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Donelly and Mulcahy, 2008; 
Lang and Lundholm 2000; Lei et al., 2013; Prommin et al., 2014), there was no 
previous study that examined the role of CG in mitigating information asymmetry 
during crisis periods in general and in UK in particular. Therefore, the current 
essay will also address this gap in the literature.  
 
Previous studies also revealed that ownership concentration might affect 
information asymmetry (Su, 2004 and Hope et al., 2009). However, examining the 
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association between block ownership and information asymmetry during crisis 
period is missing in the literature.  It is expected especially during crisis period 
that block ownership may take advantage of their position and worsen the 
information asymmetry problem. For example, block shareholders may affect 
management to hide information to protect their interests which in turn increases 
information asymmetry (Choi et al., 2010; Jiang et al., 2011; Prommin et al., 
2014). Thus, block shareholders, rather than simply monitoring management, can 
in fact influence management to take actions in their interest, thereby increasing 
the level of information asymmetry (Heflin and Shaw, 2000). Therefore, in this 
essay the effect of block ownership on information asymmetry is examined in the 
periods before and during the crisis period. 
 
Finally, prior studies that examined the effect of CG in alleviating the positive 
relationship between block ownership and information asymmetry are generally 
scarce and particularly focused on developing countries during stable periods 
(Byunet al., 2011; Prommin et al., 2014). This significantly limits our 
understanding of the role of CG mechanisms in mitigating the information 
asymmetry problem. In UK as a developed country, CG is therefore expected to 
play an important role in reducing information asymmetry in the presence of 
block ownership. The third essay, chapter 5, therefore, provides new empirical 
evidence on block ownership, their impact on information asymmetry, and the 
mitigating role of CG. 
In general, this thesis tries to bridge the gap in CG literature by examining firm-
level CG effects on investment decisions of block shareholders and by 
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investigating the effects of CG on reducing information asymmetry and improving 
firm performance with particular focus on the period preceding, and during the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008. The following Figure 1.1 presents the structural 
relationship of the three essays. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (1.1) Research Framework 
 
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
 
Motivated by the issues identified in Section 1.2, the principal aim of this thesis is 
to explore the effects of CG in reducing information asymmetry, improving firm 
performance and attracting block shareholders in the UK with particular focus on 
the periods before and during the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. This is 
achieved and presented in the form of three essays on CG practices (Chapters 3, 4 
and 5), each essay focuses on exact research questions, and, hence, it contributes 
to further understanding of CG in UK and allows the researcher to uniquely shed 
Information 
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vital and timely empirical insights on CG in the periods before and during the 
crisis. The following Table 1.1 presents the main research questions for each 
essay. 
 
Table 1.1: Research questions for each essay 
 
Paper/ 
Chapter 
Research questions 
Essay One 
(Chapter 3) 
1. Does CG affect overall block shareholders’ investment 
decisions?  
2. Which particular aspects of CG are more important in 
affecting their investment decisions? 
3. Do different types of block shareholders react 
differently to CG level? 
4. Have the recent financial crises changed the relationship 
between CG and block shareholders’ investment 
decisions? 
 
Essay Two 
(Chapter 4) 
1. Does CG act as an effective mechanism in improving 
firm performance? If so; 
2. Does agency cost mediate the relationship among CG 
and firm performance? 
Essay Three 
(Chapter 5) 
 
1. Does CG affect information asymmetry before and 
during the financial crisis? 
2. Does block ownership positively associated with 
information asymmetry? And, if so 
3. Does CG help lessen the positive relationship between 
block ownership and information asymmetry? 
 
 
1.4 Key Findings of the Research 
This section summarises the three threads of the empirical analysis as discussed in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5 to answer the research questions and provide a general 
understanding of the role of CG in the UK. In essay one, chapter 3, the results 
reveal a positive association between CG and block shareholdings for the whole 
period of study from 2005 to 2009. These results give an indication of the 
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importance of CG in the investment decision taken by block shareholders. 
However, the results show a change in this relationship from period before the 
crisis to during crisis period; the insignificant relationship in the pre-crisis period 
turns to be significant during crisis, suggesting that block shareholders view CG 
as particularly important during the crisis period. Moreover, the results indicate 
that board composition and independence (BCII) is the only CG sub index that 
affects total block shareholders’ investment decisions; implying that firms with 
better board composition and independence index attract more block shareholders. 
With regard to different types of block shareholders, the results of essay one 
reveal that only institutional block shareholders pay more attention to CG as an 
important part of their investment decisions. Moreover, the results point out that 
those different categories of block shareholders have heterogonous preferences for 
different CG provisions. Two main conclusions are drawn from the findings. First, 
not all CG mechanisms are considered important for block shareholders especially 
during a crisis period; a significant relationship is only found between BCII and 
block shareholdings. These findings highlight the important role of the 
composition and independence of the board especially during crisis periods in 
attracting block shareholders. Second, during crisis periods inventors change their 
investment behaviour and become more conservative. 
 
In essay two, chapter 4, a positive association among CG and firm performance is 
found the period prior to the financial crisis. However, during the crisis period it 
shows a non-significant relationship. These results also indicate that the 
accountability and audit index is the only CG-sub index that affects firm 
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performance in the pre-crisis period. The results further support the mediating role 
of agency cost, which is consistent with the agency theory. This mediating role is 
proved only in the pre-crisis period and holds only for one of the CG-sub indices, 
which is Accountability and Audit Index (AAI). This study, therefore, provides 
the evidence that agency cost completely mediates the relationship between CG 
and firm performance. Moreover, this study provides the evidence that there is no 
relationship between CG and firm performance during crisis period which implies 
that CG mechanisms’ effects differ from the crisis to the non-crisis period. 
Therefore, the efficacy of good CG mechanisms, such as board independence and 
board practices, that are believed to have common relevance are questionable 
especially during crisis periods. 
 
The third essay, chapter 5, provides insights into the role of CG mechanisms in 
mitigating information asymmetry. The results reveal that CG is effective in 
mitigating information asymmetry only in the pre-crisis period while no evidence 
is found for the period of the crisis itself. More specifically both Board Practice 
and Process Index (BPPI) and AAI are the only CG sub-indices that affect 
information asymmetry in the pre-crisis period. With regard to the effect of block 
ownership, the results indicate a non-significant association between block 
ownership and information asymmetry in the pre-crisis period. However, a 
positive statistical association is found between block ownership and information 
asymmetry in the crisis period. Moreover, both institutional block shareholdings 
and other block shareholdings were found to positively and significantly affect 
information asymmetry. Finally, the results showed that CG did not have any 
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effect in lessening the positive relationship between block ownership and 
information asymmetry during crisis period. These results have implications for 
regulatory bodies. In particular, there is a need for a continual review of CG 
mechanisms and legal system, especially during crisis periods. This suggests that 
a new set of CG mechanisms is required during crisis periods. More importantly, 
it is vital to search for ways to convince block shareholders to participate and be 
more involved in monitoring management. 
 
1.5 Significance of the Research  
This thesis extends existing CG literature and contributes to it in a number of 
ways. First, it provides new evidence and important empirical insights on the 
effects of CG in protecting the shareholders’ interests in both stable and turbulent 
periods; before and during the 2007/2008 global financial crisis for a sample of 
non-financial companies in UK. This adds to the previous literature which focused 
mainly on financial companies during financial crisis. 
Second, it extends CG literature by focusing on the UK as a less regulated 
environment compared to a more regulated environment such as the US. In 
general, CG standards and guidelines vary widely between countries with some 
operating as voluntary best practice and mandatory in others. This research 
focuses on the UK as a less regulated environment, where regulations emphasise 
encouraging CG rather than imposing extensive mandatory requirements. 
 
Third, distinct from most of the existing studies in which CG mechanisms have 
been tested in isolation, the current thesis develops a new composite measure of 
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26 CG dimensions that can capture the quality of CG. It has been developed based 
mainly on the requirements of the UK Combined Code of 2003. Hence, the 
crafted CG index provides a robust and validated measuring tool that allows us to 
shed important empirical insights on the impact of CG mechanisms on attracting 
shareholders, mitigating agency cost and information asymmetry and improving 
firm performance. 
 
Fourth, the first essay makes important empirical contributions to existing studies 
by distinguishing between the different categories of block shareholder, which in 
turn gives more insights regarding their preferences in terms of CG. This is the 
first study to examine the impact of CG mechanisms on the investment decisions 
made by block shareholders not only institutional investors. This consideration of 
the preferences of both total block shareholders and different types of block 
shareholders will provide significant insights to the existing literature that studied 
the effect of block ownership on firm value and its policies.  
 
Fifth, the second essay contributes to the CG theories by providing a new insight 
into the mediating role of agency cost on the relationship between CG and 
performance. Moreover, this thesis is the first study to examine the impact of CG 
on agency cost in the UK context for both periods before and during the financial 
crisis. 
 
Finally, the third essay extends the information asymmetry literature by 
investigating the impact of both CG and block ownership on information 
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asymmetry during crisis period which had not examined before. Moreover, 
drawing on previous literature regarding the different alternative mechanisms that 
could help to supply the information to investors and, hence, reduce information 
asymmetry (Byun et al., 2011), this essay contributes to this issue by examining 
CG’s role in alleviating the expected positive relationship between block 
ownership and information asymmetry. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This chapter has presented the overall focus and objectives of the three essays of 
this thesis. The background and rational of this thesis has been discussed which 
highlights the motivation and specific research questions for each essay. This is 
followed by the discussion of the main results of this essay and finally presenting 
the significance and contribution of this research. The remaining of the thesis is 
organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of the CG developments in UK 
starting from the Cadbury Report (1992) to the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2012). In addition, this chapter also discusses the developed CG index and sub-
indices that are used throughout this thesis. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present the three 
essays mentioned above which namely cover the following topics: how corporate 
governance affects investment decisions of block shareholders in UK listed 
companies: has the recent financial crisis changed the game? (Chapter 3 – 
Essay1); the impact of corporate governance on firm performance in the periods 
before and during the financial crisis: UK FTSE 350 companies (Chapter 4 – 
Essay 2); and, finally, the roles of corporate governance and block ownership in 
reducing information asymmetry (Chapter 5 – Essay 3). Each essay includes an 
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introduction, hypothesis development, methodology, analysis of results, and 
summary and conclusion sections. Chapter 6 is the final chapter and provides a 
summary of the key findings of the three essays and concluding remarks. 
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Chapter Two: 
Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter makes an attempt to discuss the development of UK corporate 
governance (CG). In UK, there have been noticeable corporate scandals such as 
the fall down of listed corporations, such as Barings, BCCI and Maxwell 
Corporation (Mallin, 2013). These corporate scandals resulted in the undermining 
of investors’ confidence in the capital markets and the need to reform CG.  In the 
same vein, the increased ownership by institutional investors in UK was another 
reason for the urgent need to develop a good CG where these investors are 
searching for a way to protect their investment; therefore, the role of CG is 
important to create an attractive investment environment (Dignam, 2007; Mallin 
et al., 2005). Accordingly, in the wake of these scandals, a sequence of CG 
developments began in UK starting from the Cadbury Committee Report in 1992 
until UK CG Code (2012). Recently, the 2007/2008 global financial crisis has 
reignited the debate regarding the need for effective CG. In this context, the 
UK government asked Sir David Walker to review corporate governance in UK 
banks and other financial institutions. The Walker Review was published in 
November 2009 and made some recommendations. The Walker Report (2009) 
provided a complete review of CG in the banking sector; however, it was applied 
to all institutions, not only banks (Adams, 2012). Incorporating the findings of the 
Walker Report, the new version of the UK CG code (previously known as the 
Combined Code) was published in 2010. The changes aim to reinforce the quality 
of the board and help the board to become more effective and accountable to 
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shareholders. The new code emphasised on the leadership of the chairman; 
therefore, one main area in the code is about the chairman responsibility in 
leading the board. In addition, there is more focus on evaluating board 
performance and a composition of the board; there is a need to have a balance of 
knowledge, skills, and independence. Moreover, it calls for the necessities of 
directors to have enough time to discharge their responsibilities effectively, and it 
also stressed the role of non-executives in developing strategies. This chapter, 
therefore, aims to provide a full account of the UK corporate governance 
framework. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next 
section provides a review of the development of CG code of best practice in the 
UK. Section three reviews the main approaches of developing CG indices that 
have been employed in the literature. Section four describes the process of 
constructing CG index used in this thesis followed by the chapter summary. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance Developments in the UK 
Several definitions of CG had been identified in the literature. Therefore, it is 
difficult to make an acknowledgment of only one definition. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997: 737), for example, defined CG as what “deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment”. The Cadbury Report also defined CG as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury, 1992: para. 2.5). In the same 
vein, Dahya et al. (1996: 71) defined it as “the manner in which companies are 
controlled and in which those responsible for the direction of companies are 
accountable to the stakeholders of these companies”. Therefore, it can be said that 
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CG is all about the control of corporations (OECD, 1999); CG presents the 
structure through which the company’s objectives are put, the ways of achieving 
these objectives, and the monitoring of performance. Moreover, it is important to 
view CG as a system of internal and external mechanisms vital to ensuring 
investors’ return. Both of these mechanisms are shaped by the overall legal and 
institutional structures of each country. Therefore, in a wide scope, CG includes 
all the mechanisms that are needed to make sure that the company is managed 
effectively and that is why CG is considered important to businesses.  
 
In UK, there have been noticeable corporate scandals such as the fall down of 
listed corporations, such as Barings, BCCI, Maxwell Corporation, Polly Peck and 
others (Mallin, 2013). These corporate scandals resulted in the undermining of 
investors’ confidence in the capital markets.  Moreover, the increased ownership 
by institutional investors in UK was another reason for the urgent need to develop 
a good CG where these investors are searching for a way to protect their 
investment; therefore, the role of CG is important to create an attractive 
investment environment (Dignam, 2007; Mallin et al., 2005). Consequently, in the 
wake of these scandals, a sequence of CG developments began in UK starting 
from the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Moreover, there are some factors that 
generally believed to affect the improvement of CG cods in UK; these include for 
example, the London Stock Exchange Code, Companies Act concerning 
transactions by directors and share dealing, the establishment of the Financial 
Services Authority, which is accountable for the requirements of CG in the UK, 
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the issuance of Company Law and the financial reporting council, as regulators of 
financial reporting (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). 
 
In recent years, there has been a considerable growth in developing CG codes and 
principles as a result of corporate failures. The UK was one of the main leaders in 
this area.  A first attempt to reform CG in UK was initiated by Cadbury in 1992.  
The Cadbury committee Report in 1992 is well thought-out as the base for all the 
subsequent reports that were published after that in many countries, and 
particularly in the UK (Aguilera and Cuervo‐Cazurra, 2009; Brennan and 
Solomon, 2008). The Cadbury report was initiated by the Financial Reporting 
Council, the accounting bodies and the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and it 
further contributed to CG in Europe (Dignam, 2007). This report suggested a 
number of recommendations which are as follows: first, it emphasises the need for 
companies to establish various functional boards committees; these are the 
nomination committee, the remuneration committee and the audit committee. 
Second, the roles of chairman and CEO should be separated. Third, it also 
suggested that a satisfactory number of outside directors should be in the board.  
These recommendations were implemented by LSE, if a company did not comply 
with these recommendations it had to explain the reason for non-compliance 
(Dignam, 2007 and Mallin et al., 2005). However, Cadbury report missed 
explaining some main issues. First, it did not define the meaning of independence. 
Second, it did not state that non-executive directors should be the majority on the 
board (Dignam, 2007). 
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The Greenbury Report (1995) was mainly published following the concerns of 
both public and shareholders about executive remuneration as there was a public 
outcry of the large increase of directors’ pay. Therefore, the Greenbury committee 
was set to look at this issue; consequently, some recommendations were suggested: 
first, the remuneration committee should consist of at least three non-executive 
directors in order for the committee to be without any personal or financial 
interests. Second, the replacement of share options by long term performance 
related criteria. Third, there should be a high level of disclosure of salaries in the 
annual reports. Forth, it is better to have a one year rolling contract for the 
directors to cut down the amount paid off for long term contracts. However, these 
recommendations did not prevent the committee to go for heavy criticism from 
the national press and from the government; this criticism was for not restricting 
excessive payouts to directors (Rodgers and Hotten, 1995). 
 
Later in January 1998, the Hampel Report (1998) was issued as a review of the 
companies’ implementation of both the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports’ 
recommendations (Rayton, and Cheng, 2009). The Hampel report (1998) 
reaffirmed the recommendations of the previous two reports; in addition, it mainly 
focused on the role of institutional investors in CG. This increased focused on 
institutional investors was due to these investors; in particular pension funds were 
blamed of being focused on short term profitability instead of long term 
performance. Furthermore, the Hampel committee provided a set of principles of 
CG that are classified into four sections: the directors, the shareholders, 
accountability and audit, and directors’ remuneration.  Also, the Hampel Report 
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called for the need for the board to have a good internal control system in order to 
protect shareholders’ interests. 
 
An important sequence of the Hampel Report was the publication of the 
Combined Code (1998) which was based on the recommendation of the Cadbury, 
Greenbury, and Hampel reports, and it was published by the London Stock 
Exchange, so this combined code could sit together with the listing roles. This 
code is recognised as an international benchmark for good CG practice. This 
combined code consists of 17 principles and 48 provisions that covered five 
sections: directors, directors’ remunerations, relations with shareholders, 
accountability and audit, and institutional investors. The code used the “comply or 
explain” approach; by this approach the listed companies have to explain in the 
annual report whether or not they had complied with the code. In section D2 of 
this code, it states that “the board should maintain a sound system of internal 
control to safeguard shareholders' investment and the company's assets”. 
However, the code did not provide any details that defined what a sound internal 
control system is. Therefore, this gap was addressed further by the Turnbull 
reports.  
 
The Turnbull reports (1999) provided guidelines regarding the internal control and 
reporting system; hence, it provided recommendations for directors regarding 
controlling firms and the financial reporting quality. These recommendations will 
help companies to put into practice the combined code requirements that are 
related to the internal control system. This in turn will help in setting up a sound 
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internal control system that enables the directors to manage risks that facing 
companies.  
 
After a series of corporate failures in late 2001 in US such as Enron, Tyco and 
World Com, there were calls for CG reforms. In UK the response was the 
establishment of both the Smith and Higgs committees in 2002. Both Smith and 
Higgs committees published their reports on 2003. The main focus of the Higgs 
report was on both the board of directors and the role and effectiveness of non-
executive directors, it provided recommendations concerning their appointment, 
resignation, remuneration, responsibilities and their relationship with shareholders 
(Higgs, 2003). The Smith report (2003) on the other hand focused on the audit 
committee role and also on the relationship between external auditors and firms. 
According to the recommendations of the audit committee, listed firms should 
have an audit committee that consists of three independent non-executive 
directors; moreover, one member at least should have recent and appropriate 
financial knowledge.  In addition, there should be at least three meetings during 
the year for this committee. Regarding the external auditors, the report stressed 
the importance to ensure their independence. 
 
In 2003, based on the recommendations of both the Higgs report (2003) and Smith 
report (2003), the Financial Services Authority replaced the Combined Code of 
1998 by a new version of it. Both Higgs and Smith reports (2003) suggested that 
the main fundamentals of UK CG system are good and they only want to revise 
the old version of the combined code for further strength. Therefore, in the new 
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version of the combined code (2003), the main principles of the combined code 
(1998) remain untouched in the new one. The new code calls for the following: 
1. The chairman and CEO roles should be separated, and the chairman 
should be independent on appointment. 
2. The independent non-executive directors should be at least half the board. 
3. Candidates for the board of directors should be considered from a broad 
variety of backgrounds. 
4. There should be an accurate and formal evaluation of board performance. 
5. The audit committee should have one member at least with recent and 
appropriate financial experience.  
 
However, the combined code (2003) relaxed some of the recommendations of the 
Higgs report, for example, small companies can have two independent non-
executive directors instead of having a minimum of half of the board at least 
(Keasey et al., 2005). This combined code provides major principles firms are 
expected to comply and report appropriately (Pop et al., 2009). The aim of this 
code is to improve the flow of information to investors about corporate operations.  
With compliance with the code, companies are sending a powerful indication to 
different stakeholders about their willingness to meet the recent standards related 
to CG (Chang et al., 2006; Sheridan et al., 2006). 
 
The Financial Reporting Council continues to regularly publish updated versions 
of the Combined Code as a result of the change in the global CG guidelines and 
also with the development in the corporate environment in the context of the UK. 
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It issued an updated version in June 2006, then in June 2008, 2010, and the new 
edition of the Code was published in September 2012. The changes from the 
version of 2003 to 2006 were related to the chairman and shareholders; for the 
chairman, if he was independent on appointment he was allowed to sit on the 
remuneration committee. With regard to changes related to shareholders, they can 
vote by proxy but having the option of withholding their vote. However, the main 
difference between the 2006 and 2008 edition is the removal of the restriction 
regarding the Chair of more than one FTSE 100 company. Moreover, for 
companies outside FTSE 350, if the chairman was independent on appointment 
time, he is allowed to sit on the audit committee (The Combined Code, 2008). 
 
Following the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, the UK government asked Sir 
David Walker to review corporate governance in UK banks and other financial 
institutions. The Walker Review was published in November 2009 and made 
some recommendations. The Walker Report (2009) provided a complete review of 
CG in the banking sector; however, it was applied to all institutions, not only 
banks (Adams, 2012). Incorporating the findings of the Walker Report, the new 
version of the UK CG code (previously known as the Combined Code) was 
published in 2010. The changes aim to reinforce the quality of the board and help 
the board to become more effective and accountable to shareholders. The new 
code emphasised on the leadership of the chairman; therefore, one main area in 
the code is about the chairman responsibility in leading the board. In addition, 
there is more focus on evaluating board performance and a composition of the 
board; there is a need to have a balance of knowledge, skills, and independence. 
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Moreover, it calls for the necessities of directors to have enough time to discharge 
their responsibilities effectively, and it also stressed the role of non-executives in 
developing strategies. Finally, the new edition of the Code was published 
in September 2012; the new UK CG Code (2012) included limited changes to the 
previous code; these changes are related to audit committee and boardroom 
diversity. This new edition will continue to be applied on “comply or explain” 
base.  
 
In sum, it can be argued based on the above review that the development of CG 
policy in UK has undergone an essential, and relatively long, process of 
adjustment and development from the time when the Cadbury Report was 
published in 1992 to create the recent series of codes. Moreover, it is a self-
regulatory system which means that there is a lack of enforcement in the CG 
system in UK. 
 
2.3 Approaches towards Developing CG Indices 
In general, CG indices have been used in the extant literature to assess the quality 
of CG which are developed either by rating agents (e.g. Standard & Poor, Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia, Governance Metrics International, etc.) or researchers 
(see for example, Black et al., 2012; Bozec and Bozec, 2012; Drobetz et al., 2004; 
Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2003). Accordingly, the next sub-sections review 
CG indices developed by rating agents and academics in order to construct an 
index reflecting the UK CG environment. 
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2.3.1 Rating agencies-constructed CG indices 
A number of rating agencies and professional bodies have developed indices to 
evaluate CG quality such as Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS), Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), The Corporate Library 
(TCL), and Governance Metrics International (GMI) (Bozec and Bozec, 2012; 
Epps and Cereola, 2008). There are many similarities between rating agencies-
constructed CG indices. First, they are usually constructed based on international 
best practices such as OCED principles, national CG recommendations, disclosure 
requirements in company acts, and accounting standards (Florou and Galarniotis, 
2007). Second, the majority of these rating systems focused on certain dimensions 
to evaluate CG quality namely: board of directors, shareholders’ rights, disclosure 
and transparency (Bozec and Bozec, 2012; Florou and Galarniotis, 2007). Third, 
in relation to data collection, annual reports, archival analysis, websites and press 
releases are the primary sources to collect CG information (Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, 2003).  However, some rating systems (e.g. Standard & poor, 2003) used 
an interactive system such as interviews with the key players (i. e. CEO, company 
secretary, directors and key shareholders), or company surveys (e.g. ISS ratings) 
(Danies et al, 2010; Florou and Galarniotis, 2007). 
 
On the other hand, there are substantial variations between rating agencies-
constructed CG indices in terms of CG indicators selection, weighting strategy, 
and sample coverage.  Regarding CG indicators selection, the ISS is composite of 
225 variables which based on 61 rating criteria and it includes 8 categories which 
mainly focused on board of directors, auditing, directors’ compensation and 
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ownership. Moreover, the GMI measure uses more than 600 items variables based 
on 7 categories, including for example board accountability, financial disclosure 
and internal controls, shareholders’ rights, and socially responsible investing 
issues. While the S&P ratings focus on 4 sets: stakeholders’ rights, ownership 
structure, disclosure and transparency and, board structure and process (Florou 
and Galarniotis, 2007 and Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2003). With regard to 
weighting strategy, most rating agencies such as GMI and S&P assign different 
weights to CG indicators based on analysts’ subjective views. In this context, 
Balling et al. (2006) argued that assigning different weightings to governance 
indicators may be confusing because the relative importance of each indicator 
differs from time to time, industry to industry, and country to country. In terms of 
sample coverage, the ISS rates over 5200 US companies and 2300 international 
companies while the TCL provides rates for over 2000 US companies and the 
GMI rates about 3400 US and international companies. These ratings also cover a 
wide range of countries, for example, the CLSA ratings cover 25 emerging 
markets, Deminor Rating covers 17 European countries and the ISS governance 
scores cover developed countries (Epps and Cereola, 2008). Moreover, they are 
typically limited to the largest public companies (Bozec and Bozec, 2012).  
 
To sum up, although these CG scores give useful information on the quality of 
governance in rated companies to investors and put pressures on companies to 
comply (Mallin, 2001), the subjectivity of the CG rating agencies may account for 
bias (Zheka, 2006) as well as  companies may interfere with the rating system 
(Daily and Dalton, 2004). 
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2.3.2 Researcher-constructed CG indices 
The second approach to measure the quality of CG is academic-constructed 
indices where researchers manually construct their CG index based on publicly 
available information, mainly firm’s annual reports (e.g. Bassen et al, 2008; Black 
et al. 2012; Ponu and Ramthandin, 2008; Florou and Galarniotis, 2007, Price et al, 
2011; Samaha et al., 2012) or based on questionnaire-based surveys (e.g. 
Balasubramanian et al., 2008; Black et al., 2006; Toudas and Karathansis, 2007; 
Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004). These indices were usually developed based on 
fewer CG items and focused on certain dimensions such as board of directors, 
disclosure and transparency, and shareholder rights (Bozec and Bozec, 2012). In 
addition, most prior studies employed un-weighted dichotomous index and used 
the binary system (1 or 0) to objectively measure the CG quality. However, this 
approach has been criticised in that the researcher is vulnerable to judgemental 
errors and bias (i.e. judgemental and selection bias) (Florou and Galarniotis, 2007).  
 
In conclusion, this thesis follows a researcher-constructed CG index approach for 
three reasons. First, there is a clear lack of consistency between ready-made 
indices, for example, scoring methodologies sometimes are treated as 
“confidential property” (Balling et al., 2006); missing or unavailable CG data is a 
common occurrence, and companies may get involved in with these rating 
agencies and request an “upgrade” (Daily and Dalton, 2004). Second, the relative 
importance of CG dimensions would be different across different industries, 
companies, periods and countries (Donker and Zahir, 2008). Contrary to the “one 
size fits all” approach to CG, the researcher believes that each country is unique in 
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its legal framework, corporate ownership structure, and the financial system 
which determine its CG system (Balling et al., 2006; Davies and Schlitzer, 2008). 
Third, subjectivity of the CG rating agencies may account for bias (Zheka, 2006). 
Therefore, a corporate governance index (CGI) is constructed in order to assess 
the quality of CG practices of listed UK firms; this index reflects the requirements 
and recommendations of the UK Combined Code (2003). The next section 
presents the process of developing CG index that is used in this thesis.   
 
2.4 Crafting the UK Corporate Governance Index  
Unlike subjective analysts’ rankings, which are based on their perceptions of CG 
quality, this thesis develops a CG index based on actual disclosures in the firms’ 
annual reports. The annual reports are well thought-out to be a common 
communication means by which companies disclose their CG information (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001). Therefore, the annual reports are considered a vital source of 
information to large shareholders when making their investment decisions. 
Although there are various channels of communication, such as company website 
and press releases, the use of company annual reports is widely accepted to 
measure CG (see for example;  Black et al. 2012; Hellman, 2005). In this context, 
prior studies indicated that written company information, including the annual 
reports, is the highest-ranked communication channel that institutional investors 
used (Hellman, 2005). In the same spirit, this thesis has also constructed its own 
CG index to assess the quality of CG among listed UK firms based mainly on the 
information provided about CG in companies’ annual reports. The crafted CG 
index is constructed based on the recommendations of the UK Combined Code 
Chapter 2: Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom  
 
31 
(2003) as an international benchmark. The process to construct the CG index was 
carried out in two stages. The first stage involved choosing the initial CG items, 
categorising these items and then modifying the index in accordance with the 
recommendations of the UK Combined Code (2003). The second stage was 
designed to score and weight CG items and then calculates the composite CG 
index. The rigorous process of developing the CG index is explained in the next 
sub-sections. 
 
2.4.1 Selection of CG items  
The key step in constructing the CG index is determining the governance 
attributes which form the basis to measure CG quality. During this stage, a careful 
review of the recommendations of the UK Combined Code (2003) and previous 
literature discussed in Section 2.3 enables the selection of CG items and then 
designing a preliminary CG composite index. In general, CG indexes have some 
common categories including board responsibilities, board structure and 
independence (e.g. Black et al. 2012; Black et al., 2003, Florou and Galarniotis, 
2007, Klapper and Love, 2002, and Cornelius, 2005), accountability (e.g. Black et 
al. 2012; Klapper and Love, 2002; Price et al, 2011), and shareholders rights 
(Ananchotikul 2008, Gompers et al., 2003; Price et al, 2011). These CG 
provisions are considered to be very important for the proper functioning of a 
firm. Therefore, for the construction of CG index used in this thesis, the 
researcher tries to consider most of these attribute that are at the same time 
consistent with the UK Combined Code (2003).  
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Pre-testing a research instrument (i.e. CG index) is a significant step in ensuring 
its reliability and validity (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Hussey and Hessey 1997). 
To check the appropriateness of the CG index for measuring CG, the initial index 
was sent to five academics having a PhD to refine the index and identify any gaps 
or inconsistencies. This checking process helped to modify the CG items in the 
index. Another strategy for giving constructive criticism and suggestions were 
provided at several academic conferences and workshops which significantly 
improved content validity of the CG index (Churchill and lacobucci, 2009). After 
several adjustments, the revised index was suitable to act as a benchmark for the 
UK listed companies. The product of this stage is the final CG composite index 
which consists of 26 items distributed across the following three sub-indices in the 
following order: 
Board composition and independence index (BCII) (5 items). This sub-index 
covers items related to board structure and independence. Board independence is 
considered a core element of CG (Dahya et al., 2008); therefore, this sub-index 
covers the issue of the independence of the board and the separation of the roles of 
CEO and Chairman (In the UK, these roles should be split). This separation gives 
a good indicator that there is a division of the powers in the board, and, 
consequently, it indicates more independence. In addition, it considers board size 
as the board should be of satisfactory; it is argued that larger boards can be less 
effective than small boards (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Also, Lasfer (2006), 
among others, suggested that larger UK boards cannot monitor or control the 
agency problem as well as smaller boards.  
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Board practice and process index (BPPI) (13 items). This sub-index focuses on 
board practices and process. We assess whether the board meets regularly. 
Frequent board meetings allow for better communication between management 
and directors; therefore, it is preferred to have frequent board meetings. A 
previous study by Brick and Chidambaram (2007) found a positive association 
between board meetings and firm value, implying that an increase in board 
meeting gives an indicator to the rise in the level of monitoring by the board. This 
is consistent with the argument of Vafeas (1999) that board meetings’ frequency 
can be used as a proxy for strategic control. The UK combined code states that 
“The board should meet sufficiently regularly to discharge its duties effectively” 
(provision A.1.1). In addition, in this sub-index, we assess whether the company 
has two key committees: the nomination and remuneration committees. According 
to the combined code “There should be a nomination committee which should 
lead the process for board appointments and make recommendations to the 
board” (provision A.4.1). The code also indicates that the “The board should 
establish a remuneration committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller 
companies two, members who should all be independent non-executive 
directors”(provision B.2.1).  Moreover, this sub-index assesses other practices 
related to the formal induction process and the election of directors.  
 
Accountability and audit index (AAI) (8 items). As the board is accountable to 
shareholders, this sub-index covers the accountability and audit issue. Having an 
audit committee is one of the requirements of the UK combined code “The board 
should establish an audit committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller 
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companies, two members, who should all be independent non-executive directors” 
(provision C.3.1). Therefore, we assess the presence of audit committee and the 
independence of its members; the UK combined code (2003) also promotes audit 
committee members’ independence. Furthermore, this sub-index considers other 
issues related to the financial experience of the audit committee members, the 
review of the internal control system and others. Appendix (1) provides more 
detailed information about the UK CG index and its component sub-indices which 
has been designed to measure the composite CG score. After selecting the CG 
items, the next stage is scoring these items. 
 
2.4.2 Scoring CG index  
There are two widely used approaches to scoring the CG items: weighted and un-
weighted approach. The weighted index tends to apply weighted score to each 
item based on its importance. In this context, Balling et al. (2006) argued that 
using a weighted score has been criticised because it may introduce a bias towards 
a particular user orientation although the items may refer to more than one user. 
Due to the criticisms of the weighted approach, many prior studies use the un-
weighted approach in which all CG items in the index are considered to be of 
equal weight (see for example; Black et al. 2014; Black et al. 2012; Price et al, 
2011). According to this approach, each of the CG items is scored using binary 
system in which each item is scored as “1” for the presence of the measured 
criteria in the firm, and “0” otherwise. This thesis adopted the equally weighted 
index in order to avoid the subjective judgement of assigning weights to the CG 
items. This approach may not reflect accurately the relative importance of 
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governance elements; but it has the advantage of being transparent and at the same 
time it is quite objective (Florou and Galarniotis, 2007). 
 
2.4.3 Measuring CG index 
Each CG sub-index was computed by adding all actual scores obtained and then 
dividing this sum by the maximum possible scores for each company. Hence, each 
CG sub-index can range in value from 0 to 1. Moreover, the total corporate 
governance scores (CG_SCORE) for each company is defined as a sum of all sub-
indices scores divided by 3 (the number of sub-indices). Since each sub-index 
effectively runs from 0 to 1, this produces equal weights for the sub-indices. After 
measuring the CG indices, all CG scores had been tested both manually and 
statistically to guarantee their reliability and validity, this issue will be discussed 
in the next sub-section. 
 
2.4.4 Assessment of Validity and Reliability of CG Index 
This thesis constructs a CG index to measure the quality of CG. Therefore, it is 
critical to ensure that the CG index does indeed measure what it is aiming to 
measure (i.e. validity) and it will do this in a consistent manner (i.e. reliability) 
(Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). In the same vein, Hair et al. (2007) mentioned that 
validity is related to accuracy, while reliability is related to consistency. 
Therefore, it is vital to assess the validity of the index, especially when using a 
newly constructed measuring instrument (i.e. CG index). Validity is defined as 
“whether an instrument actually measures what it sets out to measure” (Field, 
2009: 11). In this context, Saunders et al., (2012) suggested three methods for 
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assessing validity: (1) face validity, (2) content validity and (3) construct validity. 
First, face validity aims to ensure that the measure appears, on the face of it, to 
measure the concept which is intended to measure (Saunders et al., 2012). Face 
validity can be achieved by asking a colleague or an expert to confirm that the 
index measures what the researcher intends to measure. The face validity of the 
CG index is supported through the pre-testing as discussed earlier in this chapter 
(see Section 2.4.1). Second, content validity aims to “ensure that the measure 
includes an adequate and representative set of items that tap the concept” 
(Sekaran and Bougie, 2010: 206). In addition, Saunders et al. (2012) referred to 
content validity as the sufficient items being included in the measurement tool. 
Content validity of the CG index can be achieved by the careful definition of the 
research phenomena through literature review of CG and also by using a panel of 
professional judges to judge which items are to be included in the measurement 
(Vaus, 2002). In the current study, the initial CG index was pre-tested with five 
academics to check whether the CG items in the index adequately measure the 
level of CG (content validity). The results of pre-test method showed that the CG 
index captures adequate and representative set of dimensions to assess good CG. 
Finally, construct validity “ensures that the results obtained from the use of a 
measure are consistent with the theories in which the test is designed” (Sekaran 
and Bougie, 2010: 207). The assessment of construct validity requires the 
examination of the correlation between the total CG index and its component sub-
indices (see for example; Black et al. 2012; Hassan, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012). In 
the current study, Table (2.1) shows Pearson correlation coefficients between total 
CG index and its sub-indices. The Pearson correlation between CG_SCORE and 
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its sub-indices (BCII, BPPI, and AAI) is positively significant, with correlation 
coefficients from 0.6741 to 0.5844., at the 0.0001 level. Moreover, the inter-sub-
indices correlation is positively significant but relatively low which means that co-
linearity between sub-indices is limited. 
Notes: CG_ SCORE: Corporate Governance Index; BCII: Board Composition and 
Independence Index; BPPI: Board Practices and Process Index; AAI: Accountability and Audit 
Index. ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
 
After checking the validity of the research instrument, it is important also to 
assess its reliability. According to Field (2009: 268) reliability is defined as 
“whether an instrument can be interpreted consistently across different 
situations”. In the same vein, Sekaran and Bougie (2010:203) described reliability 
as a signal of both the stability (i.e. the ability of the measure to remain the same 
over time) and consistency (i.e. the homogeneity of the index items as one set in 
measuring a concept) of measuring the concept by the research instrument. 
Reliability can be achieved through different methods such as test-retest reliability 
and the internal consistency method (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Sekaran and 
Bougie, 2010). In the current study, test-retest reliability method was applied to 
determine the reliability of a measurement by repeating the scoring process and 
comparing the results. In this study, I calculated CG score for all annual reports at 
one time and after a short period of time, samples of these reports are scored 
Table (2.1): Pearson’s Correlations between CG Index and its sub-indices 
Variables CG_ SCORE BCII BPPI AAI 
CG _SCORE 1.0000    
BCII 0.6741*** 1.0000   
BPPI 0.5621*** 0.1885*** 1.0000  
AAI 0.5844*** 0.1650*** 0.2055*** 1.0000 
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again. The resulting scores yielded from the second time phase match exactly with 
those arrived at the first time round. To improve the reliability of CG scores, the 
scoring process for 10 randomly selected companies from the sample was done by 
three academics and it reproduced the same results suggesting that CG index is 
reliable (Saunders et al., 2012). 
 
Moreover, the internal consistency method measures the reliability of a test in 
terms of its internal consistency either across all items or across subgroups of 
items from the index. Litwin (1995: 21) defined the internal consistency method 
as “an indicator of how well the different items measure the same issue. This is 
important because a group of items that purports to measure one variable should 
indeed be clearly focused on that variable”. Cronbach's alpha is widely used to 
assess internal consistency reliability (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Alpha 
coefficient ranges in value from 0 to 1. The higher the correlation coefficient (0.70 
or over) is, the more reliable the research instrument (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). 
In the current study, the Cronbach’s alpha for CG_SCORE and its sub-indices 
(BCII, BPPI, and AAI) are 0.733, 0.815 and 0.786, respectively indicating that 
internal consistency between the three CG sub-indices is high. We conclude that 
the crafted CG index is reliable. 
 
2.5 Summary  
This chapter highlighted the development of UK corporate governance where the 
empirical work took place. The chapter also describes the process of constructing 
CG index used in this thesis. In addition, this thesis measures the quality of CG 
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based upon a self-constructed index. An equally weighted CG index and 
dichotomous approach are used in addition to the reliability and validity tests, to 
try to minimise the subjective view of the current study.  The next chapter 
presents the first essay of this thesis. 
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Appendices 
Appendix (1): UK Corporate Governance Index  
This table presents the 26 CG items that are classified into the three CG sub-indices 
used to construct the CG index in this thesis. Each of the CG items is scored using 
binary system in which each item is scored as “1” for the presence of the measured 
criteria in the firm, and “0” otherwise 
 
CG sub-
indices 
CG items Provisions of 
the Combined 
Code (2003) 
Decision 
Rule 
1 = YES, 
0 = No 
Board 
Composition 
and 
Independence 
Index (BCII) 
1. The chairman and chief executive 
officer roles should be separated. 
A.2.1 1/0 
 
2. The chairman should be independent 
on appointment. 
A.2.2 1/0 
 
3. At least half the board should consist 
of independent non-executive directors 
excluding the chairman. 
A.3.2 1/0 
 
4. There should be an adequate board 
size1. 
supporting 
principle 
1/0 
5.  There should be a senior independent 
director appointed in the board. 
 
A.3.3 1/0 
 
Board 
Practices and 
Processes 
Index (BPPI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. There should be regular board 
meetings2. 
A.1.1 1/0 
7. The chairman should meet with the 
non-executive directors without the 
presence of the executives. 
A.1.3 1/0 
 
8. The company should have a 
nomination committee. 
A.4.1 1/0 
9. The independent non-executive 
directors should be the majority in the 
nomination committee. 
A.4.1 1/0 
 
10. An independent non-executive director 
or the chairman should chair the 
nomination committee.  
A.4.1 1/0 
 
11. All directors should have access to the 
company secretary’s services and 
advice.  
A.5.3 1/0 
 
12. All new directors joining the board 
should be given a full, official and 
tailored induction.  
 
A.5.1 1/0 
 
                                                     
1  This item will be measured by calculating the average board size of all companies and 
considering this average as a benchmark. The company will be given a score of 1 if the board size 
is equal to or less than this average; otherwise, the score will be 0 
2 This item will be measured by calculating the average number of board meetings for all of the 
companies and considering this average as a benchmark. The company will be given a score of 1 if 
the number of board meetings is equal to or more than this average; otherwise, the score will be 0. 
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13. At the company’s expense the non-
executive directors should access to an 
independent professional advice.  
A.5.2 1/0 
 
14. There should be re-election of all 
directors at regular intervals. 
A.7.1 1/0 
 
 
15. There should be an insurance cover for 
legal action against directors. 
A.1.5 1/0 
 
16. The company should have a 
remuneration committee. 
B.2.1 1/0 
 
17. All the remuneration committee 
members should be independent non-
executive directors. 
B.2.1 1/0 
 
18.  There should be no share options 
included in the remuneration for non-
executive directors.  
B.1.3 1/0 
 
Accountabilit
y and Audit 
Index (AAI) 
19. The company should have an audit 
committee. 
C.3.1 
 
1/0 
20. All the audit committee members 
should be independent non-executive 
directors. 
 C.3.1 1/0 
 
21. The audit committee should include at 
least one member with financial 
expertise. 
C.3.1 1/0 
 
22. A review of the internal control 
system’s efficacy should be done at 
least annually by the board. 
C.2.1 1/0 
 
23. There should be a board statement on 
the going-concern status of the firm.  
C.1.2 1/0 
 
24. At the AGM, all directors should 
attend, and the Chairmen of the 
nomination, remuneration, and audit 
committees should be available to 
answer questions. 
D.2.3 
 
 
 
1/0 
 
 
 
25. There should be a disclosure in the 
annual reports regarding the steps 
taken to make sure that board members 
have developed an understanding of 
major shareholders’ views.  
D.1.2 1/0 
26. Shareholders should receive the AGM 
notice and other related papers at least 
20 working days before the meeting. 
 
D.2.4 1/0 
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Chapter Three: Essay One  
How Corporate Governance Affects Investment Decisions 
of Block Shareholders in UK Listed Companies: Has the 
Recent Financial Crisis Changed the Game? 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the influence of Corporate Governance (CG) on block 
shareholdings of a sample of UK non-financial listed companies, from 2005 to 
2009. It also looks at whether this relationship has changed during the recent 
financial crisis.  The findings from panel data regressions show that, for the whole 
period, there is a significant positive relationship among CG and total block 
shareholdings, and it also indicates that board composition and independence is 
the only CG sub index that affects total block shareholders’ investment decisions.  
Moreover, the results show that institutional investors pay more attention to CG 
matters as an important part of investment decisions. The results also indicate that 
there is no significant relation between CG and block shareholdings of 
management and directors. When testing this relation in the period preceding and 
during the crisis, the results reveal that the insignificant results of the impacts of 
CG score in the period prior to crisis became significant during the financial crisis 
period, thereby indicating that block shareholders view CG as particularly 
important during the crisis period. The findings suggest that firms need to sustain 
CG mainly board independence to enlarge its shareholder base and raise new 
capital. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, block shareholders, investment decisions, 
2007/2008 global financial crisis. 
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3.1  Introduction  
“Our investment group would never approve an investment in a 
company   with bad corporate governance” (McKinsey and 
Company, 2002: 4) 
 
Block shareholders play an important role in Corporate Governance (CG). Under 
the agency theory, ownership concentration is one of the control mechanisms that 
are used to solve the agency problems by aligning the interest between managers 
and shareholders. Theoretically, with the increase in ownership concentration, 
monitoring is expected to become more effective; block shareholders have the 
incentive and ability to monitor management and mitigate agency conflict and 
their large holdings are expected to alleviate the free-rider problem related to 
dispersed ownership (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  Through their large stake in the 
company, it is cost-effective for block shareholders to monitor management; 
return would be sufficient to cover their monitoring costs (Conyon and Florou, 
2002). Therefore, the presence of block shareholders and the size of their holdings 
is a common explanatory variable in CG research. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 
(2009) found statistically significant effects of block shareholders in investment, 
financial, and executive compensation policies. In the same vein, prior literature 
gave more attention to the effect of block shareholders, specifically institutional 
investors, on firm value and other performance measures (see for example; 
Nguyen et al., 2013; Thomsen et al., 2006). Institutional investors can influence 
firms to implement good CG, either by using their voting rights or by voting with 
their feet (Aggarwal et al., 2010).  In the financial markets, institutional investors 
are very important and are considered key group as buyers, holders and sellers of 
securities as they can use their power to influence financial markets (Al-Najjar, 
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2010). Therefore, institutional block shareholders such as mutual and pension 
funds are well thought-out as an important players in the majority of financial 
markets, they are holding an increasing number of shares, and they are the largest 
shareholders of most publicly traded firms in western countries.  In the United 
States and the United Kingdom, institutional investors have grown to be the main 
ownership group (Monks and Minow, 2004). For example, institutional investors 
control about 60 per cent of the outstanding shares of common stocks in the 
United States (Hayashi, 2003).  In addition, in UK equity market institutional 
investors controlled about 80 per cent (Mallin et al., 2005).  
 
In the same vein, many studies have explored the investment preferences of 
institutional investors. Starks (2009) found that institutional investors are 
interested, in particular, in firm’s CG. In addition, the study by McKinsey and 
Company (2002), examined the preferences of institutional investors from 
different countries; the findings from that wide survey, which covered 31 different 
countries, revealed that institutional investors considered CG to be at the same 
level of importance as other financial indicators for their investment decisions. A 
similar survey conducted by McCahery et al. (2010) found CG to be important for 
investment decisions for institutional investors. Furthermore, Khanna and Zyla 
(2010), in their study of investors in emerging market, provided clear evidence 
that CG is also important for their investment decisions. However, there is limited 
prior research examining the preferences of block shareholders for CG; previous 
studies gave attention only to block shareholders by institutional investors 
(Khurshed et al., 2011).   Moreover, argument on the need for good CG has 
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reignited due to the 2007/2008 financial crisis (Francis et al., 2012; Walker 
Review, 2009). This study, consequently, investigates an important policy 
question of whether firm-level CG affects investment decisions of block 
shareholders with particular focus on the period preceding, and during the 
financial crisis. Specifically, the study uses a unique corporate setting in UK, 
where the emphasis is on encouraging CG rather than imposing extensive 
mandatory requirements. These gaps in the literature form part of the motivation 
for this study. The researcher argues that the current empirical study is a more 
direct and objective test than asking survey respondents their opinions on the 
importance of CG. In addition, the scope of the study is extended to different 
types of block shareholders, rather than just the institutional investors and covers 
the time period across the recent financial crisis. Since most of the previous 
empirical studies have looked at the non-crisis period, the findings of this study 
would provide additional insights. 
 
The main objective of this paper is to study the impacts of CG mechanisms on the 
investment decisions made by block shareholders. Four specific questions are 
raised: 
- Does CG affect overall block shareholders’ investment decisions?  
- Which particular aspects of CG are more important in affecting their 
investment decisions? 
- Do different types of block shareholders react differently to CG level? 
- Have the recent financial crises changed the relationship between CG and 
block shareholders’ investment decisions? 
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This paper examines the effect of CG on the investment decisions made by block 
shareholders; it focused on a sample of UK FTSE-350 non-financial companies.  
The empirical analysis was conducted for the whole period (2005–2009) for 695 
firm-year observations.  The results of panel regression indicate a significant 
positive relationship between overall CG and total block shareholdings. When 
classifying block shareholdings into different types, it is found that CG affects 
only institutional block shareholdings. The findings of the relationship between 
CG-sub categories and block shareholdings provide strong evidence that firms 
with better Board Composition and Independence Index (BCII) attract more block 
shareholders. In addition, the results point that those different categories of block 
shareholders have heterogonous preferences for different CG provisions. Finally, 
the results show that the financial crisis has significantly changed block 
shareholders’ investment preferences as the relationship between CG and block 
shareholdings has changed during the financial crisis period. This suggests that 
improvements to CG, especially in the BCII aspect, attract more block 
shareholders. Overall, the results support regulatory initiatives aimed at improving 
CG quality. 
 
This study extends and contributes to previous studies in a number of ways. First, 
this paper seeks to specifically examine the role of CG in attracting block 
shareholders not only institutional investors. Unlike the previous studies that have 
narrowly investigated institutional investors only, this paper provides evidence 
regarding a wider range of different types of block shareholders. It complements 
in particular the study by Gompers and Metrick (2001) in the U.S. that examined 
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the effect of firm characteristics on attracting institutional investment, and also the 
study by Ferreira and Matos (2008) that revealed that, in low investor protection 
countries, institutional shareholders prefer to invest in companies with good CG 
practices. Second, in contrast to most previous studies in which CG variables had 
been experienced in isolation, this paper examines the impact of CG using a 
composite measure of twenty-six dimensions and three sub-indices of CG. Third, 
unlike existing studies, this paper focuses on a less regulated environment of the 
UK compared with U.S., where UK regulations emphasise on encouraging CG 
rather than imposing extensive mandatory requirements. Finally, the paper is 
distinguished from prior literature by examining the preferences of block 
shareholders for CG for an interesting period (i.e., from 2005 to 2009), and it 
sheds important empirical insights on CG and preferences of block shareholders in 
both periods before and during the financial crisis. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief 
discussion about ownership structure in the UK. This is then followed, in 3.3, by a 
discussion of the important of block shareholders.  Section 3.4 discusses literature 
review on the relationship between CG and ownership structure and hypotheses 
development.  Section 3.5 deals with the sampling and the empirical model used 
in this paper. Section 3.6 focuses on data analysis and the empirical results. 
Finally, section 3.7 covers the summary and conclusions of the study. 
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3.2   Corporate Ownership Structure in the UK 
The UK can be described as having a well-developed market which is 
characterised with a diverse of shareholders. Mallin (2013) indicated that the legal 
system affects the ownership structure; in UK, the common law system enforces 
the protection of minority shareholders, and this results in more companies with 
diversified shareholders. The UK is generally described as a system of dispersed 
share ownership; in over 85 per cent of listed firms, it is rare to find shareholders 
holding more than 25 per cent, or more, of voting rights (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003).  However the pattern of ownership in UK had changed in the last few 
decades; for example, in 1963, the proportion of shares held by individuals was 54 
per cent, and it had fallen to 10.7 per cent in 2012. Moreover, there was a growing 
ownership concentration by institutional investors; the proportion of the UK 
equity market owned by institutional investors had increased from 42.4% in 1963 
to 84.7% in 2004, and then to 70.1 % in 2012 (ONS, 2012); it is held mainly by 
unit trust 9.6 per cent, insurance companies 6.2 %, pension funds 4.7 % (ONS, 
2012). At the same time, an increase in the overseas ownership level has been 
noticed; it increased from 7 % in 1963 to 53.2 % in 2012; and many of them are 
US investors and European Union countries (ONS, 2012). Table (3.1) provides an 
illustration of the main categories of ownership in the UK in different times; 1963 
- 2012. 
 
From reviewing the development of corporate ownership in UK, it is clear that 
there is an increase in the institutionalisation of share ownership (Amour et al., 
2003).  These institutional investors are more likely to become locked in to the 
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market and to the individual firms in which they hold stakes. This in turn would 
result in low turnover of UK institutional investors which would encourage other 
institutional investors not to sell their shares in firms with poor performance and 
instead to engage more with portfolio companies to enhance firm performance 
(Clark and Hebb, 2004). 
 
Table (3.1): Main Categories of Ownership in the UK 1963-2012 
(percentage of total equity owned) 
 
Type of investor 1963 2004 2008 2010 2012 
Individuals  54.0 14.1 10.2 10.2 10.7 
Insurance companies 10.0 17.2 13.4 8.8 6.2 
Pensions funds 6.4 15.7 12.8 5.6 4.7 
Unit trust  1.3 1.4 1.8 8.8 9.6 
Investment trusts  - 2.5 1.9 2.1 1.8 
Banks 1.3 2.7 3.5 2.5 1.9 
Other financial institutions 11.3 8.2 10.0 12.3 6.6 
Charities, churches, etc. 2.1 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.6 
Private non-financial 
companies 
5.1 0.6 3.0 2.3 2.3 
Public sector 1.5 0.1 1.1 3.1 2.5 
Rest of the world 7.0 36.3 41.5 43.4 53.2 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 
Source: ONS Share Ownership (2012)      
 
More encouragement is provided to institutional investors in order to be more 
active in the governance of their portfolio companies (Mallin et al., 2005; Myners, 
2001). For example, the combined code 2003 section (2) puts forward some 
principles to institutional investors: “institutional shareholders should enter into a 
dialogue with companies based on the mutual understanding of objectives 
(Combined Code 2003, E.1)” and to “consider use of their votes (Combined Code, 
E.3)”. Furthermore, there is a significant trend in UK on the increasing 
collaboration between institutional investors aiming at developing CG and CSR 
standards (Aguilera et al., 2006). To sum up, there is a transformation in UK 
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ownership structure into ownership concentration; there is an increase in 
ownership concentration in the hand of small number of large institutions. These 
block ownerships, through their major position, can monitor management and 
align the interest between managers and shareholders; therefore, they are seen as 
important in reducing the agency conflict (Solomon, 2009).   
 
Therefore, the focus of this paper is on how companies can attract these block 
shareholders investments. This issue is arguably neglected in the literature; how to 
encourage these institutions and other block shareholders to increase their holding 
as a means to solve the agency problem, and, to be more specific, does CG play an 
important role in affecting the allocation of these block shareholders’ investment?  
Therefore, the total block shareholdings would be considered in this paper as well 
as different types of block shareholdings; with the aim of examining whether CG 
attracts these block shareholdings investments. Thus, at the centre of this 
investigation is the issue of whether aggregate block shareholders and different 
types of block shareholders are attracted by firms with good CG. 
 
3.3  The Role of Block Shareholders in CG 
A fundamental problem in CG arises from the trading off the cost and benefit of 
block shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Therefore, in the discussion of 
the role of block shareholders, it is important to discuss it from the perspective of 
both the benefits and the potential costs arising from the presence of block 
shareholders. First, the benefits of block shareholders in both the theoretical and 
empirical literature can be explained in terms of the “efficient-monitoring” 
Chapter 3: Paper one - How Corporate Governance Affects Investment Decisions of Block Shareholders 
in UK Listed Companies: Has the Recent Financial Crisis Changed the Game? 
 
52 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis block shareholders have the potential to 
reduce the agency problem, and improve corporate performance (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). Block shareholders have strong incentives and power to monitor 
management at a lower cost. On the other hand, the potential costs arise from the 
potential difference of interest among both minority shareholders and block 
shareholders (the expropriation-of-minority-shareholders hypothesis); as 
ownership concentration may lead to the extraction of the firms resources by 
block shareholders at the expense of other shareholders (Bebchuk, 1999).  If there 
are different preferences among Block shareholders and minority shareholders, 
the former can force their preferences at the expense of the latter. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997: 758) argued that “Large investors may represent their own 
interests, which need not coincide with the interests of other investors in the firm, 
or with the interests of employees and managers”. This means that there are two 
factors that motivate block- shareholders: the shared benefit of control and the 
private benefit.  The literature is divided regarding the question whether block 
shareholders are rather beneficial or detrimental to the interests of minority 
shareholders (Becker et al., 2011); therefore, block shareholdings are seen in the 
literature as a mixed blessing (Gutierrez et al., 2012). The focus of this paper is 
driven by how to attract block shareholders in order to get the most benefit out of 
their monitoring roles;  on the other hand, the private benefits of block 
shareholders is beyond the focus of this study. However, the literature identified 
that this private benefit of block shareholders can be mitigated when there are 
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strong legal protections and high law enforcement that provides higher protection 
for minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1997). 
 
While the literature has gone far in showing the importance of block shareholders 
and their effect, a much lesser part of the literature has considered the preferences 
of these shareholders in general (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Coombes and Watson, 
2000) and more specifically their preferences for CG (Khurshed et al., 2011).  
Consequently, this paper contributes to prior studies by directly studying block-
shareholders’ investment preferences. Furthermore, since Block shareholders have 
heterogeneous beliefs, skills, and preferences (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009), 
this paper also focuses on identifying the preferences of different types of block 
shareholders to CG. Gaining a better understanding of block shareholders 
preferences would help firms increase their shareholding base. 
 
3.4  Hypotheses Development 
This section briefly explains the definitions and unique aspects of agency theory 
that is adopted in order to explain how CG could affect the preferences of block 
shareholders. It provides justifications for the adoption of agency theory as the 
theoretical framework that forms the backbone of this paper.  
Agency theory is mainly concerned with the various problems between 
shareholders and management. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) model the role of 
block shareholders as a partial solution of the agency conflict. Under agency 
theory, block shareholders serve as a partial solution to the free rider problem and, 
as such, should reduce agency costs and improve firm value.  These block 
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shareholders aim at maximising the value of their stocks, therefore CG 
mechanisms have been established to ensure that; therefore, investors prefer 
companies with good CG as it provides them with evidence of good performance 
(Chalevas, 2011). Therefore with good CG shareholders’ interests can be 
protected; La Porta et al. (2000) indicated that potential shareholders view CG as 
a set of mechanisms for the protection of the company. In addition, firms with 
poor governance structures are more likely to expropriate outside investors 
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Consequently, block shareholders prefer to allocate 
their investments to firms with better CG for a number of reasons. The first is that 
firms with better governance show signs of better operating performance and 
better firm value, and less unproductive corporate investment. The second reason 
is to avoid costly monitoring activities. Institutional investors as block 
shareholders often hold large portfolios, which entail high monitoring costs; 
therefore, investing in firms with better CG and higher quality disclosure (with 
strong internal monitoring mechanisms) replaces the need for costly monitoring 
activities (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Bushee et al., 2010). The third reason is that 
block shareholders prefer to invest in firms with better CG because it is easier to 
meet fiduciary responsibilities. Del Guerico (1996) showed that institutional 
investors allocate their portfolios to firms that are more likely to be viewed as 
prudent investments (with better CG) with a lower probability of negative 
outcomes resulting from managerial fraud or negligence. On the other hand, if 
institutional investors put their investments in poorly governed firms, they face a 
greater risk of not earning fair rates of return (Chung and Zhang, 2011). The 
fourth reason for investment in firms with good CG is that firms with better 
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governance would also show signs of higher stock market liquidity and lower 
trading costs. The final reason, for block institutional investors, political 
motivation creates incentives for them to give more attention for CG mechanisms 
(Smith, 1996).  
 
The agency theory does not differentiate between the types of block shareholders. 
However, many studies have recently acknowledged that the identities of these 
shareholders have different implications for firms because of their differing 
objectives (Tihanyi et al., 2003; Tribo et al., 2007).  Consequently, in this paper, 
the aim is not only to focus on the preferences of block shareholders, but also to 
examine whether these preferences toward CG vary with the different types of 
block shareholders. Therefore, to address heterogeneity across block shareholders, 
block shareholders are initially classify into different types as will be explained 
later.   
 
3.4.1  Block Shareholders’ Preferences and Total CG 
There are two main streams of research to consider when examining the 
relationship between CG and ownership structure. The first stream concerns 
ownership structure effect on CG (the effectiveness of large shareholders in CG); 
ownership by large shareholders is a major approach to CG throughout most of 
the world (Hope, 2013).  From the perspective of CG, block ownership is very 
important because, by holding large percentage block, shareholders would be 
more motivated to monitor (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Therefore, an extensive 
research had been devoted to the important monitoring role of block shareholders 
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(Cornett et al., 2007). Block shareholders had become active in CG; they had 
become more eager to force management to achieve shareholders’ interests by 
using their ownership rights (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). For example, the study 
by Aggarwal et al. (2010) indicated that changes in institutional investment affect 
subsequent changes in CG. Hartzell and Starks (2003) also indicated that 
ownership concentration by institutional investors leads to improvements in the 
compensation practice. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) showed that the 
existence of block shareholders on the board would result in more control of 
executive compensation. In the same vein, Dong and Ozkan (2008) revealed that 
dedicated institutional investors control the level of compensation and, at the same 
time, strengthen the pay-performance link.  
 
The second stream of research addresses shareholders’ preferences in terms of 
CG. There is not, however, much research about this, either on the macro or micro 
level. Li et al. (2006) conducted a study that involved the macro level; in their 
study, they made a comparison of the patterns of block shareholders in different 
countries. Their results revealed that their variations depended on macro CG 
aspects; these aspects include disclosure requirements, law enforcement, and the 
level of shareholders protection. Aggarwal et al. (2005) reached similar results; 
their findings showed that U.S. mutual funds put more investment into countries 
that have good legal frameworks, higher shareholder rights, and better accounting 
standards. Kim et al. (2011) looked at a newer issue, examining whether CG in 
investors’ home countries influence their patterns of international investment in 
emerging markets, such as Korea. Their results indicated that investors from low-
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disparity countries do not prefer high-disparity stocks in Korea; investors from 
high-disparity countries are indifferent. 
Other studies have focused on the micro level, for example the study of Chung 
and Zhang (2011) which showed that the proportion of institutions that hold a 
firm’s shares increases with its governance quality. They also indicated that these 
institutions are attracted to firms with good CG, in order to meet their fiduciary 
responsibility as well as to minimise monitoring and exit costs. Bae and Goyal 
(2010) revealed that firms with better governance attracted more foreign 
ownership than poorly governed firms. Bokpin and Isshaq (2009) arrived at the 
same conclusion, indicating that foreign investors consider CG and disclosure 
practices in making their investment decisions in Ghana. Leuz et al. (2005) 
examined the preferences of institutional investors from a sample of both 
emerging and developed countries and showed that investors invest less into firms 
that are poorly governed. However, the study of Matsumoto and Uchida (2010) 
focused on Japan as a developed country and their results showed that both small 
boards and stock option adoptions increased the percentage of ownership by non-
Japanese investors. Kim et al. (2010) also showed that improvements on CG 
attract more foreign investments and that domestic investors tend to care less 
about CG than their foreign counterparts.  
 
Other studies examined also on the micro level which factors are more attractive 
to investors. Among these studies is that of Wei and Xiao (2009), which focused 
on the preferences that large shareholders in China have, concerning cash or stock 
dividends. Their results revealed that large investors generally prefer cash 
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dividends over stock dividends by non-publicly tradable shares (NPTS). The 
study by Al-Najjar (2010) focused on Jordan as an emerging market and showed 
that institutional investors consider many factors in their investment decisions; 
these includes, for example, capital structure,  liquidity, profitability, growth rates. 
Cox et al. (2004) conducted a study into the UK as a developed country, showing 
that long-term investors consider social performance as a criteria in their 
investment decision making; they may exclude companies with low level of social 
performance because it might cause them to face more risk which in turn would 
affect their financial performance in the long run. 
 
Therefore, these above mentioned studies indicate that block shareholders prefer 
investing in countries with high accounting disclosures and better shareholders 
rights while, viewed at the level of firms, they prefer mainly large ones that pay 
dividends and have better CG quality. Most of these studies focus more heavily on 
institutional investors, paying less attention to other types of block shareholders. 
Furthermore, most of these studies have been done on emerging economies rather 
than developed countries, which raise the question about whether CG quality 
matters in developed countries that have good shareholder protection. The current 
study, therefore, sheds light on the different types of block shareholders and their 
preferences in terms of CG, through examining the UK as a developed country 
with considerable shareholder protections and rights.  
 
Based on the studies by Chung and Zhang (2011) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) 
that revealed a positive association between the proportion of a firm’s shares 
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institutional investors held and its governance quality, we also hypothesise a 
positive relationship between the block shareholders and CG. According to 
agency theory, companies with better CG have lower agency cost, generate higher 
return, and perform better (Henry, 2010; Klapper and Love, 2004). Therefore, 
investors have strong incentives to put their investments in good CG companies; 
hence, the following hypothesis is examined: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between CG and the level of block 
shareholdings. 
 
3.4.2  Block Shareholders’ Preferences and CG Sub-Indices 
CG provisions do not have the same effect in attracting investors; Chung and 
Zhang (2011) showed that institutional investors were attracted only to two CG 
aspects: one is related to strengthening shareholder rights, and the other is related 
to the composition/operation of the board of directors. This shows that there are 
differences in the impact of CG provisions; this means that of all CG provisions 
institutional investors pay more attention to only the above mentioned ones.  In 
the same vein, Khurshed et al. (2011) examined the effect of two internal CG 
mechanisms on institutional block-holding; they considered both directors’ 
ownership and board composition in a sample of UK firms.  Their findings 
revealed a negative relationship between institutional block-holding and directors’ 
ownership, but on the other hand it showed a positive effect of board composition 
on institutional block-holding.  Based on their results, it is recommended that 
institutional block-holders view ownership by directors as a substitute control 
mechanism while board composition is perceived to be complementary 
mechanism. These findings indicate that there are differences on the effect of CG-
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sub indices on the investment decision of shareholders. Therefore, in this paper it 
is hypothesised that CG Sub-indices will have different effect on block 
shareholdings. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is examined:  
H2: The preferences of block shareholders vary across different dimensions of 
CG.  
 
3.4.3  Different Types of Block Shareholders’ Preferences and CG 
Consistent with previous researches which indicate that large shareholders differ 
from each other along different dimensions, such as their beliefs, skills, or 
preferences (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009), the current study aims to 
contribute to this literature by studying the preferences different categories of 
block shareholders have in terms of CG. Studies have indicated that the identity of 
institutional investors has important implications for firms because they have 
different objectives and philosophy as for example they may be constrained by 
fiduciary responsibility or political concern (Bushee, 1998 and Bushee et al., 
2010). Therefore, it is significant to distinguish between the different types, not 
only among institutional investors but among all block shareholders, when 
examining their differing preferences. Giannetti and Simonov (2006) examined if 
investors consider the quality of CG in making their stock selection decisions; 
they differentiated between two types of investors; those who enjoy private 
benefits and others who enjoy only security benefits. Their results showed that, 
whether they were domestic or foreign, institutional investors or small individual 
investors who generally place great value on security benefits are all less likely to 
invest in companies with poor CG. On the contrary, investors who have 
relationship connected with company insiders do not mind putting their 
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investments in companies that have poor CG.  Moreover, Kim et al (2010) 
revealed that there is different stock valuation between different types of investors 
in terms of CG; these are foreign investors and local investors.  They revealed that 
because foreign investors assign higher monitoring costs they may discount CG 
more severely than other domestic investors. In the same vein, Ferreira and Matos 
(2008) differentiated between independent and grey investors, and they showed 
that independent investors gave more attention to stock in countries that have 
more enforcement of legal environment, and, also, more attention to liquid stock 
than other grey investors. But at the same time, their results indicated that they 
have common preferences to invest in visible firms, large firms, and firms with 
strong CG indicators. Furthermore, Chung and Zhang (2011) examined whether 
different institutional investors exhibit different preferences towards CG structure. 
Their results showed that all different categories of institutional shareholdings had 
positive association with CG, but they also indicated that the strength of the 
relationship varies among the various categories of shareholdings. 
 
These studies indicated that various categories of investors have different 
investment preferences in general, and toward CG in particular. But most of these 
studies were concerned with differentiating between various types of institutional 
investors; Chung and Zhang (2011) for example, indicated that various categories 
of institutional investors such as insurance firms, bank trusts, independent 
advisors…etc. Have different investment preferences due to differences in their 
fiduciary responsibilities. However, there is limited research that gave attention to 
other types of block shareholders. The study by Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) 
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showed that large shareholders have distinctly different investment and 
governance styles. Based on the findings of these studies, the following 
hypothesize is examined: 
H3: Different types of block shareholders have different preferences of CG. 
 
3.4.4  Block Shareholders’ Preferences and CG Before and During the 
Financial Crisis 
The current global financial crisis, 2008 financial crisis 1 , has caused many 
economies around the world to go into recession (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). 
There has been much speculation that the 2008 stock market meltdown, at least in 
part, flowed from CG shortcomings, such as excessive risk taking by managers 
who were concerned more about short-term bonuses while ignoring the long term 
value of their companies (Zingales, 2008). Yet, a systematic analysis of how CG 
affected ownership structure during this turbulent period is lacking. This paper 
pioneers the effort to address this gap. Therefore, whether this relationship has 
strengthened during the financial crisis period is tested. 
 
Most studies conducted during the period of crisis examined the impact of CG on 
the performance of firms. The study by Beltratti and Stulz (2009) indicated that 
banks with better CG performed better during the credit crisis. Also, Leung and 
Horwitz (2010) examined the effect of management ownership and other 
governance variables on the stock performance of Hong Kong firms following the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997, and their results showed that companies with a 
                                                     
1 The study considers the effect of the financial crisis had started in 2008; this is why the study 
classify the time period to pre-crisis (2005 to 2007) and during-crisis (2008 to 2009).  
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more concentrated management ownership displayed better capital market 
performance during that period. In addition, Elkinawy (2005), who focused on an 
emerging country during the financial crisis of the late 1990s, showed that 
liquidity, trade links, and CG were considered important determinants for mutual 
fund portfolio choices during the crisis. These results from previous studies 
indicate that companies with a good CG quality performed better during the time 
of crisis and also that investors considered CG to be of major concern in their 
investment decisions. However, this previous study focused on emerging markets, 
examining the preferences of block shareholders in a developed country like UK 
during crisis period would add to the previous literature. It is expected that block 
shareholders consider the effect of CG on wealth and risk of their shareholdings 
differently in crisis versus non-crisis periods. So, it is hypothesised that the 
association between CG and block shareholdings is strengthened during financial 
crisis. Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H4: There was a change in the relationship between CG and block shareholdings 
during the financial crisis. 
 
3.5  Research Design 
3.5.1  Sample 
The target population of the three-paper in this thesis is the UK FTSE-350 whose 
constituents make up around 90 per cent of the entire UK market capitalisation. 
These companies were chosen because this study aims to test the relationships 
between CG and block shareholdings on a sample of large UK companies. In the 
current paper, a panel dataset is used that covers the period from 2005 to 2009 
inclusive. An important motivation for selecting this time frame is that it covered 
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the period preceding and including the 2007/2008 financial crisis and thus 
selecting this time period enables a comparison of the relationship between CG 
and block shareholdings in the periods preceding and during crisis. In addition, 
this time period enables investigating whether CG effect on block shareholdings 
and its different categories differ over years. 
 
The sample selected is based upon the following criteria. First, companies must be 
active or survive for the entire period of the study, as the objective is to examine 
the relation between CG and block shareholdings for firms that survived during 
the financial crisis and this would facilitate the comparison in the period 
preceding and during the 2007/2008 financial crisis. Therefore, after excluding the 
delisted companies, the total number of companies decreased to 221 firms. 
Second, financial and utility (63) firms are excluded for a number of reasons: (i) 
the composition of the assets of both types of firms tends to be ‘special’ rather 
than ‘typical’, (ii) utility firms tend to have high leverage in terms of capital 
structure, and (iii) financial firms in the UK operate under strict government 
regulations and monitoring (Mehran et al., 2011). Finally, 19 companies without 
complete financial or CG data were excluded. These criteria reduce the final 
sample to 139 non-financial companies, for these companies complete data was 
available for each year of the sampling period. Therefore, the empirical work 
comprised 139 firms with complete data throughout 2005-2009 Table (3.2 - Panel 
A). The analysis was carried out on a sample of balanced panel data, covering a 
period of five years, based on a sample companies drawn from eight main 
industries, resulting in a total of 695 firm-year observations. Table (3.2 - Panel B) 
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presents the composition of the final sample by industry. Data about block 
shareholdings were collected manually from the annual reports of the companies 
and from FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) database. Data about CG were 
also collected manually from the annual reports of the companies. All financial 
data has been obtained from DataStream database. 
 
Table (3.2) Sample Selection 
Panel (A) Sample Selection 
UK FTSE-350 companies  350 
Less  
Companies were delisted during the period (129)  
Companies in the financial and utility sector  (63) 
Companies without complete financial data  (19) 
Total final sample                139 
Panel (B) Composition of the final sample by industry 
Industry No. of Companies 
Included 
% 
 
Consumer services 
 
39 
 
28 
Industrial 45 32 
Oil and gas 11 8 
Basic material 12 9 
Technology 7 5 
Consumer goods 17 12 
Telecommunications 3 2 
Health Care 5 4 
Total 139 100 
   
3.5.2  Variables: Measurement and Description 
3.5.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are Total Block Shareholdings (Total_BLOCK), block 
shareholdings of insurance companies and pension funds (BLOCK1), other 
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institutional block holdings such as banks, mutual, nominee/trust/trustee 
(BLOCK2), block shareholdings of corporations (BLOCK3), insider block 
shareholdings such managers and directors (BLOCK4), others block 
shareholdings (BLOCK5). 
 
In academic literature, ownership concentration was measured using the fractional 
ownership of the largest shareholder (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), the number 
of block shareholders (see La Porta et al., 1998; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 
2000), or the minimum fractional ownership that is equal to a certain threshold 
(Faccio and Lang, 2002; Thomsen et al., 2006; Tribo et al., 2007). Consistent with 
previous studies on ownership concentration, the total block shareholdings 
(Total_BLOCK) is defined as the percentage of shares held by shareholders with 
no less than three per cent ownership. Shareholders below this level do not have to 
be disclosed in the UK. The disclosure threshold1 is three per cent in the UK 
(Companies Act 1995, Sections 198 and 199). A further distinction between 
different categories of block shareholdings was made. This classification was 
made to address heterogeneity across block shareholders. Block shareholdings is 
initially classified into the following two types: the first is institutional block 
shareholdings and the second is other block shareholdings. Then each type is 
divided into sub-types. The institutional block shareholdings are divided into two 
sub-types.  The first is block shareholdings of insurance companies and pension 
funds (BLOCK1). The second category includes other institutional block holdings 
(BLOCK2), such as banks, mutual, nominee/trust/trustee and the like.  The other 
                                                     
1 According to Companies Act 1995, UK companies are required to disclose in their accounts the 
names of any investor who holds three per cent or more of the issued share capital. 
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block-shareholdings are divided into three sub-types. The first is block 
shareholdings of corporations (BLOCK3).  The second (BLOCK4) includes 
insider block shareholdings such managers and directors. The third and final sub-
type includes others block shareholdings (BLOCK5). Table (3.3) below provides 
a detailed overview of block shareholdings classification scheme. 
 
Table (3.3) Block shareholdings classification scheme 
Shareholding  size Block shareholdings (TOTAL-BLOCK) 
Investor type Institutional Investors Other Block shareholders 
Investor Sub-
Types 
- Pension fund and 
insurance company 
(BLOCK1) 
- Corporations (BLOCK3) 
 
- Other institutional 
investors (BLOCK2) 
 
 
- Managers and directors 
(BLOCK4) 
- Others (BLOCK5) 
  Notes:  
(1) TOTAL-BLOCK includes investors who own at least 3 percent of the company's 
shares. (2) Initially block shareholdings are classified into the two categories; 
institutional block shareholdings and other –block shareholdings. Institutional Block 
shareholdings are then further classified into two major categories: 1- shareholdings 
of pension fund and insurance companies.2- shareholdings of other institutional 
investors. While the other block shareholdings are classified into three sub-types:1-
shareholdings of corporattions.2- shareholdings of managers and directors.3- 
shareholdings of others. 
 
 
3.5.2.2   Independent and Control Variables 
CG_SCORE (CG score) is considered the main independent variable of interest; it 
is a composite measure of twenty-six dimensions and three sub-indices: Board 
Composition and Independence Index (BCII), Board Practice and Process Index 
(BPPI) and Accountability and Audit Index (AII). The twenty-six constructs 
included in the CG index are based mainly on the guidelines of the UK Combined 
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Code (2003). This combined code is well thought-out as key guide for 
international best practices; this is due to the UK was  pioneer in showing the way 
in defining good CG practices starting from the Cadbury Committee in 1992. In 
this paper, both the aggregate CG-SCORE and the different CG sub-indices are 
used as independent variables to examine the effect of aggregate and sub-indices 
on block shareholdings. Detail description of the rigorous processes applied in 
developing the CG index was provided in (Chapter 2, Section 2.4) of this thesis 
and, therefore, is not repeated here. 
 
Furthermore, the paper included a wide range of variables to control for potential 
omitted variable bias (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001). These control variables 
covered firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), turnover (TURN), dividend yield 
(DIVIDEND), stock price (PRICE), Return on Assets (ROA), and firm value 
(Tobin’s Q). A large set of control variables are employed that were recognised 
before as determinants of shareholders’ investment decisions. Following earlier 
work that acknowledged that investors prefer large companies, the size of firms is 
included (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2005; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Grosfeld and 
Hashi, 2005). The natural logarithm of total assets is used as a proxy for firm size 
(SIZE) in this paper. The level of leverage is included as proxy for risk level of a 
firm (LEV) which is measured by the debt-to-assets ratio (Chung and Zhang, 
2011). Elkinawy (2005) mentioned that fund managers prefer firms with low 
leverage. To control for stock liquidity preferences, turnover (TURN) is also 
included which is measured by dividing the number of shares traded over the year 
by the number of shares outstanding (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Research by 
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Bennett et al. (2000) found that increased competition among institutional 
investors resulted in increased institutional preference for liquidity. Also, Huang 
(2008) and Elkinawy (2005) indicated that fund managers tilt their holdings more 
heavily toward liquid stocks. Moreover, Jain (2007) revealed that institutional 
investors prefer to put their investment in stocks with low dividend yield while 
individual investors prefer stock with high dividend yield; therefore, dividend 
yield (DIVIDEND) is included. Stock price (PRICE) is measured by the annual 
stock price. Furthermore, firm's profitability and firm value are measured by 
return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (TQ) respectively (Chung and Zhang, 
2011). Kim et al. (2010) found that investors desire companies with higher 
Tobin’s Q and higher ROA.   
 
3.5.3  The Empirical Models 
A series of regression analyses are performed to test our research hypotheses: 
Model 1:  The relationship between CG score and the total block shareholdings.   
TOTAL_BLOCKit = β0 + β1 CG_SCOREit + β2 SIZEit + β3 LEVit + β4 TURNit + β5 
DIVIDENDit + β6 ROAit + β7 TQ it + β8 PRICEit + uit……..(1) 
 
Model 2: The relationship between CG sub-indices and the total block 
shareholdings.  
TOTAL_BLOCKit = β0 + β1 BCIIit + β2 BPPIit + β3 AAIit + β4 SIZEit + β5 LEVit + 
β6 TURNit + β7 DIVIDENDit + β8 ROAit + β9 TQ it + β10 PRICEit 
+ uit  ………………………………………………………  (2) 
 
Moreover, another key issue related to this paper is to examine the association 
among each of the different types of the block shareholdings and CG score to test 
whether different types of block shareholders have different preferences of CG. 
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To test this relationship, the total block shareholdings are replaced in the previous 
regression models with the ownership from each of the five types of block 
shareholdings namely, BOLCK1; BOLCK2; BOLCK3; BOLCK4 and BOLCK5. 
The definitions and operationalization of all variables are presented in Table 3.4. 
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Table (3.4) Summary of variable definitions and data source 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Panel A:  dependent variables 
TOTAL_BLOCKi
t 
Percentage of shares owned by shareholders with at 
least 3% of the company shares. The total block 
shareholdings are split into its five components: 
shareholdings of pension fund and insurance 
companies (BOLCK 1); shareholdings of other 
institutional investors (BOLCK2); shareholdings of 
corporations (BOLCK3); shareholdings of managers 
and directors (BOLCK4) and other shareholdings 
(BOLCK5). 
Annual 
Report  
Panel B : independent variables 
CG_SCOREit A CG index containing of 26 items and each item 
scored 0 or 1. The total CG index is computed by the 
summing of the sub-indices dividing by three (the 
number of sub-indices). 
Annual 
Report 
BCIIit A sub-CG index containing 5 items to measure board 
composition and independence. 
Annual 
Report 
BPPIit A sub-CG index containing 13 items to measure 
board practice and process. 
Annual 
Report 
AAIit A sub-CG index containing 8 items to measure 
accountability and audit. 
Annual 
Report 
 
Panel C: control variables 
SIZEit Natural log of the total assets DataStream 
LEVit Percentage of total debts to total assets DataStream 
TURNit Annual share volume over the year to shares 
outstanding 
DataStream 
DIVIDEND it Percentage of dividends per share to market price-
year end  
DataStream 
ROAit Percentage of net income to total assets DataStream 
TQ it Market value of equity plus total debts to total assets DataStream 
PRICEit  The annual stock price DataStream 
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In studies of corporate governance, there is always concern about potential 
endogeneity (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). Most previous studies documented at 
least two potential sources of endogeneity that may derail empirical results: 
simultaneity and unobservable heterogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2009). The current 
study employed two approaches to tackle this problem. First, previous studies 
suggested that the use of lagged values of the main explanatory variable 
diminishes simultaneity problems (see, for example, Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; 
Stiebale, 2011).  In the same vein, Cornett et al. (2008) argued that the association 
between institutional investor and accrual policy is potentially subject to a 
simultaneity problem. To address this issue, they lagged institutional ownership 
by one year.  This lag allows for the effect of any change in institutional 
ownership to show up in firm behaviour and performance (Cornett et al., 2008). 
Following the past studies, the lagged value of CG is used to mitigate possible 
simultaneity problems between CG and block shareholdings. Second, a broad 
number of control variables are included in this study that help in mitigating the 
omitted-variable bias and also the possibility that our results are affected by 
endogeneity. Moreover, we used panel data regressions which help to address 
issues of endogeneity that might happen from unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneities (Black et al., 2005). Panel data regression techniques help to 
control for the unobserved heterogeneity component that remains fixed over time, 
thus reducing considerably the omitted variable bias problem. Panel data 
regression is chosen over simple time-series or cross-sectional data regressions for 
several reasons. It is the most efficient method for the analysis of data sets that 
combine cross-sectional and time-series characteristics (Baltagi, 2009). Panel data 
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is better than time-series or cross-sectional regression for controlling the 
heterogeneity among observations because it takes into consideration the 
relationship both within the unit of observation and across all the units (Baltagi, 
2009; Adeoye, 2009). Other statistical advantages of panel data, mentioned by 
Adeoye (2009) and Hsiao (2003), include better degree of freedom, less 
collinearity between variables, more efficiency and more informative data.  To 
sum up, panel data regression techniques contain more observations and are able 
to control for firm fixed effects by allowing the researcher to take into 
consideration the differences across companies. Therefore, it would reduce the 
risk of obtaining biased results (Baltagi, 2009).   
 
Given the panel nature of the data, we test which model is appropriate: the fixed 
effect or the random effect model by using the Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002). 
If the results reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that the fixed effect model 
should be used (this test is included in each of the regression tables). Furthermore, 
in all panel data regression models, a robust standard error is used. For example, 
Hoechle (2007) indicated that it is common to rely on “robust” standard errors in 
order to ensure valid statistical inference.  
 
3.6  Empirical Results and Discussion 
3.6.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Table (3.5) reports the descriptive statistics for the independent (total CG score 
and all sub-indices), the dependent (block shareholdings), and control variables 
for each year as well as for the whole period (2005-2009), pre-crisis period 
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(2005–2007) and during-crisis period (2008–2009), respectively. A number of 
interesting results can be derived from the descriptive statistics. First, and 
consistent with the results of Aggarwal et al (2010), there is an increase in block 
shareholdings over time. More specifically, the average block shareholding 
increased during the whole period (2005–2009) from 32.32 per cent to 38.19 per 
cent, and from 32.45 per cent (pre-crisis) to 37.66 per cent (during-crisis). The 
average value of total block shareholdings for our sample is 35.56 per cent. In 
addition, among the five different types of block shareholdings, the highest 
average is obtained in the category of shareholdings of pension fund and 
insurance companies (BOLCK1) and shareholdings of other institutional investors 
(BOLCK2), with average of 5.91 per cent and 21.09 per cent respectively. We 
find also the lowest average of block shareholdings in shareholdings of managers 
and directors (BOLCK4; mean 1.94 per cent) and other shareholders (BOLCK5; 
mean 1.39 per cent) respectively. Interestingly, all different types of block 
shareholdings increase from the period preceding the crisis to the period of the 
financial crisis.   
 
Second, the average of CG scores was found to increase from 0.7999 (2005) to 
0.8436 (2009); it also increased from 0.8105 before the crisis to 0.8391 during the 
financial crisis. This indicates that there has been a notable improvement in UK 
CG as there is 3.52 per cent increase in CG score during the crisis period. In the 
same vein, the CG sub-indices similarly depict overall CG behaviour. The results 
reveal that the average score for BPPI (board practice and process index) was the 
highest at 0.9083.  The results for AAI (accountability and audit index; average 
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score of 0.8384) show that, on average, companies perform well in this area. On 
the other hand, BCII (board composition and independence index) was ranked the 
lowest with an average score of 0.7190. In the same vein, Table 3.5 provides a 
closer analysis of the CG sub-indices before and during the financial crisis to gain 
additional insights. The average scores for the CG sub-indices, namely, BCII, 
BPPI and AAI have increased from 0.7065 (pre-crisis) to 0.7377 (during crisis), 
from 0.8978 (pre-crisis) to 0.9240 (during crisis) and from 0.8270 (pre-crisis) to 
0.8556 (during crisis) respectively, suggesting a generally increasing trend in CG 
behaviour over time. This indicates that UK listed companies tend to comply with 
the recommendations of the CG code during a financial crisis in order to rebuild 
trust and to protect shareholders’ interests. Table 3.5 shows that the average 
natural logarithm of total assets is 21.41, thus indicating that our sample consists 
of companies that are relatively large. The average ROA (LEV) is 7.8% (24.63%). 
In addition, the mean (median) value of TURN ratio, DIVIDEND and PRICE are 
2.22(1.66), 2.82(2.54) and 6.611(4.507) respectively. Furthermore, the average 
Tobin’s Q was 1.50 indicating that companies were highly valued in the market. 
Finally, drawing on the analysis of the descriptive statistics, a main policy 
implication for policy makers and regulatory authorities is that more consideration 
needs to be paid to strengthen requirements for board composition and 
independence and, by the same token, improve the quality of CG.  
[Table 3.5 around here] 
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Table (3.6) reports the Pearson’s correlation matrix between independent 
variables to test for multicollinearity1. Statistically, the correlations among the 
independent variables are fairly low; this means that no multicollinearity problem 
is found.  Both the variance inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance, are used as an 
additional test for multicollinearity; both of them were calculated for each 
independent variable. VIF statistics that is more than 10 and tolerance lower than 
0.2 show a possible multicollinearity problem. The results of this test provide 
support for the Pearson’s correlation coefficients; they are all within acceptable 
limits. This means that the correlation among these independent variables in this 
paper does not raise any serious problem that could affect results’ validity. 
 [Table 3.6 around here] 
 
3.6.2  Econometric Analysis 
3.6.2.1 Regression Results of CG and Total Block Shareholdings 
To test the relationship between total block shareholdings and CG scores, the 
regression is run using the lagged value of CG, by using (t-1) variable, to 
minimise the simultaneity problem as mentioned before. Table (3.7- Model 1) 
reports the results from the regression of block shareholdings (TOTAL_BLOCK) 
on the firm-level governance index (CG_SCORE) and company-related control 
variables. Therefore, if block shareholding is for period t, the CG_SCORE is 
measured at period t-1. The results indicate that CG_SCORE coefficient is 
statistically significant and positively related to TOTAL_BLOCK with R2 value 
                                                     
1 Multicollinearity consider a problem if the correlation is > 0.80 (Belsley et al., 1980). Therefore, 
highest correlation coefficient amongst all is 0.6026 which is between TQ and ROA is still within 
the threshold. 
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of (0.1064); this result suggests that block shareholders consider CG when taking 
their investment decisions. The results also indicate that block shareholders prefer 
companies with high liquidity. These results provide empirical support for H1 and 
the findings of previous studies which indicate the importance of CG to investors 
(Ferreira and Matosm, 2008; Giannetti and Simonov, 2006; Khurshed et al., 
2011). It also provides additional empirical support for agency theory. One 
theoretical implication of this is that the investors have strong incentives to put 
their investments in stocks of companies that have good quality of CG. Hence, 
companies commit to high levels of CG SCORE are able to alleviate agency 
conflicts and give investors more confidence in the company and make it more 
attractive to investors. 
[Table 3.7 around here] 
 
In addition, to investigate the relationship between each CG sub-indices and the 
block shareholdings, we re-ran the previous regression by replacing the 
CG_SCORE with BCII, BPPI and AAI sub-indices. Table 3.8 (Model 1) presents 
the findings of the regression of the impact CG sub-indices (BCII, BPPI and AAI) 
on block shareholdings. Running this regression gives a clear view about which 
CG provisions are considered by block shareholders in their investment decisions. 
The coefficient on BCII only is statistically significant and is positively related to 
TOTAL_BLOCK while, statistically, there are no connections between BPPI, 
AAI and TOTAL_BLOCK, suggesting that H2 is empirically supported. The 
results show that the BCII is the only CG sub-index that matters for total block 
shareholders’ investment decisions and these results provide an evidence that 
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supports  the results of prior literature (e.g., Chung and Zhang, 2011; Khurshed et 
al., 2011; McCahery et al., 2010) that indicated board independence and 
composition is an important aspect of CG. The positive association between 
TOTAL_BLOCK and BCII provides empirical support for the findings of Chung 
and Zhang (2011), which suggested that board composition is one of the most 
important provisions that attract institutional investors. Khurshed et al. (2011), in 
their study in UK, revealed a significant positive relationship between institutional 
block shareholdings and board composition. In addition, the study of McCahery et 
al. (2010) indicated that among others board independence considered important 
by institutional investors.  Useem et al (1993) also revealed that board 
composition is a major important to US institutional investors. Overall, the results 
provided the evidence that board of directors plays an important role in affecting 
the investment decision of shareholders which will widen the shareholders base of 
the company. Therefore, board composition and independence can be considered 
as a point of strength in attracting block shareholders.  
 [Table 3.8 around here] 
 
3.6.2.2 Regression Results of CG and Different Types of Block Shareholdings 
The third hypothesis is to examine if different types of block shareholders have 
different preferences of CG. The previous regression that examines the association 
between CG and total block shareholdings is re-estimated by replacing the 
TOTAL_BLOCK with the BLOCK1, BLOCK2, BLOCK3, BLOCK4 or 
BLOCK5 in turns, and the results are, respectively, presented in Models 2 to 6 of 
Table 3.7. The coefficient on CG_SCORE is statistically significant and positively 
Chapter 3: Paper one - How Corporate Governance Affects Investment Decisions of Block Shareholders 
in UK Listed Companies: Has the Recent Financial Crisis Changed the Game? 
 
79 
associated with only two types of block shareholdings namely, BLOCK1 and 
BLOCK2. The R2 in both model 2 and model 3 are 0.1100 and 0.1252 
respectively which are higher than R2 in  models 4, 5 and 6 which have the value 
of  0.0246, 0.0186 and 0.0167 respectively. The results indicate that CG scores 
affect the investment decisions of both BLOCK1 (insurance and pension funds) 
and BLOCK2 (other institutional investors), while it has no effect on the other 
types of block shareholdings. The results suggest that only institutional block 
shareholders consider CG quality when they make their investment decision. The 
positive association between CG and institutional block shareholding offers 
empirical support for the results of Bushee et al. (2010), Chung and Zhang (2011), 
Khurshed et al. (2011) and Russell Reynolds Associates survey (2003, 2005) 
which pointed out the important role that firms’ CG mechanisms play as an 
important criteria for institutional investors investment decisions. In contrast, the 
coefficient on CG_ SCORE is negatively related to managerial block 
shareholdings (BLOCK4), but it is not statistically significant; thus it fails to 
present support to Giannetti and Simonov (2006) empirical results which 
suggested that managers and directors do not mind to invest in companies with 
poor CG where strong motivation to extract private benefits by controlling 
shareholder exists. In the same vein, managers and directors have access to private 
information and, therefore, in the case of weak CG they will not be affected 
because by having this information they can monitor easily and can protect their 
interests. Therefore, these findings highlight the dissimilarity in investment 
preferences among managerial and institutional block shareholders. 
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In an unreported additional regression that has been run using the aggregate 
institutional investors, the coefficients on CG_SCORE remain positive and 
significantly related to the aggregate institutional investors. This may be explained 
that institutional shareholders build up large stakes in some companies so they 
have a keen interest in ensuring that companies run well. In conclusion, it can be 
seen from Table (3.7- Models 2,3,4,5,and 6) and the previous additional 
regression that hypothesis H3 is supported; the results show that different block 
shareholders have different preferences for CG, and provide the evidence that 
only institutional investors consider CG in their investment decisions.  
 
In respect to other explanatory variables,, the results indicate that (BLOCK1) have 
preferences for large companies which is consistent with Gompers and Metrick 
(2001) who revealed that  stocks of larger companies are preferred by institutional 
shareholders. Kang and Stulz (1997) found that insurance and pension fund prefer 
to invest in large companies. BLOCK1 also has preferences for high liquidity. 
Huang (2008) indicated that institutional shareholders have preferences for more 
liquid shares. The findings also show that BLOCK2 and BLOCK 5 prefer small 
companies and BLOCK3 prefers companies with fewer dividends. The results 
also indicate that different types of block shareholders have different preferences 
in their investment decisions with regard to TQ. The results indicate that there is a 
negative relationship between TQ and all of BLOCK 2, BLOCK3 and BLOCK5 
but it is non-significant relationship. Chung and Zhang (2011) reached to a similar 
result as they revealed a negative relationship between TQ and institutional 
ownership in a sample of U.S companies. On the other hand, the results revealed a 
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positive relationship between TQ and both BLOCK1 and BLOCK4.  Finally, with 
regard to block shareholders preferences for ROA the results indicate that there is 
a non-significant negative relationship between ROA and all the different types of 
block shareholdings. Khurshed et al. (2011) have reached to similar results where 
there found non-significant relationship between ROA and institutional block 
shareholdings in a sample of UK companies. 
 
In addition, in order to highlight which CG sub-indices are more important to each 
type of block shareholders, Table (3.8- Models 2,3,4,5 and 6) illustrates the 
regressions results between CG sub-indices and different types of block 
shareholdings. The results revealed a significant and positive association among 
BCII and BLOCK2; it is a strong association between BCII and BLOCK 2 where 
it is significant at the 1% significance level and R2 is 0.1390. These results 
provide evidence that is consistent with previous studies (Khurshed et al., 2011; 
Useem et al., 1993) that board composition, members’ expertise and the presence 
of independent members are crucial aspects in the opinion of institutional 
investors. In the same vein, Russell Reynolds Associates survey (2003, 2005) 
indicates that about 80 per cent of the UK institutional investors give important 
attention to the quality of the company’s board of directors. A significant positive 
association is also found among AAI and both of BLOCK1 and other block 
shareholders (BLOCK5) implying the importance of accountability and audit to 
their investment decisions. With regard to R2 in models 1 and 5  the values of R2 
are 0.1278 and 0.0199 respectively which is less than R2 in model 2 (0.1390).  
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In summary, the evidence provided above supports, in general, my third 
hypothesis (H3). That is block shareholders have different preferences in terms of 
CG provisions.  
3.6.2.3 Regression Results of CG and Total Block Shareholdings Pre- and 
During the Financial Crisis 
One of the main contributions of this paper is to examine an important policy 
query of whether firm-level CG affects the block shareholdings before and during 
global financial crisis periods. To answer this question, the sample period divided 
into two sub-sample periods: pre-crisis (2005 to 2007) and during-crisis (2008 to 
2009), and then re-run the previous two models (Model 1 in both tables 3.7 and 
3.8). The results of these regressions are presented in Tables 3.9 and 3.10. In 
respect to total CG, the results indicate that in the pre-crisis period (Table 3.9- 
Model 1); there was a non-significant positive relationship among CG_SOCRE 
and total block shareholdings. This implies that investors are giving less focus to 
the quality of CG when investment opportunities are plentiful. In contrast, during 
the financial crisis period (Table 3.9- Model 2), a positive and significant 
relationship among CG_SOCRE and total block shareholdings is found. This 
result shows that the relationship has changed in the period during the crisis, since 
there was no relationship between CG and block shareholdings in the pre-crisis 
period; however, during the crisis period, it turns to be a positive and significant 
association among them. This suggests that the improvement in CG results in 
attracting more shareholders to allocate their investments and this also indicates 
that block shareholders considered CG an important determinant for their 
portfolio choices during the financial crisis. When looking at the R2 statistics in 
(table 3.9) in both pre and during crisis, it is noticed that R2 has changed from 
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0.1853 in the pre-crisis period to 0.1349 in the during crisis period. Also, in (table 
3.10) the R2 statistics has changed from around 0.20 in the pre-crisis period to 
0.14 in the during crisis period. Although R-squared value is low in the during 
crisis period but we have statistically significant predictors, and we can still draw 
important conclusions about how changes in the predictor values are associated 
with changes in the response value. 
Hence, the hypothesis H4 is empirically supported, confirming that the 
relationship between CG scores and block shareholdings has changed during the 
financial crisis. Moreover, the results show that there is a significant positive 
association among block shareholdings and both TURN and leverage in the 
during crisis period. 
[Table 3.9 around here] 
 
Regarding CG sub-indices, Table (3.10- Models 1 and 2) shows the results of the 
relationship between CG sub-indices and block shareholdings before and during 
the financial crisis. Model (1) deals with this relationship in the pre-crisis period 
and it reveals a significant positive relationship between AAI and block 
shareholdings;  this means that block shareholders give more attention to 
accountability and audit in the pre-crisis period. Furthermore, Table (3.10 - Model 
1) shows non-significant relationship between other CG sub-indices and block 
shareholdings. In contrast, during the financial crisis period (Table 3.10- Model 
2), there was a significant positive relationship between BCII and block 
shareholding and no significant relationship with other CG-sub indices. The 
results imply that the preferences of block shareholders to CG sub-indices differ 
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over time from before to during financial crisis period. This result provides 
evidence to the important role of the board composition and independence in 
attracting block shareholders during crisis period. This result reveals that board of 
directors is an important internal CG mechanism that monitors and advises 
management to protect shareholders’ interest and this result offers empirical 
support for the results of Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Francis et al. (2012). 
 [Table 3.10 around here] 
 
3.6.3  Robustness Checks 
We conducted a series of robustness checks in order to ensure that our results are 
rigorous. First, a random-effect Tobit model is used to re-run the regressions for 
different types of block shareholdings; it is widely used to deal with the censored 
nature of different block shareholdings data (Abdioglu et al, 2013). The results of 
the Tobit regression analysis are shown in Table (3.11). Obviously, the results of 
Tobit regression are in line with the results presented in Table (3.9), thereby 
implying that our results are robust. 
 
Second, we introduced an additional explanatory variable; an industry effect is 
controlled through the inclusion of industry-specific dummy variables to control 
for any preferences block shareholders have for particular industries. Grosfeld and 
Hashi (2005) indicated that ownership concentration may vary across industries. 
The CG SOCRE coefficient did not change and stayed positive and significant 
(see Table 3.12 - Model 1).  Thus the results of this additional test provide 
additional support for earlier results. We also included annual stock return in the 
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model as another additional explanatory variable following Giannetti and 
Simonov (2006) and the results remain largely the same (see Table 3.12 - Model 
2); we obtain results consistent with the earlier results. 
 
Finally, an additional regression is done, to examine if CG have an impact on 
block shareholdings, using a different classification of block shareholdings. In the 
new classification, the block shareholdings is classified to 7 sub-categories; by 
keeping the previous first four types of block shareholdings and re-classifying the 
fifth category into other three types as follow: (BLOCK5a) includes states, 
governmental agencies, governmental departments or local authorities, (BLOCK 
6) includes families and individuals who are outsiders and (BLOCK 7) includes 
others such as foundations or research institutes. The results of this additional test 
provide support to the previous results suggesting that CG only matters to 
institutional block shareholders as presented in Table (3.13). These further 
analyses recommend that our results are robust to different measures and to the 
inclusion of extra variables. 
 [Tables 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 around here] 
 
3.7  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The need for effective CG has been of main attention due to the recent financial 
crisis (Francis et al., 2012; Walker Review, 2009). Therefore, in this paper, an 
important policy question of whether the quality of firm-level CG has any effect 
on the investment decisions of block shareholders in UK from 2005 to 2009 is 
investigated, before and during financial crisis periods. The study is also novel in 
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employing a new detailed classification for block shareholdings to explore the 
heterogeneity of different block shareholders in their preferences to CG. Using a 
sample of 139 UK FTSE firms, the results indicate that the tendency of CG 
compliance is increasing over the period investigated in UK. The results also 
provide evidence that CG behaviour during the period of the financial crisis is 
considerably different from those of the period prior to the financial crisis. 
Generally, UK listed companies appear to be motivated to comply more with the 
CG code recommendations during a financial crisis in order to rebuild shareholder 
trust and to develop their ability to get external funds at lower cost. This also 
suggests that their decisions to comply with CG are expected to be influenced by 
the institutional pressures.  
 
Most importantly, our results show a significant positive association between CG 
and total block shareholdings for the whole period and it also indicates that board 
composition and independence is the only CG sub-index that affects total block 
shareholders’ investment decisions. Additionally, the results provide evidence that 
institutional block shareholders, such as pension funds and insurance companies, 
pay more attention to CG matters as a vital part of investment decisions. In 
contrast, the results also indicate that no significant relationship between CG and 
block shareholdings of management and directors. Moreover, when testing the 
relationship between CG_SCORE and total block shareholdings before and during 
the crisis, the results revealed that the insignificant results of the impacts of CG 
score in the pre-crisis period became significant during the financial crisis period, 
thereby indicating that block shareholders view CG as particularly important 
during the crisis period. Therefore, this study fills an important gap in prior 
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literature and provides an understanding of the role that CG and, specifically, 
board structure play in attracting block shareholders during crisis period. The 
results recommend firms to sustain CG and, mainly, board independence to 
enlarge its shareholders base and raise new capital. 
Another important result of this paper is that the preferences block shareholders 
have in terms of the characteristics of firms change over time. Block shareholders’ 
preferences for liquidity were generally insignificant before the crisis period, but 
became significant during the crisis. Also, their preferences for dividends have 
changed during the crisis. This indicates that the financial crisis did not only 
change their preferences towards CG but also towards other characteristics of 
firms. The study by Khurshed et al. (2011) indicated that institutional investors’ 
preferences towards dividend yield, as one of the firm’s characteristics, changed 
over time in the U.K. 
 
The significance and implications of the results can serve as a reference point and 
specify the path that should be followed by a company if it has the desire to 
increase its shareholder base. Giannetti and Simonov (2006) showed that 
companies can use CG as a way to catch the attention of certain types of 
shareholders in a similar way to their use of dividends to attract investors. The 
results of this study, therefore, have implications for companies; they are useful 
for management of listed companies in managing relationships with block 
shareholders. For example, it will help them attract a particular group of block 
shareholders via improving a particular set of CG provisions. It also provides 
evidence that during financial trouble time, improving a particular mechanism of 
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CG will attract investors. Table (3.14) gives important information for companies: 
they will be able to identify what attracts block shareholders and what CG areas 
require improvement, in order to attract certain types of block shareholders. 
Furthermore, our findings have significant implications for regulators and policy-
makers; specifically, regulators and policy makers should draw on these results to 
revise the regulations of CG that will help and support companies in their efforts 
to improve CG practices and, mainly, board effectiveness. Additionally, the 
results related to areas of non-compliance are expected to help regulators and also 
companies to understand why, and where, companies are falling behind in 
ensuring compliance. In this regard, our findings call for more stringent CG 
requirements in order to provide more protection for investors and to pass up any 
negative consequences that may come up from non-compliance. 
 [Table 3.14 around here] 
Finally, the weaknesses of this paper need to be acknowledged in order to provide 
recommendations for future research. This paper focuses on investigating the 
heterogeneity of the investment preferences of different types of block 
shareholders in UK listed companies. Therefore, future research is needed to study 
the heterogeneity in another institutional setting with lower investor protection or 
within a cross-country context, which will provide a more explicit generalisation 
of our results. Furthermore, as our sample is limited to non-financial firms, future 
studies may enhance the analysis by investigating financial firms. In addition, our 
analysis focused mainly on internal CG mechanisms; thus it might be interesting 
to examine the special effects of external CG mechanisms on block shareholders’ 
investment decisions. 
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TABLES 
Table (3.5): Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent (block shareholdings), independent (total CG index and all sub-indices) and 
control variables for each year as well as for the whole period (2005-2009), pre-financial crisis period (2005–2007) and during-financial 
crisis period (2008–2009), respectively. TOTAL-BLOCK is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders with at least 3% of the 
company shares; BLOCK1 is the percentage of shares owned by pension funds and insurance companies with at least 3% of the company 
shares; BLOCK2 is the percentage of shares owned by other institutional investors with at least 3% of the company shares; BLOCK3 is the 
percentage of shares owned by corporations with at least 3% of the company shares; BLOCK4 is the percentage of shares owned by 
managers and directors with at least 3% of the company shares; BLOCK5 is the percentage of shares owned by other shareholders with at 
least 3% of the company shares; CG-SCORE is the total CG score; BCII is the score of board composition and independence index; BPPI 
is the score of board process and practice index; AAI is the score of accountability and audit index; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets; LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets; TURN is the annual share volume over the year to shares outstanding; 
DIVIDEND is dividends per share to market price-year end * 100; PRICE is the annual stock price;  ROA is the percentage of net income 
to total assets; TQ is market value of equity plus total debts to total assets.  
Variables Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2005) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2006) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2007) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2008) 
 Mean 
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2007) 
Mean  
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2008 to 2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2009) 
Total_BLOCK 32.32 
(29.8) 
(16.78) 
32.56 
(30.88) 
( 17.02) 
36.49 
(34.73) 
(17.10) 
38.26 
(37.4) 
(18.45) 
38.17 
(37.1) 
(17.08) 
33.81 
( 31.58) 
(17.04) 
38.21 
(37.25) 
(17.75) 
35.56 
(33.76) 
(17.45) 
BLOCK1 4.09 
(3.19) 
(5.52) 
4.25 
  ( 3.3) 
(5.28) 
7.01 
(4.81) 
(6.44) 
7.05 
(4.69) 
(6.10) 
7.17 
(4.49) 
(6.29) 
5.12 
 ( 3.58) 
(5.91) 
7.11 
(4.55) 
(6.18) 
5.91 
( 4) 
(6.09) 
BLOCK2 19.67 
(18.26) 
(13.23) 
20.45 
(17.7) 
(14.06) 
21.31 
(19.22) 
(14.06) 
21.86 
(20.55) 
(15.29) 
22.17 
(19.97) 
(14.97) 
20.48 
(18.27) 
(13.77) 
22.01 
(20.2) 
(15.11) 
21.09 
(18.91) 
(14.33) 
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Table 3.5 (continued) 
Variables Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2005) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2006) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2007) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2008) 
 Mean 
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2007) 
Mean  
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2008 to 2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2009) 
BLOCK3 5.22 
(0 ) 
(13.37) 
4.66 
(0 ) 
(12.45) 
4.86 
(0)  
(12.72) 
5.611 
(0)  
(13.51) 
5.80 
(0) 
(13.65) 
4.91 
(0) 
(12.82) 
5.70 
(0) 
(13.56) 
5.23 
(0) 
(13.12) 
BLOCK4 1.94 
(0) 
(7.37) 
1.85 
(0) 
(7.36) 
2.01 
(0) 
(7.43) 
1.97 
(0) 
(7.35) 
1.90 
(0) 
(7.00) 
1.940 
   (0) 
(7.37) 
1.942 
(0) 
(7.16) 
1.94 
(0) 
(7.28) 
BLOCK5 1.38 
(0) 
(5.56) 
1.35 
(0) 
(5.71) 
1.30 
(0) 
(5.95) 
1.77 
(0) 
(6.64) 
1.13 
(0) 
(5.75) 
1.35 
(0) 
(5.73) 
1.45 
(0) 
(6.21) 
1.39 
(0) 
(5.92) 
CG_ SCORE 0.7999 
(0.815) 
(.099) 
0.8086 
(0.821) 
(.099) 
0.8228 
(0.833 ) 
(.092) 
0.8346 
(0.85) 
(.088) 
0.8437 
(0.863) 
(.087) 
.8105  
(.821) 
(.097) 
.8391  
(0.857) 
(.088) 
.82199  
(.833) 
(.094) 
BCII .6977  
(.714) 
(.1914) 
.7007  
(.714) 
(.1944) 
.7213  
(.714) 
(.1830) 
.7305 
 (.714 ) 
(.1828) 
.7449 
(.714) 
(.1785) 
.7065 
(.714) 
(.1895) 
.7377 
(.714) 
(.1805) 
.7190  
(.714 ) 
(.1864) 
BPPI .8874  
(.909) 
(.1151) 
.8978  
(.909) 
(.1108) 
.9083  
(.909) 
(.1114) 
.9234  
(.909) 
(.0931) 
.9247  
(.909) 
(.0948) 
.8978  
(.909) 
(.1125) 
.9240  
(.909) 
(.0938) 
.9083  
(.909) 
(.1061) 
AAI .8147  
(.875  ) 
(.1280) 
.8273 
(.875) 
(.1188) 
.8390  
(.875) 
(.1148) 
.8498  
(.875) 
(.1117) 
.8615 
(.1071) 
(.0357) 
.8270  
(.875) 
(.1208) 
.8556  
(.875) 
(.1094) 
.8384  
(.875) 
(.1171) 
SIZE 21.41 
(21.22) 
(1.377) 
21.61 
(21.46) 
(1.406) 
21.62 
(21.46) 
(1.409) 
21.16 
(21.06) 
(1.407) 
21.27 
(21.10) 
(1.384) 
21.55 
(21.38) 
(1.397) 
21.21 
(  21.07) 
(1.394) 
21.41 
(  21.25) 
(1.404) 
 
 
Chapter 3: Paper one - How Corporate Governance Affects Investment Decisions of Block Shareholders 
in UK Listed Companies: Has the Recent Financial Crisis Changed the Game? 
 
91 
Table 3.5 (continued) 
 
Variables Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2005) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2006) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2007) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2008) 
 Mean 
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2007) 
Mean  
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2008 to 2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2009) 
LEV 0.2470 
(.2312) 
(.1640) 
0.2629 
(.2438) 
(.1681) 
0.2485 
(.2311) 
(.1657) 
0.2369 
(.2192) 
(.1749) 
0.2366 
(.2125) 
(.1657) 
0.2528 
(.2336) 
(.1657) 
0.2368 
(.2190) 
(.1700) 
0.2463 
(0.230) 
(.1675) 
TURN 2.17 
(1.61) 
(2.67) 
2.12 
(1.75) 
(2.23) 
2.45 
(1.82) 
(3.78) 
2.46 
(1.85) 
(2.85) 
1.90 
(1.44) 
(1.87) 
2.25 
(1.68) 
(2.97) 
2.18 
(1.65) 
(2.42) 
2.22 
(1.66) 
(2.76) 
DIVIDEND 2.47 
(2.46) 
(1.44) 
2.38 
(2.41) 
(1.43) 
2.08 
(2.05) 
(1.19) 
3.41 
(2.91) 
(2.90) 
3.77 
(3.39) 
(3.55) 
2.31 
( 2.28) 
(1.36) 
3.59 
(3.075) 
(3.24) 
2.82 
(2.54) 
(2.39) 
PRICE 5.148  
(3.8 ) 
(5.356) 
6.533 
(4.335) 
(6.391) 
8.378 
(6.28) 
(7.611) 
728.97 
(475.37) 
(739.44) 
5.665 
(3.533) 
(6.044) 
6.701 
(4.702) 
(6.645) 
6.477 
(4.161) 
(6.789) 
6.611  
(4.507) 
(6.700) 
ROA .1024 
(.0751) 
(.1013) 
.0670 
(.058) 
(.1104) 
.0513 
(.0482) 
(.0930) 
.0804 
(.0691) 
(.0726) 
.0933 
(.0752) 
(.0755) 
.0736 
(.060) 
(.1038) 
.0868 
(.0715) 
(.0742) 
.07895 
(.067) 
(.0932) 
TQ 1.79 
(1.50) 
(.9327) 
1.42 
(1.24) 
(1.208) 
1.15 
(0.99) 
(.6910) 
1.48 
(1.16) 
(.9593) 
1.67 
(1.34) 
(1.078) 
1.45 
(1.23) 
(.9994) 
1.57 
( 1.26) 
(1.022) 
1.50 
(1.24) 
(1.00) 
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Table (3.6): Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the Pearson’s correlation matrix for the independent variables used. All variables are fully defined in Table (3.5). 
Variables CG_ SCORE BCII BPPI AAI SIZE LEV TURN DIVIDEND PRICE ROA TQ 
All period            
CG _SCORE 1.0000           
BCII 0.6741*** 1.0000          
BPPI 0.5621*** 0.1885*** 1.0000         
AAI 0.5844*** 0.1650*** 0.2055*** 1.0000        
SIZE 0.0310 -0.0182 0.0590 0.0846 **  1.0000       
LEV 0.1376*** 0.1097*** 0.1066*** 0.0823 **    0.2634 *** 1.0000      
TURN 0.1586*** 0.2055 *** 0.1084*** 0.0694*   0.0847** 0.1304*** 1.0000     
DIVIDEND 0.1745*** 0.1492*** 0.0116 0.1645*** 0.1019 *** 0.2469*** -0.1351*** 1.0000    
PRICE -0.0718* -0.0601 0.0009 0.0007 0.2217*** -0.0979** -0.1362*** -0.1706*** 1.0000   
ROA -0.1118*** -0.0693 * -0.0485 -0.0768** -0.2416*** -0.2706*** -0.0810** -0.0920** 0.2950*** 1.0000  
TQ -0.1091*** -0.0955 ** -0.0034 -0.0408 -0.4253*** -0.0808** -0.0090 -0.2545*** 0.2739*** 0.6026*** 1.0000 
 
Pre-crisis 
           
CG_ SCORE 1.0000           
BCII 0.6665*** 1.0000          
BPPI 0.5515*** 0.1699*** 1.0000         
AAI 0.5938*** 0.1841*** 0.2140*** 1.0000        
SIZE 0.0685 0.0187 0.0926* 0.0954* 1.0000       
LEV 0.1689 *** 0.1399 *** 0.1371*** 0.0820* 0.2558 *** 1.0000      
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Table 3.6 (continued) 
 
Variables CG_SCORE BCII BPPI AAI SIZE LEV TURN DIVIDEND PRICE ROA TQ 
TURN 0.1710*** 0.2012*** 0.1350*** 0.0914* 0.1201** 0.1144** 1.0000     
DIVIDEND 0.1362*** 0.1189 ** 0.0065   0.1693 *** 0.1292 *** 0.2662*** -0.1489*** 1.0000    
PRICE -0.0157 0.0113 0.0067 0.0266  0.2389*** -0.0285 -0.1556*** -0.0529 1.0000   
ROA -0.1283*** -0.0689 -0.0663 -0.0875* -0.2293*** -0.2477*** -0.0145 -0.0043 0.2985*** 1.0000  
TQ -0.0779   -0.0546   -0.0237 -0.0019 -0.4298*** -0.0502 0.0250 -0.1237** 0.2148*** 0.5862*** 1.0000 
 
During-crisis 
           
CG_SCORE 1.0000           
BCII 0.6810*** 1.0000          
BPPI 0.5660*** 0.2005*** 1.0000         
AAI 0.5567*** 0.1126* 0.1575*** 1.0000        
SIZE 0.0678   -0.1052* -0.0413 0.0267 1.0000       
LEV 0.0837 0.0562  0.0449 0.0718 0.2681*** 1.0000      
TURN 0.1438** 0.2133 *** 0.0639 0.0330 0.0288 0.1550*** 1.0000     
DIVIDEND 0.1598*** 0.1565*** -0.0492 0.1137* 0.0117 0.2288*** -0.1353** 1.0000    
PRICE -0.1222** -0.1453** 0.0122 -0.0167  0.2270  *** -0.1844*** -0.1111* -0.2613*** 1.0000   
ROA -0.0285 -0.0324 0.0431 -0.0002 -0.2076*** -0.2976*** -0.1776*** -0.0760 0.2760*** 1.0000  
TQ -0.0759 -0.1127* 0.1114* -0.0234 -0.3786*** -0.1050* -0.0567 -0.2890*** 0.3304*** 0.5704*** 1.0000 
 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively  
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Table (3.7) Regression Results of CG Score and Total /Different Types of Block Shareholdings 
This table provides panel data regressions results of total block shareholdings (Model 1), each type of block shareholdings (Models 2,3,4,5 
and 6) and corporate governance score. All variables are fully defined in Table (3.5). These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics, which 
are in parentheses, depending on the used regression fixed effect or random effect respectively. 
 
Variables TOTAL_BLOCK 
 Model 1 
BLOCK1  
Model 2 
BLOCK 2 
 Model 3 
BLOCK 3  
Model 4 
BLOCK 4 
Model 5 
BLOCK 5  
Model 6 
intercept 1.265 (16.23) *** -.2673(-1.34) -.2302(-1.32) .1983(1.35) .0739 (1.09)  -.0237(-0.30) 
CG_ SCORE 0.1201 (2.16) ** .2386(1.69)*  .1954(1.81)* -.0801(-0.90) -.0136(-0.28)   .0525(0.99) 
SIZE 0.0946(1.29)  .7887(3.55) *** -.2477(-2.66) *** -.04540(-0.71) .1052(0.76) -.0907(-1.89)* 
LEV .0501 (1.54)  -.0469(-0.56) .0806(1.48) .0140(0.33)  .0352(1.04)  .0899(2.07)** 
TURN   .0449 (1.86) * .1894(3.65) *** .0091(0.19) .0121(0.44) .0130 (0.60) .0989(2.41)** 
DIVIDEND 0.0102(0.50) .0731(1.43) .0523(1.11) -.0812(-2.28) ** .0024(0.11)   -.0210 (-0.83) 
PRICE -.09074 (-1.90)* -.0327(-0.22) -.1036(-1.36) -.0699(-1.50)  .0112(0.13) .0615(1.34) 
ROA -.0157 (-0.87) -.0183(-0.42)  -.0117(-0.31) -.0405(-1.44) -.0011(-0.05) -.0025(-0.09) 
TQ -.0033 (-0.07)  .0975(0.71) -.0311(-0.43) -.0957(-1.79) .0272(0.34) -.0588(-1.26) 
 
R2 0.1064 0.1100 0.1252 0.0246 0.0186 0.0167 
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 556 
Groups 139 139 139 139 139 139 
Hausman test/ 
Prob > chi2 
0.0043 0.0005 0.4203 0.0510   0.0161 0.0826 
 
Method of 
estimation 
Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects 
       
  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively  
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Table (3.8) Regression Results of CG Sub-Indices and Total /Different Types of Block Shareholdings 
This table provides panel data regressions results of total block shareholdings (Model 1), each type of block shareholdings (Models 2,3,4,5 
and 6) and CG Sub-Indices. All variables are fully defined in Table (3.5). These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics, which are in 
parentheses, depending on the used regression fixed effect or random effect respectively. 
 
Variables TOTAL_BLOCK 
 Model 1 
BLOCK1  
Model 2 
BLOCK 2 
 Model 3 
BLOCK 3  
Model 4 
BLOCK 4 
Model 5 
BLOCK 5  
Model 6 
intercept 1.438 (280.48) *** .0918(7.40) *** .0441(0.64) .0826(9.00) *** .0554(8.64) .0550(1.31) 
BCII .0497 (1.73)* -.0239(-0.34) .1523(2.66) *** -.0222(-0.60) .0081(0.31) -.0371(-1.04) 
BPPI -.008305 (-0.03) .1217(1.40) -.0454(-0.76) -.0359(-0.86) .0215 (1.19) .0174(0.52) 
AAI .01778 (0.61) .1872(1.86) * -.0532(-0.84) -.0260(-0.49) -.0237(-0.64) .0723(2.05) ** 
SIZE .0830 (1.13) .7668 (3.29) *** -.2350(-2.59)** -.0666 (-0.51) .1022(0.74) -.0998(-1.99)** 
LEV .0475 (1.52)  -.0562(-0.60) .0785(1.51) -.0279(-0.51)  .0366(1.08) .0905(2.15) ** 
TURN .0432 ( 1.76)*  .1902(3.46) *** .0028(0.06) -.0012(-0.05) .0150(0.67) .10005 (2.42)** 
DIVIDEND .0111 (0.54) . 0635(1.22) .0604(1.34) -.0779(-2.04) ** .0038 (0.17)  -.0267(-1.02) 
PRICE -.0809(-1.70)* -.0662(-0.43) -.0979(-1.30) -.0693(-0.90)  .01230(0.16) .0590(1.31) 
ROA -.0168(-0.93) -.0161(-0.37)  -.0145(-0.38) -.0387(-1.37) .0001(0.01)  -.0020(-0.07) 
TQ -.0117(-0.25) .1242 (0.96) -.0334(-0.47) -.1340(-1.57) .0271(0.35) -.0611(-1.33) 
 
R2 0.1046   0.1278 0.1390 0.0781 0.0212 0.0199 
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 556 
Groups 139 139 139 139 139 139 
Hausman test/ 
Prob > chi2 
0.0023 0.0000 0.4928 0.0002   0.0003 0.1414 
Method of 
estimation 
Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects 
  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively  
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Table (3.9) Regression Results of the Relation between CG Score and Total Block Shareholdings Pre and During the Financial 
Crisis 
This table presents the regression results of total block shareholdings and CG score before and during the financial crisis. It shows the 
results of CG impact on block shareholdings before and during the financial crisis. All variables are fully defined in Table (3.5). These 
models provide t-statistics which are in parentheses. 
Variables Pre- financial crisis  
(2005-2007) 
Model  1 
During-- financial crisis 
 (2008-2009) 
Model  2 
intercept 1.212 (10.98) *** 1.145(6.73) *** 
CG_ SCORE .1120 (1.36) .2235 (1.87)* 
SIZE -.0959(-0.49) -.2969 (-0.96) 
LEV .0719(1.58) .1206(1.70)* 
TURN -.0156(-0.48) .0590(2.55) ** 
DIVIDEND -.2119(-2.25) **  .0369(1.41) 
PRICE .2912(1.63) .1509(1.66) 
ROA -.0067 (-0.33) -.0104(-0.48) 
TQ -.2730 (-2.29)** -.1797(-2.01)** 
 
R2 0.1853 0.1349 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
Hausman test/ Prob > chi2 0.0013 0.0025 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Fixed effects 
  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively  
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Table (3.10) Regression Results of the Relation between CG Sub-Indices and Total Block Shareholdings Pre and During the 
Financial Crisis 
This table presents the regression results of total block shareholdings on corporate governance sub-indices. It shows CG sub-indices impact 
on block shareholdings before and during the financial crisis. All variables are fully defined in Table (3.5). These models provide t-
statistics which are in parentheses. 
Variables Pre- financial crisis  
(2005-2007) 
Model  1 
During-- financial crisis 
 (2008-2009) 
Model  2 
intercept 1.380 (53.73) *** 1.465(27.66)*** 
BCII .0415(1.20) .1011 (2.04) ** 
BPPI -.0186 (-0.47) .0933(1.21) 
AAI .0872 (1.70)* -.0415(0.93) 
SIZE -.1350(-0.66) -.2860 (-0.96) 
LEV .0649 (1.37)  .0981(1.47) 
TURN -.0208(-0.63)  .0675(2.83)*** 
DIVIDEND -.2095(-2.20)** .0422(1.63)  
PRICE .3271 (1.76) * .1560(1.69)* 
ROA -.0084 (-0.35) -.0052(-0.24) 
TQ -.3053(-2.45)** -.1903 (-1.96) * 
R2 0.2079 0.1468 
Observations 278 278 
Groups 139 139 
Hausman test/ Prob > chi2 0.0009 0.0015 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Fixed effects 
  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively  
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Table (3.11) Tobit Regression Results of CG Score and Types of Block Shareholdings 
This table presents the results of random-effect Tobit panel regressions of different types of block shareholdings and CG. It examines CG 
impact on different types of block shareholdings. All variables are fully defined in Table (3.5). These models provide z-statistics which are 
in parentheses. 
Variables BLOCK1  
Model 2 
BLOCK 2 
 Model 3 
BLOCK 3  
Model 4 
BLOCK 4 
Model 5 
BLOCK 5  
Model 6 
intercept -.1739(-0.98) -.2809(-1.59) -.8994 (-2.95)*** -4.034(-7.64)***  -5.260(-5.38) 
CG _SCORE .2018 (1.76)*  .2382(2.15)** -.1393 (-0.76) -.2506(-0.72) .5176(0.96) 
SIZE -.0691(-0.87)  -.2140(-2.37) ** -.1242(-0.82) -.2261(-0.90) -1.37(-2.64)*** 
LEV .0858(1.41) .0791(1.34) .0508(0.54)  .1596(0.89)  .8801(2.70)*** 
TURN .2023(4.14) *** -.0002(-0.01) .0625 (0.88) . 0394(0.38) .8187(3.41)*** 
DIVIDEND .0938(2.01)** .0265( 0.62) -.1507(-2.36)** .0087(0.07)   -.1506(-0.81) 
PRICE .1261(1.87)* -.1157(-1.61) -.1934(-1.64)  .2579(1.23) .8027(2.21)** 
ROA -.0567(-1.18)  -.0187 (-0.46) -.0938(-1.56) -.0154(-0.14) .0920(0.47) 
TQ  -.0904(-1.17) -.0435 (-0.58) -.1410(-1.14) -.0883(-0.41) -.7212(-1.85)* 
 
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 
Groups 139 139 139 139 139 
Log likelihood -514.26 -441.79 -322.36 -168.76 -197.95 
 
  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively  
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Table (3.12) Results of Robustness Checks 
This table represents the results of robustness checks. Model 1 gives the random effect regression analysis when industry dummy variables 
are added to the regression. Model 2 gives the fixed effect regression results when stock return (RETURN) is added as an additional 
independent variable. All variables are fully defined in Table (3.5).  These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics, which are in 
parentheses, depending on the used regression fixed effect or random effect respectively. 
Variables Total_BLOCK  
Model 1 
2005-2009 
Total _BLOCK  
Model 2 
2008-2009 
intercept   1.178(6.37)*** 1.148 (6.68) *** 
CG _SCORE .0777(1.76)*                      .2198 (1.84) * 
SIZE -.1436(-3.52)*** -.2970 (-0.96)  
LEV .0549 (2.21)** .1201 (1.68) 
TURN .0288 (1.67)* .0586 (2.51) ** 
DIVIDEND .0113(0.65) .0364 (1.40) 
PRICE -.0201(-0.63) .1574 (1.68)* 
ROA -.0264(-1.70)* -.0095 (-0.43) 
TQ -.0714(-2.21) ** -.0086 (-0.30) 
INDUDTRY   yes ------------- 
RETURN ----------- -.1847(-1.34) 
 
R2 0.1870 0.1356 
Observations 556 278 
Groups 139 139 
Hausman test/ Prob > chi2 -------- 0.0001 
Method of estimation Random effects Fixed effects 
  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively  
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Table (3.13) Regression Analysis of CG and another Classification of Block Shareholdings 
This table presents the regression results of each type of the new classification of block shareholdings and CG score. Where BLOCK 5a is 
the percentage of shares owned by states, governmental agencies, governmental departments or local authorities with at least 3% of the 
company shares, BLOCK 6 is the percentage of shares owned by families and individuals who are outsiders, BLOCK7 is the percentage of 
shares owned by others such as foundations or research institutes with at least 3% of the company shares. All variables are fully defined in 
Table (3.5). These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics, which are in parentheses, depending on the used regression fixed effect or 
random effect respectively. 
Variables BLOCK 5a 
 Model 1 
BLOCK 6  
Model 2 
BLOCK 7 
Model 3 
intercept -.0371 (-1.57) .0598(1.00) .0235(0.35) 
CG_ SCORE .0332(1.37) -.0271 (-0.85) .0183(0.41) 
SIZE -.0078(-0.99)  .0158(0.40)  -.0758(-1.69)*  
LEV .0114 (1.31) -.0084(-0.39) .0780(1.91)* 
TURN .0016(0.86)  .0990 (  1.79)* .0303(1.46) 
DIVIDEND -.0159(-1.25) .0133(  0.69) -.0148(-0.76) 
PRICE .0138(1.00) -.0448(-1.22) .0700(1.46) 
ROA -.0017(-0.45)  -.0053(-0.46) .0029(0.10) 
TQ  -.0157 (-0.89) .0227(1.02) -.0484 (-1.25) 
 
R2 0.0304 0.0249 0.0134 
Observations 556 556 556 
Groups 139 139 139 
Hausman test/ Prob > chi2 0.0513 0.1375 0.0924 
Method of estimation Random effects Random effects Random effects 
  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively  
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Table (3.14):  Summary of the Main Results of BLOCK- Shareholders’ 
Preferences. 
Shareholders’ Preferences CG -SCORE BCII BPPI AAI 
Total_BLOCK +SR +SR NSR NSR 
BLOCK1 +SR NSR NSR +SR 
BLOCK 2 +SR +SR NSR NSR 
BLOCK 3 NSR NSR NSR NSR 
BLOCK 4 NSR NSR NSR NSR 
BLOCK 5 NSR NSR NSR +SR 
Note: +/- SR: Positive/Negative significant relationship; NSR: Non- significant 
relationship 
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Chapter Four: Essay Two 
The Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm 
Performance Pre and During the Financial Crisis: UK 
FTSE 350 Companies 
Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the effect of Corporate Governance (CG) on 
firm performance before and during the financial crisis in UK context. It also 
examines one channel suggested in the literature through which CG could have 
impact on firm performance; it examines the mediating effect of agency cost. The 
results indicate that only in the pre-crisis period, CG affects firm performance; 
however, during the crisis period, it shows a non-significant relationship. 
Empirical results further support the mediating role of agency costs which is 
consistent with the agency theory; this mediating role is proved only in the pre-
crisis period and this is held only for one of the CG-sub indices.  These results 
reveal that not all of CG sub-indices are effective in reducing agency cost and 
improving firm performance; namely, board composition, independence and 
practice proved to be ineffective in reducing agency cost and enhancing firm 
performance both before and during crisis period. Moreover, this study provides 
the evidence that CG is less effective in influencing firm performance during 
crisis period which implies that CG mechanisms’ effects differ from the crisis to 
the non-crisis period. Therefore, the efficacy of good CG mechanisms, such as 
board independence and board practices, that are believed to have common 
relevance are questionable especially during crisis periods. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, agency cost, firm performance, 2007/2008 
financial crisis, UK 
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4.1  Introduction and Research Focus 
The financial crisis that followed the subprime meltdown in the US has raised a 
lot of concern about the role of CG (Aebi et al., 2012). It is argued that poor CG, 
among other factors, contributed to the crisis (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). 
Therefore, the weaknesses in CG systems could lead to a financial crisis 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009).  In addition, according to The Shareholder Bill of Rights Act 
of 2009, CG was a major cause of the severe financial crisis that badly affected 
the United States (Tarraf, 2011). 
 
There are some reasons why CG became more important during a period of the 
financial crisis: first, the expected rate of return is expected to decline during the 
crisis time; therefore, there is a more chance for the increasing of expropriation by 
managers. Second, investors give more focus to CG in crisis times and, therefore, 
any weaknesses in CG will easily be discovered by them; these weaknesses may 
be ignored in normal time .Third, companies might suffer from financial distress 
during financial crisis period; therefore, they are expected to have severe agency 
problems. Consequently, CG is important to deal with such problems (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Johnson et al., 2000; Kim and Lee, 2003; Mitton, 2002; Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998). 
 
Although the current economic crisis is the biggest one since the Great 
Depression, it can be argued that limited research appears to have been conducted 
regarding the relationship between CG and firm performance during this financial 
crisis period. This limited research focused on banks and financial institutions’ 
CG. More attention was given to financial institutions due to the increasing 
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importance given by public policy makers regarding the suitability of CG systems 
applied to financial institutions (Walker, 2009).  Examples of studies that 
examined the relationship among CG and performance in banks and financial 
institutions during the recent financial crisis include: the study by Aebi et al. 
(2012), Cornett et al. (2010), Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009), and Minton et al. 
(2010).  Minton et al. (2010), for instance, used a sample of US financial 
institutions to examine the effect of CG on firm performance before and during 
the financial crisis. They considered the effect of financial expertise of the board 
and also board independence and their analysis indicated a negative association 
among financial expertise and performance during the crisis period; however, this 
relationship is found to be positive in the pre-crisis period. Cornett et al. (2010) 
also considered U.S. banks and examined internal CG mechanisms’ effect on bank 
performance before and during the financial crisis. They found that in the period 
before and during crisis there was a sharp decline in many CG mechanisms. The 
results indicated also that larger banks with poor CG performed badly during the 
crisis. In addition, Aebi et al. (2012) examined the influence of both CG 
characteristics and risk governance characteristics on bank performance; they 
examined the effect of both chief risk officer existence on the board and whether 
they report directly to the board or CEO. Their results revealed that during the 
crisis period banks performed better when chief risk officer reported directly to 
the board. 
 
Whereas the role and importance of CG on affecting banks and financial 
institutions’ performance during the crisis were at the focus of previous studies, 
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CG impact on non-financial institutions during this crisis period has mainly been 
ignored in prior literature until now. Recently, Essen et al. (2013), in a large 
sample of both financial and non-financial firms that cover more than 1100 firms 
from 26 European countries before and during the recent crisis, investigated the 
effect of CG at both firm and country levels on firm performance.  The current 
paper will add to this previous literature and will focus mainly on non-financial 
firms; using a sample of FTSE 350 non-financial firms, the current paper will 
examine the effect of CG on the performance in the period before and during the 
financial crisis.  In addition, little attention is given to the channel through which 
CG affects performance; what is missing in prior literature that attempted to study 
the effect of CG on firm performance is the channel through which CG affects 
performance (Henry, 2010). Some previous studies have suggested some 
intermediate channels that could explain the effect of CG on firm performance. 
For example La Porta, et al. (2000) suggested stronger shareholder rights and 
legal protection mechanisms as channels. Black et al. (2011) considered Related-
Party Transactions as one channel as their results indicated that in firms with high 
CG level a weak significant negative relationship is found between related party 
transactions and Tobin’s Q. Other channels include informative disclosure; firms 
with good CG make better disclosure (Beekes and Brown, 2006). Moreover, 
Mcdonald et al. (2008) revealed that CEOs’ advice networks mediated the 
relationship between CG and firm performance. Another important channel 
mentioned by Henry (2010) and Le and Buck (2011) is agency cost; Henry (2010) 
found significant negative relationship among companies’ compliance with CG 
index and agency cost level.  However, in his study he did not empirically test the 
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mediating role of agency cost. Only the study by Le and Buck (2011) considered 
this mediating effect of agency cost on the relationship between state ownership 
and firm performance. Therefore, the current paper extends the previous studies to 
examine the mediating role of agency costs on the relationship among CG and 
firm performance. 
To sum up, the main objective of this paper is to study the relationship between 
CG and firm performance before and during the current financial crisis as limited 
research appears to have been conducted to examine this relationship in non-
normal period. Further, it aims to examine the mediating role of agency cost on 
this relationship. Therefore, in a sample of UK listed companies covering both pre 
and during crisis period, the current paper addresses the following questions: 
1. Does CG act as an effective mechanism in improving firm performance? 
 If so; 
2.  Does agency cost mediate the relationship among CG and firm performance? 
 
Using a sample of 139 companies of the UK FTSE 350, the results indicate that in 
the period before the crisis there was a significant positive association among 
overall CG and Tobin’s Q (TQ) as a measure of firm performance; they also 
reveal a non-significant association among CG and Return On Assets (ROA). 
During the crisis period on the other hand, the results indicate a non-significant 
association between CG and firm performance measures. Moreover, the results 
found that CG-Score has no effect on agency cost in both before and during the 
crisis periods; however, only accountability and audit index (AAI) is found to 
affect agency cost in the pre-crisis period. The final results show that agency cost 
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fully mediates the relation between AAI and firm performance in the pre-crisis 
period. 
 
This paper provides a number of contributions to the literature. First, it 
complements and extends existing research that attempts to study the effect of CG 
of non-financial firms on performance during the recent financial crises. It 
considers this relationship before and during the recent financial crisis in UK; it is 
considered the first to test this relationship in this turbulent period and also the 
first to consider non-financial firms. Previous studies focused on financial firms 
and focused more on the macro economic factors (see for example Beltratti and 
Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; Taylor, 2009). Second, it contributes to the 
theoretical background as it is among the first to empirically examine the 
mediating role of agency cost on the relationship among CG and performance. 
Third, this paper extends the existing empirical work on CG and agency cost;  it 
examines the impact of CG on agency cost by using a composite measure of CG 
instead of focusing on a small number of CG variables and overlooking its overall 
impact on agency costs. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study is 
considered the first paper in the UK that examines the effect of a composite 
measure of CG on agency cost on UK large listed companies; therefore, it adds to 
McKnighta and Weir (2009) who first examined agency costs in large UK 
companies. This paper differs from the study of McKnight and Weir (2009) 
because it focuses on the impact of a composite CG measure on agency cost 
instead of focusing on board characteristics and ownership structure. Moreover, 
the only study that examined the impact of CG Index on agency cost is the study 
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of Henry (2010) in Australia that studied the impact of an overall CG code on 
agency cost that covers the years from 1992 to 2002. So Henry (2010) examined 
this relationship in a normal period while our paper examines it in another country 
and also in a crisis period. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The nature of agency environment in UK is 
discussed first in Section 2, followed by section 3 that presents the theoretical 
framework and hypotheses development. Section 4 focused on the research 
method used in this paper. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. The final 
section presents the summary and concluding remarks. 
 
4.2  Agency Environment in UK 
In this paper UK market is considered an appealing setting to study the agency 
cost and at the same time to investigate CG effect on reducing this agency cost. 
CG environment of UK is characterised by having a large degree of managerial 
discretion (Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). Certain factors lead to increase 
managerial discretion and higher agency cost. These factors include the poor 
disciplinary role played by the market of corporate control. In addition, although 
there is an increasing ownership by institutional investor in UK, most of these 
investors adopt a passive role in monitoring management (Ozkan, 2007). 
Therefore, it is important to increase the level of involvement of institutional 
investors and encourage them to be more involved; lately in UK both the 
institutional investors committee and the UK government were thinking  in a way 
to increase shareholder activism by making the voting of fund managers at 
shareholders meetings to be compulsory (Mallin et al., 2005). Also, weak 
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fiduciary obligation on directors in UK compared to other developed country like 
US; in US for example directors have obligations to take care of shareholders and 
they can be sued if they fail to do that. However, in UK the weak fiduciary 
obligations motivate non-executive directors to play only advisory role instead of 
doing their monitoring role; they should monitor executive directors and make 
sure that they work for achieving shareholders wealth maximisation (Fama, 1980; 
Goergen and Rennebog, 2001). 
Thus the realisation of these agency problems has resulted in the need to focus on 
several important aspects including: competitive market for managerial labour, 
corporate control mechanisms, and the development of CG codes to mitigate these 
agency problems (Henry, 2010). Therefore, examining the impact of CG on 
mitigating agency cost in UK before and during the current financial crisis in the 
current paper would be of significant importance. 
 
4.3  Theory and Hypotheses Development  
This section reviews previous studies that examined the different relationship 
between CG and performance, between CG and agency cost, and the relationship 
between agency cost and performance in order to develop a research hypothesis 
for further analysis in this paper. 
4.3.1  The Relationship between CG and Firm Performance 
An ultimate test to know if CG reform has a positive impact is by investigating 
whether a positive relationship exists between CG and firm performance or not 
(Solomon, 2009). The majority of previous CG research that studied this 
relationship was based on the framework of agency theory (Sami et al., 2011).  
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According to agency theory, the separation between owners and managers will 
cause conflict between them and also among shareholders and debt holders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Internal and external CG mechanisms, according to 
agency theory, are considered important mechanisms to address agency problems 
in modern corporations that occur due to this separation of principals and agents. 
Therefore, agency theory recognises the important role played by CG in aligning 
the interest of both shareholders and managers which in turn will reduce agency 
problem and will allow firms to perform better   (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Sami et 
al., 2011).  
 
Many previous studies examined the association among CG and firm performance 
(e.g. Aman and  Nguyen, 2008; Anderson and  Gupta, 2009; Bhagat and Bolton, 
2008;  Black et al., 2003; Black et al., 2006; Bozec et al., 2010; Cremers and Nair, 
2005; Dahya et al., 2008; Davis, 2002; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Florackis, 2005; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Li et al., 2012; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990;  Rani et al., 2013; Sami et al., 2011; Tariq  and Abbas, 2013; 
Veprauskaite and  Adams, 2013; Wang et al., 2012). However despite the 
extensive literature, its results are rather inconclusive; moreover, most of these 
studies examined this relationship in non-crisis periods. The relationship between 
CG and firm performance during turbulent period did not receive much attention. 
There is little research about the crisis period and CG role in affecting 
performance during this turbulent period. 
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By reviewing  previous literature, it can be argued that  a number of studies 
investigates the relationship between CG and firm performance during Asian 
financial crisis period; these include for example the study by Mitton (2002) who 
studied CG influence on performance; he examined three CG dimensions which 
are corporate diversification, ownership structure, and disclosure on firm 
performance, and he found that during crisis period all three dimensions have a 
significant effect on performance. Lemmon and Lins (2003) also considered the 
effect of one aspect of CG which is ownership structure on firm performance; by 
focusing on eight East Asian countries they considered a sample of more than 800 
firms and their findings indicated that TQ declined during the crisis period of 
firms in which there was more expropriation of minority shareholders and also 
that stock return in these firms underperformed other firms during the crisis. In 
addition, Leung and Horwitz (2010) examined also the relationship between CG 
and firm value on Hong Kong during the Asian financial crisis; they focused on 
ownership structure like the study of Lemon and Lins (2001), but they focused 
mainly on management ownership and their findings revealed that firms with 
more ownership concentration by management performed better during the crisis 
period. 
 
However, less attention was given to the recent financial crisis; there is little 
research regarding CG effect on firm performance during this recent financial 
crisis. This limited literature includes for example Beltratti and Stulz (2012) who 
tried to answer the question of why banks performed badly during crisis period 
and examine if CG played a role in this crisis.  Their empirical results during 
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crisis period indicated that a board that is Shareholder-friendly had a negative 
effect on firm performance. Minton et al. (2010) also focused on board 
characteristics and examined their effect on firm performance by examining the 
effect of both financial expertise of the board and board independence before and 
during the crisis in a sample of U.S. financial institutions. Their findings showed 
that during the crisis period financial expertise had a negative effect on stock 
performance; further the results indicated a positive effect prior to the crisis. This 
is because financial expertise is related to more risk taking before the crisis; they 
were rewarded for their attitude by the market before the crisis hit which in turn 
led to poor performance during crisis period. This result indicates that banks with 
good CG may take more risk which in turn affect negatively in performance 
during crisis period (Fortin et al., 2010). 
 
Erkens et al. (2012) reached similar results to those of the previous study of 
Minton et al. (2010); they investigated the influence of two CG mechanisms on 
performance including: independent directors and influential shareholders.  In 
their study they considered 30 countries and relied on a sample of large financial 
institutions; their analysis found that companies perform poor during the crisis 
period if they have institutional shareholders and more independent directors.  
This result is due to the managers being encouraged by both institutional investors 
and independent directors in the period leading to the crisis to increase 
shareholders return by greater risk-taking. On the other hand, the Aebi et al. 
(2012) focused more on risk governance and examined the association between 
risk governance and performance of banks in the period during financial crisis. 
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Their results showed if chief risk officer report directly to the board and not to the 
CEO this will affect positively on both Return On Equity (ROE) and stock return. 
In addition, their findings indicated a non-significant relationship between 
standard CG mechanisms and banks’ performance during the crisis. Cornett et al. 
(2010) revealed that many CG mechanisms of a sample of U.S. firms before and 
during crisis had been weakened significantly, and they also found that large 
banks with poor CG performed badly during the crisis.  Peni and Vähämaa (2012)  
revealed mixed results in US banks as their results indicated a positive association 
between CG and profitability, but they also found that in the middle of the crisis 
good CG had a negative effect on stock performance. 
 
Thus, from these previous studies it can be argued that their results are rather 
inconclusive; in addition, the majority of previous literature gave more attention 
to the Asian financial crisis with little focus on the current financial crisis 
especially in the non-financial firms. The following studies considered non-
financial firms during the recent financial crisis. Francis et al. (2012), on a sample 
of US non-financial companies during the recent crisis, examined the effect of one 
dimension of CG on performance and their findings revealed a non- significant 
association between board independence and firm performance; however, when 
they used outside directors who had limited connections with the CEO as another 
definition of the true independence, they found a positive association between 
board independence and firm performance. Also, Aldamen et al. (2012) examined 
the influence of CG on firm performance during the recent financial crisis, but 
they focused only on the association between the characteristics of audit 
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committee and performance. Their sample consisted of non-financial firms of 
S&P 300, and their results indicated that during crisis period a number of audit 
committee characteristics had a significant association with firm performance. 
 
Moreover, there are recently two more studies that considered non-financial firms; 
they are the study of Gupta et al. 2013 and the study of Essen et al. (2013); Gupta 
et al. (2013) investigated the influence of internal CG on firm performance in a 
sample non-financial firms from different countries during financial crisis; by 
using CG index they found no evidence for any association between CG and 
performance during crisis period. On the other hand, the study of Essen et al. 
(2013) studied the effect of both micro and macro CG on the performance of a 
cross country sample covered 26 European countries before and during crisis; 
their sample consisted of financial and non-financial firms and they investigated 
the combined effect of firm and country level CG and they showed that there is a 
difference of the effect of firm and country CG level from steady to crisis period.  
 
Therefore, this paper will add to the previous literature and will try to fill this gap 
in the literature by studying the association between CG and firm performance 
over the period from 2005 to 2009 on a sample of non-financial UK listed firms. 
Thus, this paper provides new evidence regarding the association among CG and 
firm performance in both periods before and during the financial crisis in UK 
context. Thus, following the prior literature that studied the association among CG 
and firm performance, in which the majority of these prior literature documents a 
positive relationship among CG and firm performance and which had revealed 
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that during the financial crisis better CG improved the financial performance 
(Ammann et al., 2011; Beltratti and Stulz , 2012;  Cornett et al.,  2010; Renders et 
al., 2010), the following hypothesis will be tested in this  paper: (see Figure 4.1, 
link 1)   
H1: There is a significant association between CG and firm performance during 
the crisis period.      
 
In addition, the previous relationship will also be tested for the period before the 
crisis to assess this relationship in both periods; to examine the role of CG in both 
periods. Moreover, the effect of CG sub-indices on firm performance will also be 
examined in both periods. 
 
4.3.2  Corporate Governance and Agency Cost 
4.3.2.1 Agency Conflicts and Agency costs 
CG is given more attention due to the development of the capital market and also 
due to the financial scandals around the world and, in addition, to the failure in 
CG that had been accused to contribute to the recent financial crisis (Tarraf, 
2011). For these reasons the focus had been centred on the effectiveness of CG; 
therefore agency cost is considered as an important factor that reflects this issue 
and has given more attention (Junwei et al., 2011).  Conflicts of interests between 
the agents and the principals occur as a result of the separation between ownership 
and control; this conflict brings out agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Therefore, agency costs arise when the interests of managers are not the same as 
the interests of shareholders. Managers may have the motivation to take on 
practices that provide them with benefits at the expense of shareholders such as 
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shirking, preferences for on-the-job perks, and other self-interested behaviour that 
affect shareholder wealth negatively (Ang et al., 2000; Wang, 2010). 
Agency cost includes all the costs that are related to the operating system and the 
activities intended to align the interests of both shareholders and managers.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976:6) defined agency cost as “the sum of (a) the 
monitoring expenditures by the principal, (b) the bonding expenditures by the 
agent, and (c) the residual loss”.  This residual loss occurs because it is actually 
impossible to entirely remove the conflict between the agent and the principal, 
which means that the residual loss remains. 
 
Thus, to mitigate this agency cost, firms need a system to reduce this agency cost 
and a system that can control management and improve shareholders’ interests 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). CG provides that system; by both internal and external 
CG mechanisms, managers’ opportunistic behaviour can be restricted and the 
conflict of interests among shareholders and managers can be reduced and hence 
agency costs can be mitigated (Shilefer and Vishny, 1986). According to the 
agency model CG mechanisms will help to align the interests of both agents and 
the principles and hence minimise agency costs (McKnight and Weir, 2009). 
Therefore, it is argued that internal and external CG mechanism will help in 
reducing this agency cost and hence to reduce their negative effect on firm 
performance. The following section reviews the prior literature that is related to 
the effect of CG on agency cost. 
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4.3.2.2 The Relationship between CG and Agency Costs 
Based on CG literature and agency theory, there are a number of mechanisms 
mentioned to restrict the opportunistic behavior of managers and hence protect 
shareholders interests. The most common CG mechanisms mentioned in the 
literature include ownership structure, directors and the board characteristics, 
financial disclosures, compensation, auditing and the market for corporate control 
(Firth et al., 2008). Investigating whether CG reduces agency costs is necessary; 
particularly taking into consideration the positive effects CG has on firm 
performance as mentioned in prior literature. The empirical literature that 
examined the effect of CG on agency cost started by Ang et al. (2000) who 
considered the first study to examine the association among CG and agency cost 
as they focused on non-publicity traded firms in US small businesses, their result 
indicated a significant negative association between agency costs and ownership 
by management and they also revealed a significant positive association between 
the number of shareholders and agency cost.  In the same vein, Fleming et al. 
(2005) studied the association between ownership structure and agency cost in 
non-listed Australian firms and they reached similar results. Moreover, Singh and 
Davidson (2003) followed Ang et al. (2000) but they focused on large American 
firms and their result showed that both large managerial ownership and smaller 
board size increased the asset utilisation ratios as a proxy of agency cost. Chen 
and Austin (2007) also followed the study of Singh and Davidson (2003) and 
investigated the effect of block ownership on reducing agency costs and in their 
analysis they covered the period from 1996 to 2001 for a sample of on large 
Chapter 4: Essay Two – The impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance Pre and During the 
Financial Crisis: UK FTSE 350 Companies 
 
119 
publicly traded companies, and they found that both inside and outside block 
shareholders reduced agency costs.  
 
While in developing countries; Mustapha and Ahmad (2011) investigated in 
Malaysian listed firms the agency relationship by examining the association 
between managerial ownership and agency costs; their findings supported those 
obtained in western countries; their results indicated a negative association among 
managerial ownership and agency costs. Iskandar et al. (2012) in addition 
considered ownership structure as a moderator variable and examined its 
influence on the association between free-cash flow and agency cost. They 
considered the monitoring role of three types of ownership concentration; they 
are:  management, foreign and government ownership. Their result, however, 
indicated that both management and foreign had an important monitoring task on 
assets utilisation in firms characterised with high free cash flow.  
 
Thus, prior literature that concerned with examining the relationship between CG 
and agency cost started by examining the relationship between ownership by 
management and agency cost; most this research found a negative association 
between them. Others studies also considered other CG variables to be related to 
agency cost; board of directors and its characteristics, managerial incentives, and 
capital structure are more popular in the literature (Gillan, 2006; Mcknight and 
Weir, 2009). Studies focused on board characteristics include, for example, the 
study of Florackis and Ozkan’s (2004) which revealed a negative association 
among board size and agency cost. On the other hand Ibrahim and Samad (2011) 
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examined in a sample of Malaysian firms the effect of independent director, board 
size, and duality on reducing agency costs and they found a significant negative 
relationship among board size and agency cost; therefore, larger board is efficient 
in reducing agency cost.  
 
Other studies examined the impact of different CG variables such as board 
characteristics, ownership structure, compensations and others include: the study 
of Florackis (2008) examined the effect of several CG mechanisms on agency cost 
using two proxies for agency costs; asset turnover ratio and the ratio of selling, 
general and administrative expenses to total sales (SG&A).  Using a UK sample 
for the period 1999-2003, he studied the effect of managerial compensation, 
capital structure, board composition and ownership on agency cost. Again 
Mcknight and Weir (2009) focused on the UK context and they also examined the 
influence of both ownership and governance on agency cost of large UK firms for 
the period from 1996-2000; the effect of board characteristics, ownership 
characteristics and debt are examined in their paper. In UK context Florackis and 
Ozkan (2009) also examined the influence of entrenchment on agency cost for the 
period 1999-2005. Davidson et al. (2006) investigated the impact of CEO 
ownership and other CG mechanisms on agency cost for pre-IPO firms and then 
in the post-IPO firms; their result indicated a significant negative association 
between CEO ownership and agency cost in both pre- and post-IPO and at the 
same time indicated that board composition, leverage, block holders ownership 
and venture capital firms did not have any impact on agency cost.  Firth et al. 
(2008) investigated the impact of ownership structure and CG on agency costs in a 
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different agency setting other than western countries; they examined this 
relationship in Chinese listed companies.  In their study, they focused on the 
identity of shareholders by investigating the impact of different types of 
ownership on agency cost and they also considered the influence of board 
composition on reducing agency cost, and their results indicated no effect of 
ownership structure on reducing agency cost, on the contrary they found that 
companies with foreign shareholders have higher agency cost. Adut et al. (2011) 
examined the relationship between CG variables and the probability to 
consistently meet or beat earnings benchmarks (CMBE), they also examined the 
impact of CG in reducing agency cost that is associated with CMBE. They argued 
that good CG will reduce this agency cost due to the reduction in management 
opportunistic behavior. However, they found that not all CG attributes reduced 
agency cost; their result indicated CEO power increased agency cost. At the same 
time, they found that with more level of shareholder power it is less possible for 
managers to engage in opportunistic behavior to reach CMBE. 
 
Despite that most of the previous studies focused on internal CG as mentioned 
before, recently there has been more attention given to other CG related variables; 
the following three studies are examples. Jurkus et al. (2011) investigated the 
association between top manager’s gender diversity and agency costs; they 
considered both female CEOs and female corporate officers. Their result 
confirmed that top management gender diversity is negatively associated with 
agency costs. Within the Chinese setting Xu et al. (2011) focused on an ignored 
mechanism which is tax enforcement;  this study focused on tax enforcement as 
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an external CG mechanism  and examined its influence on two types of agency 
costs; agency costs between block holders and minority shareholders and agency 
costs between managers and shareholders. Their results revealed a negative 
association between tax enforcement and both agency costs types especially for 
state-controlled firms. Finally, Boivie et al. (2011) considered how CEO 
organisational identification affects agency costs as an internal psychological 
factor, and their results showed that CEO with higher level of organisational 
identifications will result in lesser agency cost, and another important finding is 
that with this high level of identification, board independence will have weaker 
influence on agency cost which imply that in the presence of high level of CEO 
organisational identifications, there will be less need for external control 
mechanisms. 
 
To sum up, CG aims to reduce agency costs; prior empirical studies had showed 
results that in line with agency theory which indicated that CG reduces agency 
costs; firms minimise agency costs by a variety of governance mechanisms. 
Consistent with agency approach and with previous result of Henry (2010) that 
showed a negative association between CG and agency cost, the developed CG 
index in our paper is anticipated to be negatively associated with agency costs. 
Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:  (see Figure 1, link 2) 
 
H2: There is a negative association between CG and agency costs. 
 
This previous relationship will be tested also in the pre-crisis period. In addition, 
from an individual governance attribute perspective, the current study will also 
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investigate the relationship among CG-Sub indices and agency cost; agency costs 
are anticipated to be negatively associated with CG-sub indices, i.e. Board 
Composition and Independence index (BCII), Board Practice and Process Index 
(BPPI) and Accountability and Audit Index (AAI). 
 
4.3.3  The Relationship between Agency Cost and Firm Performance 
Agency cost and its effect had been the focus in different contexts such as its 
impact on dividends policy (Al Taleb, 2012; D’Souza and Saxena, 1999; Filbeck 
and Mullineaux, 1999; Utami and Inanga, 2011), and company’s financial 
decisions; agency cost affects financial decisions such as capital structure 
especially when considering the principle-agent problem (Bell, 2010 and Lasfer, 
1995). On the other hand, limited studies examined the association between 
agency cost and performance. This limited stream of research revealed that firm's 
performance is significantly related to agency costs (Gompers et al., 2003). 
Boardman et al. (1997) focused on the performance of MNE subsidiaries and their 
results are consistent with agency theory as they indicated that agency cost is an 
important determinant of differences in performance between both domestic and 
foreign Canadian firms. Also Le and Buck (2011) reached to the same result in a 
Chinese context; their result showed that agency cost is negatively associated with 
firm performance. Xiao (2009) examined the same relation on 156 Chinese 
publicly listed companies between 2002 and 2007. Moreover, Wang (2010) 
examined the effect of both agency cost and free cash flow on firm performance 
on a sample of Taiwanese companies; they found evidence that supports the 
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agency theory as their results indicated that agency cost has a significant negative 
association with both stock return and firm performance. 
Therefore, the above mentioned empirical studies supported the agency theory; 
they revealed a negative relationship between agency costs and firm performance. 
Based on the agency theory the current study aims to re-investigate agency cost 
influence on firm performance in both periods before and during crisis. Therefore 
the following hypothesis is tested:  (Figure 4.1, link 3) 
H3:  there is a negative relationship between agency costs and firm performance. 
 
4.3.4  Agency Cost as a Mediator Variable in the Relation between CG and 
Performance 
According to agency theory, good CG mitigate agency cost and improve 
performance and shareholders return, but the empirical research that examines the 
relationship between those three variables is missing. Agency theory suggests that 
firms with good CG have better performance and have higher value as a result of 
reducing agency cost. For example, according to agency theory, effective board of 
directors, as one of the CG mechanisms, provides better monitoring on managers 
which in turn will minimise agency costs and increasing shareholders’ wealth 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). This is supported by many studies that focused mainly 
on the direct relationship between firm performance and CG (Black et al., 2012; 
Gompers et al., 2003), or between CG and agency cost (Henry, 2010). There is 
only one study, to the best of our knowledge, that studied the mediating role of 
agency cost on the association among CG and firm performance; Le and Buck 
(2011) examined the mediating role of agency cost on the association between 
state ownership and firm performance in a sample of Chinese companies.  Their 
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findings revealed a positive association between state ownership and firm 
performance, and also their further empirical analysis supported agency cost 
mediating role. Based on the agency theory, this paper aims to examine the 
mediating role of agency cost on the relationship among CG and performance. 
Therefore, the current hypothesis will be tested in both periods and is based on the 
first hypothesis: (Figure 4.1, link 4) 
H4: Agency costs mediate the positive association among CG and firm 
performance. 
 
The next section presents the research methodology employed in this paper; 
sample, data collection, variables measurement and empirical models are all 
discussed in details. 
 
4.4  Research Methods 
4.4.1  Sample Selection and Data Sources 
For the purpose of the paper, a sample of FTSE 350 UK listed companies was 
selected as the aim is to test the relationships between variables on a sample of 
large firms. A balanced panel dataset is used that covers the period from 2005 to 
2009. The sample includes 139 companies excluding the financial institutions and 
utility companies. The total sample is 695 of firm-year observations 
demonstrating 139 companies for the period from 2005-2009. This sample period 
is divided into two main periods: the pre-crisis period from 2005 to 2007 and the 
crisis period from 2008 to 2009 (for more details about sample selection see 
chapter 3, section 3.5.1). 
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Accounting, market-based and financial data was obtained from DataStream.  
Data about firm size, total debt, dividend, ROA, total sales, and asset utilisation 
were collected from DataStream. In addition, data about CG variables were hand-
collected from the annual reports of sample companies.  
 
4.4.2  Variables: Measurement and Description 
4.4.2.1 Agency Cost Measurement 
Agency cost is used as an independent variable in H3 and as a dependent variable 
in H2 and as a mediator variable in H4. There are many measures used for agency 
cost but the following two measures commonly used in financial economics and 
accounting studies (Ang et al., 2000): The asset utilisation ratio is the first 
common measure of agency cost calculated as annual sales divided by annual total 
assets. It is an inverse proxy for agency costs and it measures how effectively 
management is using its assets.  A low assets utilisation ratio means higher agency 
cost because companies that have poorer ratios have inefficient use of assets; they 
make poor investment decisions or unproductive asset purchase. This variable had 
been used by Ang et al. (2000), Florackis and Ozkan (2004), McKnight and Weir 
(2009), and Singh and Davidson (2003).  The second measure is the ratio of 
operating expense to sales and it is also adopted by Ang et al. (2000), and this 
ratio measures how operating costs are effectively controlled by management. 
Instead of using the operating expense to sales ratio, others adopted selling, 
general and administrative (SG&A) expenses to sales ratio; it is a direct proxy of 
agency costs. This ratio is used to identify expenditure on salaries, travel expense, 
office building, equipment and fitting, advertising and marketing and rents 
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(Florackis and Ozkan, 2004). It reflects management’s discretion in spending the 
firm’s resources; higher SG&A ratio means that firms are expected to have higher 
agency cost between managers and shareholders (Singh and Davidson, 2003). 
 
There are other measures used as proxies for agency cost, among them; first, the 
asset liquidity ratio, and the greater the liquidity ratio the higher the agency cost 
(Prowse, 1990; Wang and Ye, 2014).  Second, Henry (2010) used another proxy 
for agency cost which is TQ ratio, and it is measured as the “sum of the market 
capitalisation of equity plus the book value of preference shares plus the book 
value of long-term debt, divided by the book value of total assets” (Henry ,2010, 
p.31). A lower TQ ratio shows poor managerial performance and the existence of 
agency problems. Finally, free cash flow ratio (FCF) is used by Henry (2010), and 
McKnight and Weir (2009); managers with high levels of FCF are expected to 
invest it in negative net present value projects instead of paying it to shareholders.  
This paper employs one proxy measure of the agency cost for listed UK firms; 
following prior studies such as Ang et al. (2000), Henry (2010) and Singh and 
Davidson (2003), this paper focuses on the asset utilisation ratio as a proxy for 
agency cost. This measure was adopted by Ang et al. (2000); it has been chosen 
because it is a valuable proxy for agency costs; it evaluates the effectiveness of 
the investment decisions and also an indication of whether management is able to 
make best use of its assets. Therefore, this proxy is more likely to capture the level 
of agency conflicts that might subsist among shareholders and managers (Truong 
and Heaney, 2013). Moreover, this paper did not adopt (SG&A) expenses to sales 
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ratio due to the unavailability (missing data for some companies); data related to 
expense for the listed UK companies was missing for a number of companies. 
 
4.4.2.2 Performance Variables Measurement 
Two measures of firm financial performance are adopted in this paper. The first 
measure is a more stable market performance measure that is commonly used in 
the literature; it is TQ.  It is calculated as “the ratio of the market value of 
common shares plus total debt divided by the book value of total assets of the 
company” (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1047). The second measure that is used 
in this paper is a short term accounting measure that is also frequently used in the 
literature- ROA- calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets (Klapper and 
Love, 2004). Using these measures is particularly interesting as ROA is 
considered backward-looking accounting measures while TQ is considered a 
forward-looking market measure (Chen et al., 2008).  Higher TQ value means that 
CG of the firm is more effective; it also indicates that there is a good market 
perception of the performance of the company (Ibrahim and Samad, 2011; Weir et 
al., 2002). In addition, higher ROA shows the company uses its asset effectively 
in serving shareholders’ economic interests. 
 
4.4.2.3 CG Measurement 
The independent variable is CG; the developed CG Index is as discussed earlier in 
chapter 2. In this paper, both the aggregate CG-Score and the different CG-Sub 
indices are used as independent variables to study the influence of both the 
aggregate and the sub-indices on agency cost and firm performance as mentioned 
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before. Data about CG was hand-collected from the annual reports of these 
companies. 
 
4.4.2.4 Control Variables 
There are a number of control variables that are included in the analysis; previous 
literature generally recognises additional control variables for the previous 
mentioned relationships. In consistence with previous research, some control 
variables have been included; previous research considered a number of variables 
including firm size (Beiner et al.,2006; Leung and Horwitz, 2010; Mitton ,2002), 
and leverage (Ammann et al., 2011; Chen and Austin, 2007; Ibrahim and Samad, 
2011; Singh and Davidson, 2003), dividend (Dobbin and Jung, 2011; Florackis 
and Ozkan, 2009; Henry, 2010), ROA (Fleming et al., 2005; Zhang and Li, 2008), 
and book to market ratio (BM) (Jurkus et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2011). This paper 
will consider firm size, leverage (Ammann et al., 2011; Singh and Davidson, 
2003), dividend (Dobbin and Jung, 2011; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009), and ROA 
(Fleming et al., 2005; Zhang and Li., 2008) as control variables. 
 
4.4.3  Empirical Models 
Four relationships will be examined in this paper (Figure (4.1) below illustrates 
these four relationships). The first relationship aims to study the direct association 
between CG the independent variable and the dependent variable (firm’s 
performance). In the second relationship, CG is the independent variable and 
agency cost is considered the dependent variable; therefore, in this relationship, 
the effect of CG on agency cost is examined. In the third relationship, agency cost 
represents the independent variable and the dependent variable is firm 
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performance; here the focus is to examine the association among agency cost and 
firm performance. Finally, the fourth relationship examines the effect of the 
inclusion of the mediating variable which is agency cost in the first relationship 
that studies the association among CG and firm performance. 
  
     Independent variable                                 Mediator variable                                  Dependent variable  
 
                                                         (2)                                                        (3) 
            
                                                    
                                                     (4) Decline in direct effect due to Mediator 
                                                                                   (1) 
 
Figure (4.1): The mediation model 
There are different methods that are used to examine the relationship between CG 
and performance; Bozec and Bozec (2012: 82) mentioned some of these methods 
“portfolio analysis, event studies approach, OLS regressions, panel regressions, 
instrumental variables in a 2SLS/3SLS and/or a simultaneous equations 
framework”. In this paper, Panel regression will be used; as mentioned before in 
chapter (3), panel data is considered one common means to control the 
endogeneity problem between CG and firm performance. It addresses spurious 
correlation that might take place if an unnoticed variable concurrently determines 
CG and performance (Bozec and Bozec, 2012). The other type of endogeneity is 
simultaneity; most studies, including the current paper, lack a good instrument to 
address the issue of endogeneity. Thus, in order to address this endogeneity 
problem between CG and performance, the lagged explanatory variable is used in 
the analysis. This method is considered a partial method of solving the 
Agency Cost Corporate  
Governance 
Firm performance 
Chapter 4: Essay Two – The impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance Pre and During the 
Financial Crisis: UK FTSE 350 Companies 
 
131 
simultaneity problem. Therefore, the lagged value of CG is used as explanatory 
variable; by using CG mechanisms immediately before the financial crisis period; 
therefore, to a large degree, the problem of simultaneity can be eliminated (Baek, 
et al., 2004). 
 
Given the panel nature of data, we test which model is appropriate (the fixed or 
the random-effect model) by using the Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002).  If the 
null hypothesis is rejected, this suggests that the fixed effect model should be used 
(this test is included in each of the regression tables). Furthermore, in all panel 
data regression models, a robust standard error is used; Hoechle (2007) indicated 
that it is common to rely on “robust” standard errors in order to ensure valid 
statistical inference.  
In order to test H1, which posits that CG is significantly associated with firm 
performance; the following models have been developed: 
First, to investigate the influence of CG score on operating performance, the 
following model has been estimated: 
 ROAit= α i + β1CG _SCOREit+ β2 SIZEit+ β3 LEVit+ β4 DIVIDENDit+ uit …..(1) 
 
Where CG_ SCORE is the total CG index that is computed by the summing of the 
sub-indices dividing by three (the number of sub-indices), LEV is calculated as 
total debt to total assets, SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s total assets, ROA is 
the ratio of net income to total assets, and DIVIDEND is Dividends per Share / 
Market Price-Year End * 100  
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Second, to study the impact of CG score on firm value, the following model has 
been estimated: 
TQit= αi + β1 CG_SCOREit+ β2 SIZEit+ β3 LEVit+ β4 DIVIDENDit+ β4 
ROAit + uit ……………………………………………………..    (2) 
 
Where TQ is measured as Market value of equity + total debts /total assets, and 
the other variables as defined before. These previous two models will also be re-
estimated by including CG sub-indices instead of CG_SCORE in order to 
examine the impact of CG sub-indices on firm performance. 
To test hypothesis two which examines the relation between CG and agency cost, 
the following model has been developed: 
ASSET_ UTILIZATIONit= αi + β1 CG _SCOREit+ β2 SIZEit+ β3 LEVit+ β4 
DIVIDENDit+ β5 ROAit+ uit ………………………..…. (3) 
 
Where ASSET_UTILIZATION is measured by annual sales divided by annual 
total assets, and the other variables as defined before. Also, this previous model is 
re-estimated by including CG sub-indices instead of CG_SCORE in order to study 
the impact of CG sub-indices on agency cost. 
 
To test hypothesis three which examines the association among agency cost and 
firm performance, the agency costs variable (ASSET_UTILIZATION) is added to 
the previous first two models (model 1 and 2) as follows: 
ROAit= αi + β1 CG_SCOREit+ β2 ASSET_UTILIZATIONit + β3 SIZEit+ β4 
LEVit+ β5 DIVIDENDit+ uit …....................................................... (4) 
 
TQit= αi + β1 CG_SCOREit+ β2 ASSET_UTILIZATIONit+ β3 SIZEit+ β4 
LEVit+ β5 DIVIDENDit+ β6 ROAit+ uit ………………………………(5) 
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To test H4, which examines whether agency cost mediates the relationship 
between CG and firm performance, a formal mediation test is conducted as 
described by Baron and Kenny (1986).  This test include the following steps: 
First, examine whether CG which is the independent variable is associated with 
financial performance which is the dependent variable (Figure 4.1, link 1). 
Second, examine whether CG affects the mediator, that is, agency cost (Figure 
4.1, link 2). Third, adding agency cost as an additional explanatory variable in the 
model that examines the association between CG and financial performance. In 
order to establish mediation by agency cost, the following conditions must occur. 
First, the mediator variable (agency cost) must have an effect on the dependent 
variable (financial performance) after controlling for the effect of CG (Figure 4.1, 
link 3). Second, including agency cost in the regression should reduce the degree 
of the effect of CG (Figure 4.1, link 4). 
The next section presents the result of empirical analysis used to test the research 
hypothesises. Both CG Index and CG Sub-indices are used in order to investigate 
the effect of these aggregate and disaggregate measures on both agency cost and 
firm performance. Therefore, section 5 presents the descriptive statistics, the 
regression results, and finally the robustness checks. 
 
4.5  Empirical Results and Analysis 
4.5.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Table (4.1) reports the descriptive statistics of the variables: dependent, 
independent, and control variables.  It shows the mean, median and standard 
deviation for each variable in each individual year and also before and during 
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crisis periods. It reveals that the average of asset utilisation ratio has increased 
from 1.023 in the pre-crisis period to 1.122 during crisis period. This increase in 
the average value indicates a reduction in agency cost from the pre-crisis period to 
during crisis. This table also shows that the average of CG scores was found to 
increase from 0.7999 (2005) to 0.8436 (2009); it also increased from 0.8105 
before the crisis to 0.8391 during the financial crisis. This indicates that there has 
been a notable improvement in UK CG from before to during crisis as there is 
3.52 per cent increase in CG score during the crisis period. In the same vein, the 
CG sub-indices similarly depict overall CG behaviour. The results reveal that the 
average score for BPPI (board practice and process index) was the highest at 
0.8978 in the pre-crisis period and increased to 0.9240 in the crisis period. The 
average score for AAI (accountability and audit index) was 0.8270 in the pre-
crisis period showing that, on average, companies perform well in this area. On 
the other hand, BCII (board composition and independence index) was ranked the 
lowest with average score of 0.7065 and 0.7377 in both pre and during crisis 
respectively.   Table (4.1) shows that the average scores for the CG sub-indices, 
namely, BCII, BPPI, and AAI have increased from 0.7065 (pre-crisis) to 0.7377 
(during crisis), from 0.8978 (pre-crisis) to 0.9240 (during crisis) and from 0.8270 
(pre-crisis) to 0.8556 (during crisis) respectively. Table (4.1) also shows that ROA 
has increased from (0.0736) in the pre-crisis to (0.0868) in the crisis period. The 
mean TQ ratio for sample firms in the pre-crisis period has increased from 1.44 to 
1.57 during crisis period. Therefore both ROA and TQ increased from pre-crisis 
to during the crisis period. Concerning the control variables table (4.1) shows that 
the average natural logarithm of total assets in the pre-crisis period is 21.55 and it 
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decreased to 21.21 during crisis period.  In addition, the mean (median) values of 
LEV and DIVIDEND in the pre-crisis period are 0.2528 (.2336) and 2.31(2.28) 
respectively. This has changed to 0.2368 (.2190) and 3.59(3.075) respectively in 
the during crisis period. 
[Table 4.1 around here] 
Table (4.2.) reports the Pearson's correlation matrix between the independent 
variables to test for multicollinearity. Statistically, the correlations between 
variables are fairly low, implying that no problem of multicollinearity is found. 
The variance inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance are used as an additional test for 
multicollinearity; both of them were calculated for each independent variable. VIF 
statistics that is more than 10 and tolerance lower than 0.2 show a possible 
multicollinearity problem. The results of this test provide support for the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients; they are all within acceptable limits. This 
means that the correlation among these independent variables in this paper does 
not raise any serious problem that could affect results’ validity. 
 [Table 4.2.around here] 
 
4.5.2  Multivariate Analysis Results 
Regression results are presented in the next four sub-sections; these regressions 
study the association between the three variables: the dependent, independents and 
the mediating variables. The first section displays the results of the regression of 
CG and firm performance by examining the effect of CG score and then 
examining the effect of CG Sub-indices on both performance measures (TQ and 
ROA).  In the second section, the regression of CG and agency cost is reported; 
also by examining the effect of CG score and CG sub-indices and their effect on 
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agency cost. The third section will consider the regression between agency cost 
and firm performance using both measures: TQ and ROA. Finally, the fourth 
section displays the results of the mediation role of agency cost.  In these previous 
mentioned relationships, the regression analysis will be done for both the period 
prior to the crisis (2005-2007) and the during crisis period (2008-2009). 
4.5.2.1 Regression Results of CG and Firm Performance 
Firm performance is measured as mentioned above through two measures (1) 
market valuation by TQ and (2) ROA as an indicator of the firm’s operating 
performance. The association between CG scores and firm performance is tested 
by using the lagged value of CG, by using (t-1) variables to minimise the 
simultaneity problem. Table (4.3) reports the regression results of CG score and 
TQ; therefore, two regressions between CG and TQ are being run; one for the pre-
crisis period (2005 to 2007) and the other for the during-crisis period (2008 to 
2009).  Model 1 in table (4.3) reports the regression results between CG and TQ 
for the pre-crisis period (2005 to 2007); TQ is regressed on total CG score, and 
the regression model also includes the entire control variable defined before.  
Overall, the result shows a significant positive relationship between CG score and 
TQ at 5 % significant level and with R2 value of 0.3653. This result is in line with 
prior research that revealed a significant and positive association between CG 
index and TQ such as Ammann et al. (2011), Bauer et al. (2010), Black et al. 
(2006), Beiner et al. (2006) and Gompers et al. (2003). Model 2 in table (4.3) 
reports the regression result between CG and TQ in the during crisis period. It 
shows a non-significant positive association between CG and TQ where the R2 
value reduced to 0.3198 during crisis period; therefore this result does not support 
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hypothesis one that presumes a significant association during the period of the 
crisis between CG and performance. This non-significant association between CG 
index and TQ is also in line with previous research; Bauer et al. (2004) revealed a 
non-significant relationship between CG and firm value. In the same vein, Cheung 
et al. (2010) also found non-significant positive relationship between the two 
variables in China. Therefore, from the previous regression, it can be argued that 
the association among CG score and performance measured by TQ has been 
changed from the before crisis to during crisis period. The significant positive 
relationship between CG and TQ before the crisis period turned to be non-
significant during crisis period, which indicates that the financial crisis has 
changed the relation between the two variables. 
 
The regression result also indicates a significant negative relation between size 
and TQ in the crisis period; this result is consistent with that showed by Lehmann 
and Hitz (2012) who found that size is negatively related to their valuation 
measures. Table (4.3) also indicates a positive association between leverage and 
TQ in the crisis period. Aggrawal et al. (2008) indicated that leverage can increase 
firm value because as a result of the debt, managers are compulsory to pay out 
money instead of put this money in projects with negative net present value. 
McConnell and Servaes (1995) also revealed a significant positive association 
among leverage and firm value. 
[Table 4.3 around here] 
 
When examining the association among CG score and firm’s operating 
performance measured by ROA; the result indicates that there is a non-significant 
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association between CG and ROA before and during crisis periods with R2 values 
of 0.2248 and 0.1062 in both pre and during crisis period respectively (Table 4.4 
model (1) and model (2)). Bauer et al. (2004) also revealed a non-significant 
association between CG and performance.  In the same vein, other studies 
including for example Gupta et al. (2009), Gupta et al. (2013), and Price et al. 
(2011) did not find any significant association among the two variables.  Our 
results are inconsistent with the results of both Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and 
Gomper et al. (2003); these studies reported a significant positive association 
among CG and operating performance showing that companies with good CG 
have better returns, better firm operating performance and have higher value. 
Therefore, this previous result on the relationship between the GC score and ROA 
again does not support hypothesis one. Moreover, it also indicates that CG in UK 
is not related to operating performance measured by ROA in both before and 
during crisis period. 
 
For the effect of the control variables, the results indicate a statistically significant 
and negative association among ROA and dividend. Previous studies including 
Dobbin and Jung (2011), Aljifri and Mustafa (2007) and Bohren and Odegaard 
(2003) reached the same results. Aljifri and Mustafa (2007) found that paying 
dividends proved to have a negative impact on the firms’ performance. These 
results were also consistent with the studies by Bohren and Odegaard (2003) that 
focus on the companies listed on the Oslo stock exchange. According to these 
previous studies, paying more dividends will result in less retained earnings which 
in turn minimize the performance of the firm. In the same vein, Dobbin and Jung 
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(2011) found a negative effect of dividend yield on both ROA and TQ. With 
regard to the effect of leverage, the results also revealed a negative relationship 
between leverage and firm operating performance in both before and during crisis. 
Studies of Gupta et al. (2013), Renders et al. (2010), Sami et al. (2011), and weir 
et al. (2011) showed similar results. Finally, the results show a negative 
relationship between firm’s size and ROA, thereby indicating that the increase in 
size will result in decline in profitability. In the same vein, in a sample of UK 
from the period from 2002 to 2008, Weir et al. (2011) recognised a significant 
negative association between size and firm performance.  
[Table 4.4 around here] 
 
This paper also aims to examine the effect of CG provisions on firm value and 
operating performance before and during the financial crisis. Therefore, to test the 
effect of specific CG sub-indices on firm performance before and during a crisis, 
the previous tests are repeated by including CG Sub-indices instead of CG-Score 
in the regression models. Table (4.5) presents the regression results on each of the 
three CG sub-indices and TQ. Model (1) and model (2) show the results between 
these three CG sub-indices and TQ before and during crisis period respectively; 
model (1) shows a non-significant positive association among both BCII and BPII 
and TQ in the pre-crisis period. In the same vein, Veprauskait and Adams (2013) 
found that board structure, which includes board composition, board size and 
board interactions, has no influence on firm Performance in UK. Furthermore, 
Bhagat and Black (2002) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) indicated that there 
is non-significant effect of outside directors percentage and Tobin’s Q. Moreover, 
the results of model (1) also indicate that AAI is the only CG sub-index that 
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proves to have a significant positive association with TQ (R2 value for model 1 is 
0.3700 which means a good explanatory power) which indicates the importance of 
accountability and audit role in affecting firm value. This significant positive 
relation is in line with previous result of Bauer et al. (2010) which revealed a 
significant positive effect of audit committee index on TQ. 
 
In addition, during the crisis period the results indicate non-significant 
relationship among CG sub-indices and performance (Table 4.5, Model 2). Model 
(2) indicates a non-significant positive effect of BCII on TQ in the during crisis 
period. Francis et al. (2012) reached a similar result; they found that board 
independence did not influence firm performance. Model 2 also indicates a non-
significant negative association between BPPI, AAI and TQ. Therefore, during the 
crisis period no CG sub-indices had an important role in affecting TQ (R2 has 
changes to 0.3331 which is lower than the R2 in the pre-crisis period shown in 
model 1). This result is inconsistent with the result of Erkens et al. (2012) who 
found a negative association between board independence and firm performance 
during the crisis. Others studies also found a negative effect of board 
independence on firm performance (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). These 
results are contrary to the expectations and inconsistent with agency theory which 
indicates that good monitoring by board of directors will result in increasing 
shareholders wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
When testing the relation between CG sub-indices and ROA in table (4.6) both 
model (1) and (2) indicate that all CG-sub-indices prove to be non-significantly 
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related to ROA in both before and during the crisis period (in model 1 and model 
2 R2 is lower than R2 values in model 1 and model 2 in table 4.5 which imply a 
less the explanatory power of CG provision and other control variables). Model 
(1) shows that each CG sub-indices is positively related to ROA; it is a non–
significant relationship.  Also, model (2) indicates that the association between 
BCII and ROA is insignificant and negative association which is inconsistent with 
agency theory that considered board of directors to be generally an important CG 
mechanism due to its role in monitoring and providing advice to management to 
protect shareholders’ interests (Beiner et al., 2004).  Therefore, it is more likely 
that the composition and independence of the board will help to improve board 
success and hence improve firm performance. So, the obtained result is not 
consistent with prior literature that indicated significant positive association 
between board composition and ROA such as Gupta et al. (2009). Finally, model 
(2) also reports non-significant positive relationship between BPPI, AAI and 
ROA. 
 [Table 4.5 and 4.6 around here] 
 
4.5.2.2 Regression Results of CG and Agency Cost 
In this session, the impact of CG on agency cost is examined. First, the effect of 
CG_Score on agency cost before and during the financial crisis will be examined. 
Then, the effect of CG-Sub indices on agency cost before and during the financial 
crisis is examined after that. In the following regression (Table 4.7 model (1) and 
(2)), agency cost is measured by asset utilisation ratio. The results indicate a non-
significant positive effect of CG Score on assets utilisation ratio in both before 
and during crisis period (model 1 and model 2).  Therefore, this result is not in 
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line with agency theory in both before and during crisis periods as CG score is 
proved to have no effect in reducing agency cost and this result is inconsistent 
with the previous result of Henry (2010) who found that CG index has a 
significant negative impact on agency cost.  
 
When looking at the relation between agency cost and the control variables, table 
(4.7) also indicates a negative significant association between firm size and asset 
utilisation ratio in both periods; the coefficient for firm size is negative and 
significant in both periods.  Doukas et al. (2000) found that big companies are 
expected to have more agency costs due to their sophistication; in addition, 
owners are faced with more informational complications. This result is 
inconsistent with the study by Florackis and Ozkan (2009) in UK as they found a 
negative coefficient with agency cost, but it was insignificant. Also, our result is 
not consistent with those of Ang et al. (2000), McKnight and Weir (2009), Singh 
and Davidson (2003), and Truong and Heaney (2013) who found firm size to have 
a significantly negative relationship with agency cost. In addition, dividend proves 
to be effective in reducing agency cost only in the crisis period. While leverage is 
found to have a significant negative association with asset utilisation in the pre-
crisis period and turned to be insignificant in the crisis period. This result is 
inconsistent with the results of Fleming et al. (2005), but it is consistent with the 
results of Truong and Heaney (2013) who revealed that leverage is negatively 
associated with asset utilisation in the period following the global financial crisis; 
while our result provides the evidence of this negative relationship in the pre-
crisis period.  Finally, the coefficient of ROA is positive and significant in the pre-
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crisis period which is consistent with the study of Fleming et al. (2005) who 
revealed that asset utilisation is positively associated with ROA which implies 
that firm performing well have higher level of asset utilisation. 
 [Table 4.7 around here] 
 
Table (4.8) reports the regression result of the association among CG Sub-indices 
and agency cost; AAI is found to significantly reduce agency cost in the pre-crisis 
period at 5% significant level with R2 value of 0.4633 (see Table 4.8 Model 1). 
Moreover, both BCCI and BPPI have non-significant effect on agency cost. This 
result is consistent with previous results of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Ang et 
al. (2000) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) who revealed that board 
independence has non-significant effect in mitigating agency costs. Singh and 
Davidson (2003) also found that independent outsider on the board did not affect 
agency cost. In the same vein, Firth et al. (2008) revealed that the composition of 
the board of directors has no effect on agency cost. These results are inconsistent 
with agency theory which indicates that board of directors provides better 
monitoring of management, which in turn reduces agency cost and therefore 
maximises shareholders’ value (Juras and Hinson, 2008).  Our result is also 
inconsistent with the results of Junwei et al. (2011) whose results revealed 
significant positive association between agency cost and board characterises. In 
their explanation of the result, they indicated that board characterises might not be 
the major variables that affect agency costs, but operating conditions and business 
environment might be. 
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While in the crisis period none of the CG Sub-indices show statistically 
significant relationships with agency cost (a low R2 value compared with R2 in 
the pre-crisis period). Therefore, these findings are similar to the result of 
McKnight and Weir (2009) who found weak support for the effect of individual 
CG mechanisms in reducing agency costs. Moreover, results obtained during 
crisis period are consistent with those obtained by Henry (2010) who reached a 
similar result as he found that individual CG mechanism has no effect on reducing 
agency cost. In addition, Table (4.8) indicates a negative and significant 
association between leverage and asset utilisation in the pre-crisis which means 
that creditors may leave more flexibility to management instead of exercising their 
monitoring role. This result is contrary to that obtained from the previous studies; 
Ang et al. (2000), McKnight and Weir (2009) and Truong and Heaney (2013) 
found a negative relationship between debt and agency costs. This relationship 
then turned to be insignificant during the crisis period.  Ang et al. (2000) and 
Singh and Davidson (2003) have mixed results regarding the impact of leverage 
on agency cost. Ang et al. (2000), for example, found that higher leverage is 
significantly related to higher asset turnover as a measure of agency cost, but in 
addition it is not significantly correlated with lower expense ratio. Also, Singh and 
Davidson (2003) results indicated that higher leverage is significantly associated 
with lower asset turnover for large firms, but the relationship between higher 
leverage and lower expense ratio is not always significant. In addition, the result 
indicates that firms that pay higher dividend yield have significantly lower agency 
cost in the during-crisis period. Therefore, dividend is considered as a mechanism 
that is used to control cash and hence avoiding investment in negative return 
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projects which in turn reduce agency costs. Henry (2010) found the same result 
regarding dividend yield. However, Borokhovich, et al. (2005) found no evidence 
that dividend increases reduce agency costs. 
[Table 4.8 around here] 
 
4.5.2.3 Regression Results of Agency Cost and Firm Performance  
This section reports the regression results between agency cost and performance; 
the regression is run using agency cost measurement and also different firm 
performance measurement (Table (4.9) and (4.10)). Table (4.9) shows a 
significant negative association among agency cost and TQ in the pre-crisis 
period.  It shows a positive association between asset utilisation and TQ at 5% 
significant level and with R2 value of 0.4007 which has been changed to a lower 
value in model 2 which shows non-significant relation between agency cost and 
performance. When running the regression using ROA as performance measure 
(see table 4.10); the result indicates non-significant relationship between agency 
cost and ROA in the pre-crisis period. But for during-crisis period there is 
negative impact of agency cost on ROA. Therefore, this result is consistent with 
the agency theory where agency cost is significantly negatively associated with 
firm performance; this means that companies that express lower agency problems 
and costs tend to have better performance and higher value. Moreover, this result 
is similar to the results of prior studies that revealed a negative association 
between agency cost and firm performance such as Le and Buck (2011) and Wang 
(2010). 
[Table 4.9 and 4.10 around here] 
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4.5.2.4 Regression Results of the Mediating Role of Agency Cost 
To test H4, which examines whether agency cost mediates the relation between 
CG and firm performance, a mediation test is conducted as described by Baron 
and Kenny (1986).  According to Baron and Kenny (1986), certain conditions 
have to be met: first, there should be a significant relationship among the 
dependent and the independent variable. Second, there should be a significant 
relationship among the independent and the mediator variable.  Third, the 
mediator should have a significant association with the dependent variable. 
Finally, the association between the independent and dependent variables should 
be lessened after including the mediation variable in the regression (Le and Buck, 
2011). 
 
When applying this process, first, whether CG is associated with firm 
performance (Figure 4.1, link 1) is tested; this step establishes that there is a 
relationship between the independent and the dependent variables that might be 
mediated. Second, to test whether CG influences the mediator, that is, agency cost 
(Figure 4.1, link 2); this step essentially involves treating the mediator as if it were 
an outcome variable. Third, including agency cost as an extra explanatory variable 
in the previous model (that tests the relationship between CG and firm 
performance) to examine the impact of agency cost on performance (Figure 4.1, 
link 3).  Therefore, to establish mediation by agency cost between CG and firm 
performance, the following conditions must be met. First, agency cost should have 
an impact on firm performance (Figure 4.1, link 3) after taking into account the 
effect of CG. Second, adding agency cost to the model should reduce the degree 
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of the effect of CG on firm performance (Figure 4.1, link 4). If all the above 
conditions are met and the influence of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable becomes insignificant in the existence of the mediator; then it can be said 
that the effect of CG is fully mediated by the agency cost. However, if the effect 
of the CG remains significant in the presence of the agency cost, then the effect of 
CG is partially mediated. There is also no mediation effect if any of the above 
conditions are missed (Baron and Kenny, 1986 and Le and Buck, 2011).  
 
Following the above-mentioned steps, this study did not find any support for the 
mediation effect of agency cost in the crisis period; the results show no influence 
of CG on performance during the crisis period. Therefore, there is no effect that 
may be mediated. While for the pre–crisis period, CG score affects TQ (Table 
4.3), but CG score is found to have no effect on agency cost (Table 4.7) and 
agency cost is also found to affect TQ (Table 4.9). Therefore, this mediation effect 
cannot be tested for the effect of CG score, but it can be tested for one of the CG 
sub-indices which is AAI.  All condition are met for the mediation effect of 
agency cost on the relationship between AAI and TQ; the results indicate that AAI 
has a significant effect on TQ (table 4.5) also it is found that AAI has a significant 
relationship with agency cost (table 4.8); moreover, adding agency cost in the 
regression that tests the association between AAI and TQ results in a significant 
association between agency cost and performance and at the same time 
insignificant association between AAI and TQ (table 4.11 model 1 with  a good 
R2 value which is 0.4028). Therefore, adding agency cost to the regression leads 
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to insignificant association between AAI and TQ; it can be said that the effect of 
AAI is fully mediated by the agency cost. 
[Table 4.11 around here] 
 
4.5.3  Robustness Checks 
In this section, robustness checks are done to test the previous results; First, 
another proxy of agency cost is used which is the asset liquidity ratio which is 
measured as the sum of cash and marketable securities divided by total assets 
(Wang and Ye, 2014; Prowse, 1990). Higher ratio means more management 
discretion in the employment of these funds; there is a chance that these funds 
may be sub-optimally used by management. Therefore, it is expected that the 
higher this ratio the higher the agency costs.  The result of this regression is 
consistent with the previous result indicating a non-significant negative 
relationship between CG score and agency cost in the pre-crisis period (Table 4.12, 
Model1). Second, an extra variable that may be correlated with Tobin’s Q is 
added into regression; it is the liquidity variable measured as the annual share 
volume over the year divided by shares outstanding.  Wu and Liu (2011) showed 
that stocks that are characterised with more liquidity have better TQ. Again, the 
results are similar, indicating that the association between CG and TQ is the same, 
i.e. positive and significant (Table 4.12, Model 2). This means that this omitted 
variable is unlikely to explain the previous results. Third, another test is done by 
including the block ownership as an extra variable as previous studies like 
Lemmon and Lins (2003) and Seifert et al. (2005) indicated a significant 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. Therefore, by 
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including block ownership in the regression model, the result remains unchanged 
(Table 4.12, Model 3). The fourth test is done by changing the during crisis period 
classification by including year 2007 in the time period; the relation between 
agency cost and performance measured by ROA is tested using the new definition 
of the during crisis period (2007-2009). This new classification of the crisis period 
is adopted to examine if the results are sensitive to the classification of the crisis 
period and we get the same result (Table 4.12, Model 4). Finally, an additional 
explanatory variable is added; an industry effect is controlled through the 
inclusion of industry-specific dummy variables; by including dummy variables in 
the regression that examines the relationship between CG and agency cost 
measured by asset utilisation. The results are unchanged indicating that the effect 
of CG on asset utilisation is positive and non-significant in the pre-crisis period 
(Table 4.12, Model 5). 
 [Table 4.12 around here] 
 
4.6  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This study aims to complement the governance literature by providing new 
evidence of the effect of CG on firm performance before and during the recent 
financial crisis; CG effect on firm performance and also its role on mitigating 
agency cost in the UK was the main focus in this paper. In particular, the focus 
was on investigated the impact of both aggregate CG and CG-sub indices on both 
agency cost and firm performance. The influence of agency cost as a mediator in 
this relationship was also examined.  Analysis of both agency cost and firm 
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performance especially during crisis period allow the researcher to shed light on 
CG aspects that are less clear during stable and normal periods. 
 
Using a sample of 139 UK FTSE 350 firms, empirical analysis yields a number of 
key findings; the results reveal a significant positive association between CG and 
firm performance; from the results shown in the previous section, it is found that 
CG affects firm performance only in the pre–crisis period as it indicates a 
significant positive relationship between CG and TQ. The result also indicates a 
non-significant positive relation between CG and ROA in both before and during 
the crisis periods. Therefore, this significant result between CG and TQ is 
consistent with an agency theoretic perspective of monitoring that indicates that 
better quality of CG has a positive consequence on firm performance, but this 
holds only for the pre-crisis period only. Considering the CG-Sub indices it has 
been found that only AAI has a significant positive association with TQ in the 
period prior to the crisis, while both BCII and BPPI have no influence. This paper 
also showed interesting results that during the recent financial crisis no evidence 
is found of a significant association among CG and performance; this holds for 
both CG score and CG sub-indices. This result is consistent with the study by 
Gupta et al. (2013) who indicated an insignificant relation between CG and 
performance during the recent crisis on a sample of non-financial firms in 
developed countries including UK. Therefore, the empirical results of this paper 
are contrary to the findings of previous studies concerning the previous crisis 
period (the Asian financial crisis) which indicated a link between CG and 
performance (Johnson et al., 2000; Mitton, 2002).   
Chapter 4: Essay Two – The impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance Pre and During the 
Financial Crisis: UK FTSE 350 Companies 
 
151 
Our findings also reveal a non-significant relationship among CG score and 
agency cost in both before and during crisis period; this finding is robust to an 
alternative definition of agency cost. The findings also reveal that AAI is the only 
CG sub-index that has a significant association with agency cost in the pre-crisis 
period. In general, CG sub-indices measuring board composition and 
independence, and board practice and process do not influence agency cost. These 
results imply an ineffective role of both board composition and independence and 
board process in reducing agency costs. Therefore, considering the impact of CG 
sub-indices gives better result in reducing agency cost than considering overall 
CG mechanisms especially in the pre-crisis period. Thus, these findings reveal 
that CG proves to be effective in reducing agency cost in the pre-crisis period. 
However, moving to during crisis period, it can be argued that the improvement in 
both CG score, and CG sub-indices has no effect on agency cost. Finally, the 
results of mediation test show that agency cost fully mediate the association 
between CG and firm performance only in the pre-crisis period and this is held 
only for one of the CG sub-indices-AAI-. Therefore, consistent with agency 
theory, this finding provides empirical support on the role of agency cost in 
mediating the relation between CG and performance.  
 
To sum up, based on the result of the current paper, it can be argued that CG 
proved to be effective in reducing agency cost and improved firm performance 
only in the period prior to the crisis period. These results imply that CG 
mechanisms’ effects differ from crisis to non-crisis period.  Although there are 
improvements in CG mechanisms form the pre-crisis to during crisis period but 
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there is no effect on firm performance; this suggests that there is a need to new 
governance structure to enable firms to cope with challenges in business 
environment.  Also, this suggests that policy communities should consider CG 
differently during crisis conditions and should investigate whether those good 
governance mechanisms have the same effect during non-stable periods.  Finally, 
the current study did not find either any support for the common view in both 
media and literature that considers CG failure to be one of the main causes of the 
current crisis, and this is at least for non-financial firms. In this study, no evidence 
is found that CG detrimental to firm performance during crisis period. However, it 
was expected from CG in the situation of the crisis to play more roles in reducing 
agency problem and enhancing firm performance. It was expected if CG to make 
a difference, it should do that in the period of financial crisis. Consequently, there 
is a need for improvements in CG mechanisms that failed to reduce agency cost 
and enhance firm performance. Companies should make more effort specifically 
in improving their boards and increase their independence especially that board 
independence is considered a significant influencing aspect on board activity. 
Francis et al. (2012) revealed that the effect of board efficacy on firm performance 
is more manifested during crisis period than the pre-crisis period. A final thought: 
CG mechanisms should be evaluated in terms of their ability to act well in 
different condition whether it is normal or turbulent conditions. 
 
Despite the findings, this paper has limitations; first, the results are based on UK; 
therefore, focusing on single country is beneficial in giving more detailed results 
about this country but, at the same time, these results may not be generalisable. 
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Consequently, future studies should focus on both developed and developing 
countries as that might be useful in terms of international comparability. Second, 
this paper also focuses on larger listed companies; therefore a more empirical 
work is needed to investigate CG effect on agency costs and firm performance for 
smaller business. 
 
The results of this paper appear to boost significant implications; first, for both 
shareholders and managers of firms who are concerned about firm performance, 
the findings suggest that the adoption of good CG practices by UK companies will 
help decrease agency cost, which in turn results in performance improvement for 
firms and their shareholders. Therefore, investors should be aware of CG practice 
of firms in UK in which they are thinking or considering putting their investment 
in. In addition, both board of directors and managers of firms should be keen to 
adopt good CG practices in order to reduce agency cost and enhance performance. 
Moreover, the results of this paper will guide them on CG areas that need 
improvement which prove to be ineffective in reducing agency cost especially 
during the crisis period.  Second, these findings are also important for regulators 
to formulate appropriate CG control mechanisms to protect the interest of 
shareholders. 
 
Based on the results of this paper, a number of future research recommendations 
are suggested; first, it is a good idea to examine external CG mechanisms’ effects 
on agency costs. For future research, the role of further external monitoring 
mechanisms, e.g. financial analysts, on the extent of agency costs may be of 
Chapter 4: Essay Two – The impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance Pre and During the 
Financial Crisis: UK FTSE 350 Companies 
 
154 
interest; it will be of great significance to include laws, regulations and the 
external market mechanisms, into an empirical model to examine their effect on 
agency costs. Second, those who want to further investigate the effect of CG on 
agency cost needs to cover financial sectors which have different ownership and 
governance structure, which will add to the literature as it will provide new 
evidence into the effective role of CG  in reducing agency cost in a period of 
financial crisis in a vital sector. Finally, future research might also try to examine 
how CG mechanisms affect other mediating variables that might be expected to 
eventually affect performance. By doing this, it might help, to a greater extent, to 
understand the inclusive results of the prior research regarding the influence of 
CG on firm performance. 
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TABLES 
Table (4.1): Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics on the overall sample for each year from 2005 to 2009 and also for the pre-crisis and during-crisis 
periods for the dependent, independent and control variables. Where CG SCORE is the governance score, BCII is the Score of board 
composition and independence index , BPPI is the score of board process and practice index, AAI is the score of accountability and audit index 
,SIZE is Natural log of total assets, LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets, Dividend is dividends Per Share / Market Price-Year End * 100 
(World Scope item 09404),  ROA is the  ratio of net income to total assets, TQ is Market value of equity + total debts /total assets, and 
ASSET_UTILIZATION is  ratio of annual sales to total assets. 
 
Variables Mean 
(Median) 
 (Std. Dev.) 
( 2005) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2006) 
Mean 
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2007) 
Mean 
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2008) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2007) 
Mean    
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2008 to 2009) 
 
CG_SCORE 0.7999 
(0.815) 
(.099) 
0.8086 
(0.821) 
(.099) 
0.8228 
(0.833 ) 
(.092) 
0.8346 
(0.85) 
(.088) 
0.8437 
(0.863) 
(.087) 
.8105  
(.821) 
(.097) 
.8391  
(0.857) 
(.088) 
BCII .6977  
(.714) 
(.1914) 
.7007  
(.714) 
(.1944) 
.7213  
(.714) 
(.1830) 
.7305 
 (.714 ) 
(.1828) 
.7449 
(.714) 
(.1785) 
.7065 
(.714) 
(.1895) 
.7377 
(.714) 
(.1805) 
BPPI .8874  
(.909) 
(.1151) 
.8978  
(.909) 
(.1108) 
.9083  
(.909) 
(.1114) 
.9234  
(.909) 
(.0931) 
.9247  
(.909) 
(.0948) 
.8978  
(.909) 
(.1125) 
.9240  
(.909) 
(.0938) 
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Table (4.1) Continued        
Variables Mean 
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2005) 
Mean 
(Median) 
 (Std. Dev.) 
(2006) 
Mean 
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2007) 
Mean 
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2008) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2007) 
Mean    
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2008 to 2009) 
AAI .8147  
(.875  ) 
(.1280) 
.8273 
(.875) 
(.1188) 
.8390  
(.875) 
(.1148) 
.8498  
(.875) 
(.1117) 
.8615  
(.1071) 
(.0357) 
.8270  
(.875) 
(.1208) 
.8556  
(.875) 
(.1094) 
SIZE 21.41 
(21.22) 
(1.377) 
21.61 
(21.46) 
(1.406) 
21.62 
(21.46) 
(1.409) 
21.16 
(21.06) 
(1.407) 
21.27 
(21.10) 
(1.384) 
21.55 
(21.38) 
(1.397) 
21.21 
( 21.07) 
(1.394) 
LEV 0.2470 
(.2312) 
(.1640) 
0.2629 
(.2438) 
(.1681) 
0.2485 
(.2311) 
(.1657) 
0.2369 
(.2192) 
(.1749) 
0.2366 
(.2125) 
(.1657) 
0.2528 
(.2336) 
(.1657) 
0.2368 
(.2190) 
(.1700) 
DIVIDEND 2.47 
(2.46) 
(1.44) 
2.38 
(2.41) 
(1.43) 
2.08 
(2.05) 
(1.19) 
3.41 
(2.91) 
(2.90) 
3.77 
(3.39) 
(3.55) 
2.31 
( 2.28) 
(1.36) 
3.59 
(3.075) 
(3.24) 
ROA .1024 
(.0751) 
(.1013) 
.0670 
(.058) 
(.1104) 
.0513 
(.0482) 
(.0930) 
.0804 
(.0691) 
(.0726) 
.0933 
(.0752) 
(.0755) 
.0736 
(.060) 
(.1038) 
.0868 
(.0715) 
(.0742) 
TQ 1.79 
(1.50) 
(.9327) 
1.42 
(1.24) 
(1.208) 
1.15 
(0.99) 
(.6910) 
1.48 
(1.16) 
(.9593) 
1.67 
(1.34) 
(1.078) 
1.45 
(1.23) 
(.9994) 
1.57 
( 1.26) 
(1.022) 
ASSET_UTILIZATION  1.054 
 (.9637) 
(.6402) 
.9982  
(.9228) 
(.6474) 
1.016  
(.9178) 
(.6744) 
1.147 
 (.9956) 
(.8713) 
1.096 
 (.9812)   
(.6423) 
1.023  
(.9340)  
(.6530) 
1.122  
(.9897)  
(.7645) 
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Table (4.2): Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the Pearson’s correlation matrix for the independent variables used in the empirical analysis for both pre and during the 
financial crisis. All variables fully defined in Table (4.1). 
Variables CG_SCORE BCII BPPI AAI SIZE LEV DIVIDEND ROA ASSET_UTILIZATIO 
Pre-crisis 
 
         
CG_SCORE 1.0000         
BCII 0.6665*** 1.0000        
BPPI 0.5515*** 0.1699*** 1.0000       
AAI 0.5938*** 0.1841*** 0.2140*** 1.0000      
SIZE 0.0685 0.0187 0.0926* 0.0954* 1.0000     
LEV 0.1689 *** 0.1399 *** 0.1371*** 0.0820* 0.2558 *** 1.0000    
DIVIDEND 0.1362*** 0.1189 ** 0.0065   0.1693 *** 0.1292 *** 0.2662*** 1.0000   
ROA -0.1283*** -0.0689 -0.0663 -0.0875* -0.2293***   -0.2477*** -0.0043 1.0000  
ASSET_ 
ULTILIZATION 
0.1003** 0.1089** -0.0704 0.0171 -0.2303*** -0.1092** 0.2534*** 0.2037*** 1.0000 
 
During-crisis 
 
         
CG_SCORE 1.0000         
BCII 0.6810*** 1.0000        
BPPI 0.5660*** 0.2005*** 1.0000       
AAI 0.5567*** 0.1126* 0.1575*** 1.0000      
SIZE -0.0678   -0.1052* -0.0413 0.0267 1.0000     
LEV 0.0837 0.0562  0.0449 0.0718 0.2681*** 1.0000    
DIVIDEND 0.1598*** 0.1565*** -0.0492 0.1137* 0.0117 0.2288*** 1.0000   
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Table (4.3) 
Regression Results of the Relation between Corporate Governance Score and TQ Pre 
and During the Financial Crisis 
 
This table presents the regression results of corporate governance score and TQ pre and 
during the financial crisis. CG impact on TQ pre and during the financial crisis is examined. 
All variables fully defined in Table (4.1). These models provide t-statistics which are in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Variables TQ  pre-crisis 
Model (1) 
TQ  during crisis  
Model (2) 
intercept -.2316(-1.63) -.1842(-1.01) 
CG_SCORE .2774(2.56)** .0500(0.42) 
SIZE -.2885(-1.33) -.7551(-2.81) *** 
LEV -.1010(-1.22) .3908(3.27)*** 
DIVIDEND -.6378(-4.62)*** -.1419(-3.71)*** 
ROA .0020(0.03) .1281(3.09)*** 
 
R2 0.3653 0.3198 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
hausman test/ Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Fixed effects 
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Table (4.4) 
Regression Results of the Relation between Corporate Governance Score and ROA 
Pre and During the Financial Crisis 
 
This table presents the regression results of corporate governance score and ROA pre and 
during the financial crisis. All variables fully defined in Table (4.1.). These models provide 
t-statistics or z-statistics which are in parentheses depends on the used regression fixed 
effect or random effect respectively. ***, ** and * denote respectively significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Variables ROA  pre-crisis 
Model (1) 
ROA  during-crisis 
Model (2) 
Intercept -.3613(-0.80) -.2370(-1.18)  
CG_SCORE .3216(1.04)   .0123(0.09)  
SIZE -.7586(-1.88)*   -.1557(-2.00)** 
LEV -.4595(-3.30)*** -.2515(-3.30)*** 
DIVIDEND   -.5030(-2.83)*** -.0318(-0.58) 
 
R2 0.2248 0.1062 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
hausman test/ Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.5233 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Random effects 
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Table (4.5) 
Regression Results of the Relation between Corporate Governance Sub-Indices 
and TQ Pre and During the Financial Crisis 
 
This table presents the regression results of corporate governance Sub-Indices and TQ 
pre and during the financial crisis. All variables fully defined in Table (4.1.). These 
models provide t-statistics which are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Variables TQ  pre-crisis 
Model (1) 
TQ  during-crisis 
Model (2) 
intercept .1757(3.98)*** -.1101(-2.17)** 
BCII   .0977(1.64) .0640(1.01) 
BPPI .0236(0.45) -.0516(-0.74) 
AAI .1049(1.74)* -.0782(-0.84) 
SIZE -. 2999(-1.38)  - .7427 (-2.47)** 
LEV -.1072(-1.27)    .3630(3.02)*** 
DIVIDEND -.6341(-4.62)*** -.1376(-3.57)*** 
ROA . 0025 (0.04) .1327(3.18)***  
 
R2 0.3700 0.3331 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
hausman test/Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Fixed effects 
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Table (4.6) 
Regression Results of the Relation between Corporate Governance Sub-indices 
and ROA Pre and During the Financial Crisis 
 
This table presents the regression results of corporate governance Sub-indices and 
ROA pre and during the financial crisis. All variables fully defined in Table (4.1.). 
These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics which are in parentheses depends on 
the used regression fixed effect or random effect respectively. ***, ** and * denote 
respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Variables ROA pre-crisis 
Model (1) 
ROA during-crisis 
Model (2) 
Intercept .1025(1.96)* -.2180(-3.03)*** 
BCII .0757(0.38) -.0122(-0.20) 
BPPI .0125(0.13) .0112(0.14) 
AAI .1081(0.54) .0630( 0.98) 
SIZE -.7695(-1.85)* -.1617(-2.05)** 
LEV -.4690(-3.43)***  -.2497(-3.26)*** 
DIVIDEND -.4986(-2.76)*** -.0381(-0.71) 
 
R2 0.2228 0.1080 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
hausman test/ Prob > chi2 0.0005 0.4667 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Random effects 
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Table (4.7) 
Regression Results of the Relation between Corporate Governance Score and 
agency cost Pre and During the Financial Crisis 
 
This table presents the regression results of agency cost and corporate governance score 
pre and during the financial crisis. All variables fully defined in Table (4.1.). These 
models provide t-statistics which are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Variables ASSET-UTILIZATION 
pre-crisis 
Model (1) 
ASSET-UTILIZATION 
during-crisis 
 Model (2) 
intercept -.0581(-0.53)   -.0212(-0.25)  
CG_SCORE .0366(0.48) .0396(0.66) 
SIZE -.6034(-5.61)*** -.6475 (-4.25)***   
LEV -.1028(-2.14)** -.0713(-1.03) 
DIVIDEND -.0142(-0.25) .0450(2.14)** 
ROA .0287(0.62)   .0657(2.09)** 
 
R2 0.4439 0.2941 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
hausman test/Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Fixed effects 
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Table (4.8) 
Regression Results of the Relation between Corporate Governance Sub-indices and 
agency cost Pre and During the Financial Crisis 
 
This table presents the regression results of agency cost and corporate governance Sub-
Indices pre and during the financial crisis. All variables fully defined in Table (4.1.). 
These models provide t-statistics which are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Variables ASSET_UTILIZATION 
pre-crisis  
Model(1) 
ASSET_UTILIZATION 
during-crisis  
Model(2) 
intercept   -.0028(-0.19)  .0348(1.38)   
 BCII -.0059(-0.13) .0024 (0.08) 
 BPPI -.0284(-0.83) .0588(1.33) 
AAI  .0709(2.22)** .0046(0.11) 
SIZE -.6067(-6.03) *** -.6472(-4.38) *** 
LEV -.1105(-2.31)** -.0683(-0.99) 
DIVIDEND -.0107(-0.20) .0460 (2.17)** 
ROA .02712(0.63)   .0660( 2.09)** 
 
R2 0.4633 0.3021 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
276 
138 
hausman test/Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Fixed effects 
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Table (4.9) 
Regression Results of the Relation between Agency Cost and Firm Performance (TQ) 
Pre and During the Financial Crisis 
 
This table presents the regression results of agency cost and firm performance pre and 
during the financial crisis. All variables fully defined in Table (4.1.). These models provide 
t-statistics which are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote respectively significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Variables TQ  pre-crisis 
Model (1) 
TQ  during-crisis 
Model (2) 
Intercept -.2068 (-1.42) -.1799(-0.98)  
ASSET_UTILIZATION .4264(2.14)**   .2002(1.19) 
CG _SCORE .2618(2.35) **     .0420 (0.35) 
SIZE -.0312(-0.13) -.6254(-2.26)**   
LEV -.0572(-0.68) .4051(3.53)*** 
DIVIDEND -.6317(-4.40)*** -.1509(-3.72)***  
ROA -.0102(-0.16) .1149(2.65)*** 
 
R2 0.4007 0.3281 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
hausman test/Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Fixed effects 
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Table (4.10) 
Regression Results of the Relation between Agency Cost and Firm Performance 
(ROA) Pre and During the Financial Crisis 
 
This table presents the regression results of agency cost and firm performance pre and 
during the financial crisis. All variables fully defined in Table (4.1.). These models provide 
t-statistics or z-statistics which are in parentheses depends on the used regression fixed 
effect or random effect respectively. ***, ** and * denote respectively significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Variables ROA  pre-crisis 
Model (1) 
ROA  during-crisis 
Model (2) 
Intercept -.3316(-0.68) -.1595(-0.78)  
ASSET_ UTILIZATION .4334(0.67)   .2005(2.13)** 
CG  _SCORE .3018(0.91)     -.0263(-0.19) 
SIZE -.4875(-0.71)   -.1135(-1.39)  
LEV -.4092(-2.86)*** -.2220(-2.68)*** 
DIVIDEND -.4905(-2.65)*** -.0783(-1.28) 
 
R2 0.2345 0.1278 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
hausman test/Prob > chi2 0.0001 0.0516 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Random effects 
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Table (4.11) 
Regression Results of the Mediating Role of Agency Cost On the Relationship 
between AAI and Firm Performance (TQ) Pre the Financial Crisis 
 
This table presents the regression results of the mediating role of agency cost on the 
relationship between AAI and firm performance pre the financial crisis. All variables 
fully defined in Table (4.1.). This model provides t-statistics which are in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Variables TQ  pre-crisis 
Model (1) 
intercept .1769(3.87)*** 
BCII  .1002(1.61) 
BPPI .0355 (0.70) 
AAI 
ASSET_UTILIZATION 
.075(1.21) 
.4176(2.09)** 
SIZE -.0465(-0.20)  
LEV -.0610(-0.71)  
DIVIDEND -.6296(-4.42)*** 
ROA -.0087(-0.14) 
 
R2 0.4028 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
hausman test/Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Method of estimation Fixed effects 
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Table (4.12) Robustness Checks 
Table (4.12) presents the results of robustness checks. Model (1) presents the random effect regression results between agency cost and corporate 
governance score pre the financial crisis using another proxy of agency cost which is the asset liquidity ratio defined as the sum of cash and marketable 
securities divided by total assets. Model (2) gives the fixed effect regression results when LIQUIDITY is added as an additional independent variable. 
Model (3) gives the fixed effect regression results when BLOCK is also added as an additional independent variable. Model (4) gives the fixed effect 
regression analysis when using the period from 2007 to 2009 as the during crisis period. Model (5) presents the regression when adding industry 
dummy variables in the regression in the pre-crisis period. These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics which are in parentheses depends on the 
used regression fixed effect or random effect respectively. ***, ** and * denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Variables Liquidity Ratio 
pre-crisis  
Model (1) 
TQ  
pre-crisis 
Model (2) 
TQ  
pre-crisis 
Model (3) 
ROA 
During-crisis 
Model (4) 
ASSET _UTILIZATION 
pre-crisis 
Model (5) 
 intercept .0774 (0.37) -.2318(-1.63) -.3226(-1.34) .5890(1.97) -.4624(-1.11) 
CG_SCORE -.0740(-0.54) .2776(2.56)** .2778(2.58)** -.4198(-1.99)** .0610 (0.88) 
SIZE -.1803(-2.52)** -.2901(-1.33) -.2783(-1.32) .1011(0.30)  -.3104(-4.71)*** 
LEV -.0096(-0.10) -.1007(-1.22) -.1023(-1.24) -.3295(-1.82)*   -.1454(-4.00)*** 
DIVIDENEND   -.2170 (-2.49)** -.6368(-4.66)***  -.6374(-4.61)*** -.1961(-2.73) ***   .0638(1.41) 
ROA .0567 (0.82) .0016(0.03)   .0034 (0.05) -------------------   .0491(2.22)** 
LIQUID 
BLOCK 
--------- 
----------- 
.0043(0.07) 
---------------- 
----------------- 
.0682(0.55) 
--------------- 
-------------- 
------------ 
-------------- 
INDSTURY ----------------- ---------- ----------- ------------- YES 
ASSET_UTILIZATION ----------------- --------- ------------ 1.168(3.75)*** ------------- 
 
R2 0.1113 0.3654 0.3670 0.1702 0.1659 
Observations 
Group 
278 
139 
278 
139 
278 
139 
417 
139 
278 
139 
168 
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Chapter Five: Essay Three 
 Corporate Governance and Block Ownership Roles in 
Reducing Information Asymmetry 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of both Corporate Governance (CG) and block 
ownership of a sample of FTSE 350 UK listed companies on information 
asymmetry over the period from 2005 to 2009 that covers before and during the 
financial crisis. The effects of different CG sub-indices and different types of 
block ownership on information asymmetry are also investigated. Moreover, it 
also examines if CG can lessen the positive association between block ownership 
and information asymmetry. The empirical results of a sample of 139 listed firms 
indicated that CG had a negative association with information asymmetry 
measured by bid-ask spread in the pre-crisis period while no evidence of 
significant relationship is found for the period of the crisis itself. This suggests 
that CG is an effective tool to reduce information asymmetry in stable economies 
only but not during the crisis period. Moreover, the results indicated a non-
significant association between block ownership and information asymmetry in 
the pre-crisis period.  However, a positive statistical association is found between 
block ownership and information asymmetry in the crisis period; both institutional 
block shareholders and other block holders are found to significantly affect bid-
ask spread used as a proxy for information asymmetry.  Finally, the results 
showed that CG did not have any influence in lessening the positive relationship 
between block ownership and bid-ask spread during crisis period.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, block ownership, information asymmetry, 
bid-ask spread, financial crisis, UK 
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5.1  Introduction 
The effectiveness of Corporate Governance (CG) remains a very important topic, 
especially in the wake of scandals such as Enron, WorldCom…etc. Moreover, the 
recent financial crisis that extended rapidly causing a global economic shock and 
turbulence in financial markets has highlighted how important it is to adopt good 
forms of CG. Thus, understanding the effect of CG mechanisms on information 
asymmetry is considered important from both the perspectives of investors and 
public policy. By reviewing the empirical literature of CG, it is found that it 
tended to focus more on the impact of CG on firm value, performance and on cost 
of capital (Beiner et al., 2006; Krafft, et al., 2014; La Porta et al., 2000). One 
means through which CG mechanisms may affect value, performance and cost of 
capital is through their influence on information asymmetry (Chung, et al., 2010; 
and Lang and Lundholm, 2000).  
 
However, these previous studies provide only an indirect link between CG and 
information asymmetry. On the other hand, the direct empirical association 
between CG and information asymmetry is still limited in prior literature (Byun et 
al., 2011; Chung et al., 2010; Elbadry et al., 2013; Fan, 2013; Kanagaretnamand et 
al., 2007).  What makes things puzzling is the limited available literature which 
provides conflicting evidence regarding the relationship between CG and 
information asymmetry. Furthermore, prior research has examined this 
relationship during normal periods; there was no previous study that examined the 
role of CG in mitigating information asymmetry during crisis periods in general 
and in UK in particular.  Although, some previous literature has highlighted the 
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importance of CG during financial crises (Adams, 2012; Aebi et al., 2012, 
Aldamen et al., 2012; Leung and Horwitz 2010 and Mitton 2002), these studies 
did not consider the role which CG plays in reducing information asymmetry 
during the crisis period. Therefore, this important issue is still missing in the 
literature; hence it needs to be examined. Therefore the current paper adds to this 
literature by presenting new evidence regarding the association between CG and 
information asymmetry in the period of financial crisis. It is important to consider 
the effectiveness of CG during this turbulent period.  During this unstable period, 
it is expected that all parties, including investors, firms, and the market, would act 
in different ways. The current study extends this analysis to cover both the periods 
before and during the financial crisis to examine whether CG helped to mitigate 
the effect of the financial crisis shock and helped to reduce information 
asymmetry. 
 
Moreover, following previous studies that indicated ownership structure as one 
source of information asymmetry (Su, 2004 and Hope et al., 2009), the current 
paper also aims to study the influence of block ownership on information 
symmetry. This issue is important because ownership concentration is considered 
a governance mechanism in itself; hence block shareholders should monitor 
management and thus reduce agency cost (Edmans, 2013). But on the other hand, 
rather than monitoring management, block shareholders can influence 
management to take actions in their interest; hence this may increase the level of 
information asymmetry (Heflin and Shaw, 2000).  Therefore, this paper 
contributes to the prior literature and examines the influence of block 
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shareholdings on information asymmetry. In addition, it examines the influence of 
various categories of block ownership on information asymmetry.   This paper 
also examines CG’s role in alleviating the expected negative impact of block 
ownership. Following the study of Byun et al. (2011), who considered the 
alternative mechanisms that could help to supply the information to investors and 
which might reduce the negative effect caused by block ownership, the current 
paper examines the role of CG system in mitigating the positive relationship 
between block ownership and  information asymmetry. 
 
To sum up, the current paper provides the following contributions to the previous 
studies. First, it addresses directly the relationship between CG and information 
symmetry in UK during the crisis period; this would shed light on the 
effectiveness of CG. Second, it provides new evidence on the effect of overall 
composite measure of CG on information asymmetry. Third, it also contributes to 
ownership structure literature by providing new evidence of the association 
between block ownership and information asymmetry during crisis period. In 
addition, it considers the different categories of block ownership. Fourth, it looks 
at the CG’s role during crisis period in lessening the positive association between 
block ownership and information asymmetry which has not examined before. 
So this research attempts to answer the following research questions: 
1. Does CG affect information asymmetry before and during the financial 
crisis? 
2. Does block ownership positively associated with information asymmetry? 
And, if so 
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3. Does CG help lessen the positive relationship between block ownership 
and information asymmetry? 
The empirical results show a significant negative effect of CG on information 
asymmetry pre the crisis period while no evidence is found during crisis period. In 
addition, the results provide evidence of a positive association between ownership 
concentration and information asymmetry during crisis period. Both institutional 
block shareholders and other block shareholders have significant positive 
association with bid-ask spread during crisis period, indicating that they are 
perceived as having private information. Finally, CG was found with non-
significant effect in lessening the positive association between block ownership 
and information asymmetry.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.   Section 2 presents the literature 
review and the development of hypotheses. Section 3 deals with the sampling, 
variable measurement, and empirical models used. Section 4 focuses on data 
analysis and on the empirical results, and the final section provides summary and 
conclusion. 
 
5.2  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In this section, the concept of information asymmetry is discussed first and the 
relationship between agency theory and information asymmetry is reviewed. 
Then, theoretical and empirical literature linking information asymmetry to CG is 
also reviewed. Finally, I review the existing literature tying ownership structure 
with information asymmetry.  
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5.2.1  Information Asymmetry 
Akerlof’s (1970) is considered the first to introduce the concept of information 
asymmetry: “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism”. Akerlof relates quality and uncertainty and develops the notion of 
asymmetric information, using the automobile market as his example. Akerlof 
(1970) mentioned an example of the market for used cars where the sellers 
generally have better information than the buyers. According to Akerlof (1970) 
this information variation between both parties results in the adverse selection 
“lemons problems” that leads to the improper functioning of the market. 
Therefore, asymmetric information is also known as the “Lemons” problems and 
usually refers to the difference of information that is held by market participants 
(Biswas, 2004).   
 
Asymmetric information is also linked to the principal-agent problem; this means 
that the problem of information asymmetry exists because managers have more 
knowledge and awareness regarding the company and its financial position than 
the other current or potential shareholders (Solomon, 2009). Therefore, the 
separation of ownership and control creates information asymmetry between both 
shareholders and managers, which in turn lets shareholders exposed to agency 
costs (Ashbaugh et al., 2004). Therefore, information asymmetry is considered to 
be the major source of agency problems (Fan, 2013).   
 
These informational asymmetries cause adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Moral hazard can be defined, according to Eisenhard (1989), as the 
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“lack of effort on the part of the agent”. There are different forms of self-
interested managerial behaviour that could include: shirking behaviour, 
consumption of perquisites, excessive pay, and empire-building.  Information 
asymmetry also creates an adverse selection problem, which can be defined as the 
misrepresentation of ability by the agent; the agent may misrepresent his/her self 
as having specific skills and, at the same time, the principal cannot completely 
confirm these skills (Ashbaugh et al., 2004; Gauld, 2007, and Eisenhard, 1989). 
 
Information asymmetry has several consequences; it can affect cost of capital. The 
more severed information asymmetry companies have, the higher the cost of 
capital will be (Lambert et al., 2008). Information asymmetry could also harm 
market liquidity because higher information asymmetry leads to lower market 
liquidity (Bhide, 1993); it affects the efficiency of capital markets (Zhang, 2006), 
it potentially leads to market failure (Akerlof, 1970 and Fama, 1991) and it also 
affects earnings management. With more information asymmetry, there will be a 
more serious level of earnings management (Dai et al, 2013; Richardson, 2000). 
 
Recognising these consequences of information asymmetry, several solutions 
have been suggested; CG is considered one important mechanism for reducing 
information asymmetry. As explained by Brandas (2011: 55) “The problems 
generated by the information asymmetry within the agency relationships at 
corporation level, governments and capital markets led to a higher necessity for 
corporate governance (CG)”, CG aims at resolving both types of the agency 
conflicts that arise either between shareholders and managers or between block 
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shareholders and minority shareholders; this would result in lower agency costs 
(Tang and Wang, 2011). Thus, based on the agency theory, CG is considered one 
important factor in affecting the information disclosed to shareholders; by 
affecting the level of information available to shareholders, this helps in reducing 
information asymmetry (Charoenwong et al., 2011). 
 
5.2.2 Corporate Governance and Information Asymmetry 
Previous related work, as mentioned above, had given more attention to the 
association between CG and various measures of firm value (Black et al., 2006), 
firm performance (Bauer et al, 2008; Sami et al., 2011), and the association 
between CG and cost of capital (Ashbaugh et al., 2004;  Chen et al., 2009; Donker 
and Zahir, 2008). These previous studies have suggested a relationship between 
both CG and information asymmetry;  one means through which CG mechanisms 
may have an influence on firm value, performance, and cost of capital is via their 
influence on the level of information asymmetry. Information asymmetry is 
suggested to be the main source of agency problems (Armstrong et al., 2012). CG 
has been viewed as effective in reducing information asymmetry (Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti, 2007; Donelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Lang and Lundholm 2000).  
However, this previous literature examined this relation indirectly; they examined 
the channel through which CG can affect information asymmetry. Fan (2013), for 
example, mentioned some channels through which CG can affect asymmetric 
information; CG can reduce insider trading and, therefore, reduce information 
asymmetry. CG can also improve information disclosure which in turn will help 
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in solving agency problems (Chung et al., 2010; Cohen, et al., 2004; Leuz et al., 
2003).  
 
Most of the literature focused more on disclosure as one channel; for example, 
they focused on the CG’s effect on disclosure and on the disclosure effect on 
information asymmetry (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007).  Good CG improves 
disclosure; this high disclosure will in turn mitigate the problem of asymmetric 
information that arises between outsiders and insiders and that arises between 
informed and uninformed investors (Chung et al, 2010; Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991). According to agency theory, good CG mechanisms strengthen internal 
monitoring, reduce the opportunistic behaviour, and encourage management to 
disclose more information; this will help to lower the information asymmetry 
problem (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Welker, 1995).  
 
Examples of previous literature that considered CG effect on disclosure are Chen 
and Jaggi (2000), Craswell and Taylor (1992), Ernstberger and Grüning (2013), 
Forker (1992), Gao and Kling (2012), and Ho and Wong (2001). On the other 
hand, another stream of research focused on disclosure effect on information 
asymmetry (Armstrong et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2007; Cheng et al., 2006; 
Gajewski and Quéré, 2013; Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000;  Petersen, and Plenborg, 2006; Welker, 1995; Zhang and Ding, 2006). 
These previous studies indicated an influence of disclosure on information 
asymmetry. Zhang and Ding (2006) found that firm disclosure reduces the 
severity of information asymmetries. In the same vein, Chen et al. (2007) showed 
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that the ranking of Transparency and Disclosure (T&D) is negatively related to 
information asymmetry. Recently, the study by Geyt et al. (2014) focused on 
examining the role of corporate communication in lowering information 
asymmetry; they studied the influence of disclosure on information asymmetry by 
investigating this relation for the different communication channels and their 
result proves that these different channels of communications have different 
influences on information asymmetry.  Therefore, the association between 
disclosure and information asymmetry can be justified in terms of reducing 
private information search motivations (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007), and/or 
reducing the degree of informed trading (Ertimur, 2007). 
 
To sum up, the previous relevant studies found that CG affects the level of 
disclosure, and also a series of papers revealed that disclosure is negatively 
associated with information asymmetry. Thus, the current study, instead of 
examining the channel through which CG affects information asymmetry as in 
prior research, it adds to the previous studies by studying directly CG influence on 
information asymmetry.  There is limited literature that investigated the direct 
effect of CG on information asymmetry; the current study, therefore, 
complements this previous research by providing a new empirical support of CG 
influence on information asymmetry. Kanagaretnam, et al. (2007) are considered 
the first to examine CG influence on information asymmetry; they studied the 
effect of CG variables in reducing information asymmetry and considered the 
effect of directors’ and officers’ ownership. Furthermore, they considered board 
composition and independence and board practice; their results indicated that 
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these previous CG variables negatively affect information asymmetry. Their result 
implies that with good CG, information asymmetry will be mitigated. In the same 
vein, Cormier et al. (2010) studied both disclosure and CG variables’ influences 
on information asymmetry; in their analysis, they considered the importance of 
board characteristics on reducing information asymmetry. Their results suggest 
that governance disclosure complements CG attributes in reducing information 
asymmetry. Anglin et al. (2011) examined the relationship between CG and 
information asymmetry for real estate investment trusts; they focused on internal 
CG mechanisms, e.g. the characteristics and activities of the board, compensation 
and characteristics of the audit committee. Once more, the result confirmed that 
good CG results in mitigating information asymmetry.   
 
Moreover, Elbadry et al. (2013) examined CG influence on information 
asymmetry in UK listed companies for the period from 2003 to 2006.  Their 
empirical analysis indicated that with good CG mechanisms, the problem of 
information asymmetry will be mitigated; it indicated that both compensation and 
board independence had an influence in lowering information asymmetry. 
However, on the other hand, it also indicated that the increase in both block 
ownership and insider ownership leads to more information asymmetry. Also, the 
study of Lei et al. (2013) considered both types of agency problems that 
companies may have suffered from and examined how different CG mechanisms 
could have an impact on information asymmetry. Based on CG measure that 
represents both types of agency problems, their empirical results indicated that, in 
a sample of Chinese firms, CG mechanisms aiming at reducing types I and type II 
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agency problem reduced the information asymmetry. In addition, the result also 
indicated that there are differences in firms that are more subject to type I agency 
cost and firms that are more subject to type II agency cost.  
 
These previous studies tend to focus on internal CG variables; however, other 
studies considered other external CG variables. Among them is the study of 
Armstrong et al. (2012) which focused on external CG variables; they studied the 
association between changes in antitakeover and information environments. In 
doing that, they studied state antitakeover laws’ influence on information 
asymmetry, and the results pointed out that both the asymmetric information 
between investors and that between insiders and outsiders had decreased 
subsequent to the changes of the antitakeover laws. Furthermore, they considered 
different channels through which antitakeover law affects information asymmetry; 
their results indicated that asymmetric information declined due to the decrease in 
the collection of private information and also due to the increase in informational 
content of financial statement.  In the same vein, the study by Jain et al. (2008) 
considered the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and regulatory response influence on 
information asymmetry, and they revealed an influence of financial reports quality 
in lowering bid-ask spread. 
 
While the above mentioned studies focused on individuals CG variables, others 
focused on overall CG index; the study of Chung et al. (2010) relied on 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data to construct CG index comprised of 
six sub-indices that mainly focused on transparency. Their results indicated a 
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significant negative effect of CG on information asymmetry when using different 
measures including, for instance, spread and probability of informed trading 
(PIN).  Fan (2013) used information content of stock trade to measure information 
asymmetry and he studied firm level CG effect on information asymmetry; he 
used a sample of 100 companies in US and relied on Risk Metrics Global 
Governance database to collect firm level governance data. His empirical results 
showed that CG quality is negatively associated with information content of stock 
trade; this result indicated that internal CG mechanism is the main factor that 
reduces information asymmetry.  In another context, Tang and Wang (2011) 
considered the relationship between overall CG rating and liquidity in the Chinese 
firms for years from 1999 to 2004. Using publicly available information, they 
constructed their CG index; generally speaking, what their analysis revealed 
supports a negative effect of CG on information asymmetry. Prommin et al. 
(2014) also reached similar results in the Thailand context when testing this 
relationship on large firms that covered years from 2006 to 2009.  Moreover, 
using Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CSLA) rating as a rating for overall CG, 
Charoenwong et al. (2011) also investigated, in a sample of companies in 
Singapore, the association between overall CG rating and information asymmetry 
focusing on adverse selection element of the spread. Using  both overall CG rating 
and CG sub-indices, their analysis  supported  a negative effect of the overall CG 
level on the adverse selection factor; however, the result indicates that only the 
transparency index was found to have a  negative effect of adverse selection 
element.  
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Therefore, based on previous studies, there is a limited prior research that directly 
tested CG influence on information asymmetry in general and in UK in particular.  
Moreover, limited literature exists that considered the effect of overall CG quality 
and asymmetric information. Therefore, this current study extends the literature 
on CG and information asymmetry by examining this direct relation in UK before 
and during the financial crisis. It is expected that good governed firms can ensure 
more efficient operations of corporate boards and better protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests, and maintain more appropriate disclosure and better 
transparency. Therefore, the major hypothesis of this study is posited as follows:  
 
H1: There is a significant negative association between CG score and 
information asymmetry. 
 
The above mentioned hypothesis is tested for both the period before and the 
period during the crisis. In addition, it is tested for CG sub-indices to examine the 
differences between CG sub-indices in reducing information asymmetry in both 
the period before and the period during the crisis. 
 
5.2.3  Ownership Structure and Information Asymmetry 
Corporate ownership structure is considered one source of information asymmetry 
(Choi et al., 2010); previous literature that studied ownership structure influence 
on information asymmetry gave more attention to three types of ownership 
structure: insider ownership (Heflin and Shaw, 2000), institutional ownership 
(Poon et al., 2013; Wang and Zang, 2009), and block ownership (Jiang et al., 
2011). These three shareholders categories are argued to have superior 
information (Rubin, 2007). 
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Institutional investors get more information advantage because of their roles in 
monitoring; therefore, this may result in the rise of the adverse selection cost and 
information asymmetry (Wang and Zhang, 2009). With regard to insider 
ownership, they have direct contact and may acquire private information; this may 
also increase the risk of insider trading and this may increase bid-ask spread 
(Heflin and Shaw, 2000). Block ownership has two different effects; the first 
effect is that block ownership is more likely to monitor management – the 
efficient monitoring hypothesis – which reduces the level of agency problems and 
information asymmetry (Choi et al., 2010; Hope et al., 2009). In addition, a strong 
relationship may exist between block shareholders and firms; this strong 
relationship may in turn lead to an improvement in information environment and, 
consequently, increase information transparency which reduces information 
asymmetry (Hope et al., 2009).  The second effect, block shareholders, may take 
advantage of their position to optimise their benefits rather than maximise 
shareholder value. Therefore they might conceal some of the information in order 
to protect their interests; this in turn worsens information problems, and increase 
information asymmetry (Choi et al., 2010).  
Therefore, block shareholders can provide good monitoring, but at the same time 
they could create information asymmetry problems; block shareholders have a 
better chance to reach private information through their monitoring; therefore, 
they have an advantage over other non-block shareholders in respect of both 
accessing more accurate information and lowering cost of the acquisition of this 
information (Brockman and Yan, 2009). Therefore, this may cause problems of 
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poor disclosure and also a lack of transparency which in turn increase information 
asymmetry (Attig et al., 2006; Sakawa et al., 2014; Tang and Wang, 2011).  
 
By reviewing the previous literature that studied ownership structure influence on 
information asymmetry, it is noticed that there were contradicting results in this 
previous research between block ownership and information asymmetry.  Using a 
sample of listed firms in Canada, Attig et al. (2006) addressed a positive 
association between ownership and bid–ask spread. In the same vein, Jiang et al. 
(2011) studied the same relationship in New Zealand, and their results in general 
confirmed that an increase in ownership concentration is associated with higher 
bid-ask spread around reports release dates.  In UK listed firms, Elbadry et al. 
(2013) examined this relationship and their results support the previously 
mentioned positive association between ownership concentration and information 
asymmetry when using different measures including spread, volatility and 
volume. In addition, Jacoby and Zheng (2010), in a sample of US firms, indicated 
also a positive relationship between block ownership and asymmetry of 
information; their sample included firms from NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX; 
their result indicated that block shareholders, by having informational advantage, 
will have an effect on the adverse selection risk and raise the bid-ask spreads.  
Moreover, Brockman and Yan (2009) empirically examined block ownership 
effect on the information environment of the firm, and they found a positive 
association between block shareholdings and both idiosyncratic volatility and 
PIN; therefore this result indicated that block ownership increase information 
asymmetry. Byun et al. (2011) studied ownership concentration effect on 
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information asymmetry; focusing on a Korean context, they showed a positive 
statistical relationship between block ownership and information asymmetry. 
 
While the above previous studies suggested a positive relationship which means 
that an increase in ownership concentration would lead to more information 
asymmetry, other studies found non-significant relationship such as Kini and 
Mian (1995) who found that ownership concentration had non-significant 
influence on information asymmetry of a sample US firms. Choi et al. (2010) also 
found non-significant relationship where block ownership is found to be 
statistically non-significant.  They got the same results using other different 
measures of ownership concentration when using the proportion of shares owned 
by shareholders with no less than 1% of equity ownership, or when they 
considered block ownership as the proportion of shares that are owned by the top 
ten shareholders. 
 
In this paper, based on the majority of previous studies that found that block 
ownership increases information asymmetry, such as Brockman and Yan (2009), 
Jacoby and Zheng (2010), and Elbadry et al. (2013) who studied this relationship 
in UK and found that the higher the level of ownership concentration the higher 
the information asymmetry problem, the study hypothesises that block ownership 
would be positively associated with information asymmetry. This expected 
positive relationship can be justified in that block shareholders are thought to have 
more private information; furthermore, with the increase in block ownership, there 
may also be a reduction in public information. Therefore, as a result of an increase 
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in block ownership, information asymmetry is expected to increase; therefore, the 
current hypothesis is examined: 
 
H2: There is a significant positive relationship between block ownership and 
information asymmetry. 
 
Due to the strong heterogeneity between block shareholders, it is essential to 
consider dissimilarity between block shareholders as they have diverse monitoring 
power and ability; furthermore, they may have differences in their motivation and 
information sharing (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Jiang et al., 2011). Without 
the separation of different types of block shareholders, it would be hard to find out 
which category of these block shareholders causes the observed association (Jiang 
et al., 2011; Rubin, 2007). Previous research found, for example, that insiders 
have an information advantage over other outside investors, which can be shown 
through trading activities (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004). Brockman and Yan 
(2009) found that the relationship is positive and significant between both outside 
and inside block ownership and information asymmetry, but it is insignificant for 
employee block shareholders. Jiang et al. (2011), when categorising block 
ownership into various categories, found that more information asymmetry is 
associated with ownership structure that is controlled by financial institutions and 
management. Rubin (2007) also proved a significant positive association between 
institutional block ownership and bid-ask spread. 
 
Therefore, block ownership in the current study is divided into three different 
categories:  institutional investors, insider investors, and other block ownership; 
then the influence of each category of block ownership on information asymmetry 
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is examined. Relying on the prior studies, it is expected that both insider block 
shareholders and institutional block shareholders have access to private 
information and this would increase information asymmetry.  Therefore, taking 
the heterogeneity between these block shareholders into consideration offers new 
evidence and clear understanding of the impact of block shareholdings on 
information asymmetry. 
 
5.2.4  Interaction effects of block ownership with corporate governance on 
information asymmetry 
 
Based on the hypothesis stated in the previous section that block ownership and 
information asymmetry is positively associated,  the current paper also examines 
the role of an important information distribution mechanism in lessening the 
negative effect of block ownership. This study examines whether internal CG 
mechanisms help lessen the negative effects of block ownership. Although block 
shareholders can take benefit from their position, and increase the information 
asymmetry problem (Heflin and Shaw, 2000), strong CG mechanisms in such 
situations would help to reduce block shareholders motivation to hold back 
relevant information to other shareholders (Gisbert and Navallas, 2013). 
Therefore, good CG would help to reduce the negative effect of block ownership 
(Brockman and Chung, 2003); this opportunistic behaviour should be reduced 
when CG becomes more effective (Hou et al., 2012). Therefore, it is important 
when examining the relationship between block ownership and information 
asymmetry to consider the interaction between block ownership and CG.  
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Having block shareholders may result in reducing public information and also 
increasing private information; therefore, it is argued that if good CG facilitates 
information sharing, it is expected that the perceived risk will be reduced. CG 
aims to protect shareholders from agency and information asymmetry problems 
characterising the modern corporations; providing enough information about 
company for the market will facilitate the achievement of that purpose. Thus, it is 
argued that CG is effective in improving disclosure and transparency and this, in 
turn, reduces the information asymmetry problem (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lama, 
2012). The presence of good CG means an increase in monitoring which 
consequently facilitates information sharing to investors; this reduces the private 
benefit of block shareholdings which, in turn, reduces the information asymmetry 
(Love, 2010).   
 
Consequently, investigating the relationship between block ownership and 
information asymmetry should consider the interaction between block ownership 
and CG (Prommin et al., 2014). This will in turn lead to more understanding of 
the relationship between block ownership, CG, and information asymmetry 
variables. There is limited research that examined the interactive effect of 
different mechanisms in alleviating the negative effect of block ownership; to the 
best of our knowledge, only limited literature has examined this issue. Jiang et al. 
(2011) examined whether voluntary disclosure attenuates information asymmetry 
of block ownership of a sample of listed companies in New Zealand in the period 
from 2001 to 2005; their result indicated that this interactive variable of block 
ownership and disclosure had a negative relationship with information asymmetry 
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and it is significant for firms with management controlled ownership structure.  In 
the same vein, Byun et al. (2011) examined the role of a number of other 
information dissemination mechanisms in mitigating information asymmetry of 
ownership concentration. They examined the role of four mechanisms: 
institutional ownership, rating agencies, analyst following, and the quality of CG. 
Their result indicated that only analyst following had an effect in reducing 
information asymmetry related to block ownership.  Therefore, it is argued that 
analyst supplies more information and this in turn decreases information 
asymmetry. Another more recent study, Gjerde et al., (2013)  also examined the 
interaction between ownership by block insider and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in reducing bid-ask spread; furthermore, they examined the interaction 
effect between block insider and board independence, the interaction effect of 
block insiders and monitoring by outside institutions in reducing bid-ask spread. 
Their results indicated that these three variables moderate the relationship 
between block ownership and bid-ask spread. 
 
These previous studies focused on countries with poor law enforcement and also 
low level of shareholder protection; in addition, these studies examined this 
relationship in a normal period. Therefore, it can be argued that no previous 
studies considered the relationship between CG and information asymmetry in the 
presence of ownership concentration during crisis period. Therefore, the current 
paper adds to these previous studies by providing new evidence on the role of 
internal CG as information dissemination mechanisms in reducing information 
asymmetry in UK that is characterised by high investor protection; the current 
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study examines this interactive role in a crisis period contrary to the other studies 
that focused on normal or stable periods. Thus, in such country where there is a 
high protection of shareholders, CG is expected to play a major role in reducing 
information asymmetry. It is expected that in a country like UK, where there is 
high legal mechanisms, CG should play a major role in reducing block 
shareholders incentive to hide significant information and, consequently, reduce 
information asymmetry. 
 
Building on these previous findings, in the current paper, CG is considered to 
have an important task to monitor management and increase disclosure of 
information to investors. Hence, CG plays a major task in affecting the firm’s 
information environment. If CG plays this important role to improve transparency, 
this would result in reducing information asymmetry.  Hence, the current 
hypothesis is tested: 
 
H3: There is a significant negative relationship between the interaction variable 
of CG and block ownership and information asymmetry.  
 
To test this hypothesis, an interaction variable of CG and block ownership is built. 
The idea is to see whether the relationship between block ownership and 
information asymmetry is influenced by CG variable. A negative relationship 
between the interactive variable and information asymmetry is expected. In 
addition, the current paper examines the interaction between different categories 
of block ownership and CG and its effect on information asymmetry; such 
relationship is unexplored in UK.  
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5.3  Research Methods 
5.3.1  Sample Selection and Data Sources 
This paper used a sample of FTSE 350 UK listed company; the sample included 
139 companies after excluding the financial institutions and utility companies. 
The total sample is 695 of firm-year observations demonstrating 139 companies 
for the period from 2005-2009. This sample period is divided into two main 
periods: the pre-crisis period from 2005 to 2007 and the crisis period from 2008 to 
2009 (for more details about sample selection see chapter 3, section 3.5.1). Data 
for CG variables and block ownership was collected from the annual reports of 
sample companies while the data of bid-ask spread and control variables was 
collected from DataStream. 
 
5.3.2  Variables Measurements 
5.3.2.1  Measurement of Information Asymmetry 
There are some proxies that have been used for information asymmetry in the 
literature. The most common ones include: bid-ask spreads (Cheng et al, 2011; 
Kangaretnam et al., 2007), PIN (Armstrong et al., 2011; Ascioglu et al., 2012; 
Brockman and Yan, 2009; Byun, et al., 2011; Jin and Myers, 2006), stock return 
volatility (Harris and Raviv, 1993), trading volume (Elbadry et al., 2013), and 
analysts’ forecast dispersion (Ajinkya et al., 1991; Diether et al., 2002). 
 
Following prior studies, this paper used one of the market microstructure based 
measures, the bid-ask spread (SPREAD), which is better than other measures; this 
measure had been used in previous studies (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; 
Chapter 5: Essay Three – Corporate Governance and Block Ownership Roles in Reducing Information 
Asymmetry 
 
192 
Chung et al., 2010; Clarke and Shastri, 2000; Elbadry et al., 2013). Bid- ask 
spread had been used extensively; with higher level of information asymmetry, 
spread will be wider in order to face market-maker losses incurred from trading 
with informed investors (Fu et al., 2012). Bid-ask spread is common and at the 
same time is an appropriate measure because it provides a more accurate measure 
of information asymmetry outcomes (Armstrong et al., 2011; Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000). Moreover, although other proxies are closely related to 
information asymmetry, such as trading volume and price volatility, there are 
many factors that affect these measures other than information asymmetry (Yoon 
et al., 2011). 
Bid-ask spread (SPREAD) is calculated in percentage as average of daily bid-ask 
spread (the difference between ask and bid prices divided by the average of these 
two prices) of each firm in each year (Choi et al., 2010). Daily bid and ask prices 
were collected for UK FTSE 350 from DataStream.   
 
5.3.2.2 Measurement of Block Ownership 
As an explanatory variable, block ownership (BLOCK) in the current paper is 
measured by the total percentage of shares that is owned by shareholders who 
own no less than three percent of equity ownership. This block ownership is 
divided into three types of block ownership; the first is block ownership by 
institutional investors (INSTITUTIONAL) which includes banks, insurance 
companies, mutual fund, pension funds…etc. The second is the block ownership 
by insider (INSIDER) which includes directors, and managers. The third includes 
the other block ownership (OTHER). 
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5.3.2.3 Measurement of Corporate Governance 
CG index has been developed as mentioned before in chapter two. Both the CG 
index and sub-indices are considered in this paper to assess their effect on 
information asymmetry in both the periods before and during the financial crisis. 
There are a number of control variables that also included in the empirical 
analyses. These control variables are included because they have been proven to 
affect bid-ask spread in previous literature (see for example Choi et al. (2010); 
Heflin and Shaw (2000); Jacoby and Zheng (2010) and others). Firm size is 
included; a negative relationship is expected between firm size and spread (Choi 
et al., 2010); (SIZE) is measured by the natural log of total assets. Stock price 
(PRICE) is also included; a negative relationship is expected between price and 
bid-ask spread (Welker, 1995). TURNOVER is also included as control variable; 
turnover represents the degree of the trading activities and is measured as the 
number of shares traded over the year divided by the number of shares 
outstanding.  The empirical analysis finds that bid-ask spread relates negatively to 
turnover (Choi et al., 2010, and Fu et al., 2012). 
 
5.3.3  Empirical Models  
Since the current data contains both cross-sectional and time-series observations, 
a panel data methodology is applied. Panel regression is employed in this study, 
using the fixed or the random regression, which is based on the Hausman test 
(Wooldridge, 2002) as mentioned before in chapter three and chapter four. 
Although the random-effect model estimation is more efficient (Greene, 2002), 
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the fixed effect should be used if the null hypothesis is rejected as it provides 
consistent estimator.  
 
To address the endogeneity problem, as mentioned before in chapter 3 and 4, the 
lagged explanatory variable is used in the analysis; this method is considered a 
partial method of solving the simultaneity problem. Therefore, the lagged value of 
both CG and block ownership is used as explanatory variables. In the current 
paper, five models are tested. The first model tests the relationship between CG 
and information asymmetry, and is shown as model (1) below. 
SPREADit = α i + β1 CG_SCOREit + β2 SIZEit + β3 PRICEit + β4 TURNit 
+ uit  .................................................................................(1)  
  
This model represents the main focus of this paper that considers CG and other 
control variables such as price, size and turnover ratio that may affect bid-ask 
spread. Where SPREAD is measured by the average daily bid-ask spread of the 
firm over the year, CG_SCORE is the corporate governance score, PRICE is the 
annual stock price, and TURN is turnover rate that represents the level of trading 
activity and it is measured by the total number of shares traded over the year 
divided by the number of shares outstanding. 
 
The second model tests the relationship between CG sub-indices and bid-ask 
spread, and is shown as model (2) below. 
SPREADit =α i + β1 BCIIit + β2 BPPIit + β3 AAIit + β4 SIZEit + β5 PRICEit 
+ β6 TURNit + uit  ...........................................................(2) 
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Where BCII is the Board Composition and Independence Index, BPPI is the 
Board Practice and Process Index, and AAI is the Accountability and Audit Index, 
and other variables as defined above. 
 
In model (3), the relationship between block ownership and information 
asymmetry is tested, block ownership is added to the previous two models, model 
(1) and (2), as shown below in model (3) and (4) 
  SPREADit =α i + β1 CG_SCOREit + β2 BLOCKit+ β3 SIZEit + β4 PRICEit 
+ β5 TURNit + uit  .........................................................(3) 
 
Where BLOCK is block ownership calculated as the percentage of shares that is 
owned by shareholders with no less than three percent of equity ownership. 
SPREADit =α i + β1 BCIIit + β2 BPPIit + β3 AAIit + β4 BLOCKit+ β5 SIZEit 
+ β6 PRICEit + β7 TURNit + uit  ...................................(4) 
 
Finally, model five presents the interaction model that tests CG role in mitigates 
the pessimistic effect of block ownership; therefore, the interaction variable of CG 
and block ownership is included in model (3) as shown below in model (5).  
SPREADit =α i + β1 CG_SCOREit + β2 BLOCKit+ β3 CG_SCOREit * 
BLOCKit +β4 SIZEit + β5 PRICEit + β6 TURNit + uit  ......(5) 
 
 
Where CG_SCORE * BLOCK is defined as the interaction between CG and block 
ownership. In addition, the effect of the interaction between CG and different 
types of block ownership on bid-ask spread is also examined.  
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5.4 Empirical Results and Analysis 
5.4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Table (5.1) and (5.2) report the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
respectively for the variables. Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics; in the 
pre-crisis period, the mean bid-ask spread is (0.4727) while in the crisis period, 
the mean is (0.24013) which indicates a decrease in the bid-ask spread from the 
pre-crisis to the crisis period. The mean of CG-Score has increased from (0.8140) 
in the pre-crisis period to (0.8391) in the crisis period; in addition, all the CG-Sub 
indices have also increased. Block ownership with at least 3% ownership had a 
mean of 33.81% in the pre-crisis period which increased to 38.23% in the crisis 
period. The mean of the different types of block ownership has increased for all 
the three types from the pre-crisis to the crisis period; the institutional block 
ownership has increased from 25.60% to 29.13%, and the insider block ownership 
increased from 1.940% to 1.942% and, finally, the other block ownership has 
increased from 6.26% to 7.16%. The mean turnover is (2.25) in the pre-crisis 
period and became (2.18) in the crisis period. Moreover, the mean of both size 
and price has decreased in the crisis period to (21.55) and (6.47) respectively. 
Table (5.2) reports the correlation analysis between independent variables. Within 
this Pearson correlation matrix, there appears no significant high correlation 
between the independent variables. Therefore, there is no multi-colinearity 
problem to be considered. 
[Table 5.1 and 5.2 around here] 
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5.4.2 Regression Results of the Relationship between CG and Information 
Asymmetry  
Table (5.3) model (1) represents the results of the effect of CG score on bid-ask 
spread; it reveals a negative relationship between CG score and bid-ask spread in 
the pre-crisis period and it is a significant relationship at 5% significant level and 
with a higher R2 value of 0.6878  . This result supports the first hypothesis by 
providing the evidence of a negative relationship between CG and information 
asymmetry. This result also supports the previous results of Fan (2013) and Lei et 
al. (2013). On the other hand, model (2) reports the regression results during crisis 
period, and it indicates a negative but not significant relationship between CG 
Score and bid-ask spread (The R2 in model 2 turned to be of lower value than in 
model 1 (0.6650)). Therefore, the observed significant negative association 
between CG and information asymmetry is consistent with prior literature 
(Charoenwong et al., 2011; Chung et al., 2010; Fan, 2013; Lei et al., 2013).  
These results indicated that internal CG has a negative effect on bid-ask spread; 
with the increase in CG quality, there will be better information environment and 
hence lower information asymmetry.  While the observed non-significant 
influence of CG on bid-ask spread during crisis period is consistent with the 
results of Byun et al. (2011) where they found that there is non-significant 
negative relationship between CG Index and information asymmetry in a sample 
of Korean firms. Thus, in general the current findings imply that CG is important 
in providing sufficient information to investors that enables them to take the right 
investment decision in the pre-crisis period. 
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Considering the control variables, the results indicate that price and size have a 
significant negative relationship with bid-ask spread in both periods. However, 
TURN has a significant negative relationship with spread only in the period 
before the crisis, and it turned to be non-significant during crisis period. This 
result supports the result of previous studies; Choi et al. (2010) reported the same 
relationship between SIZE, TURN and bid-ask spread. Also Lei et al. (2013), in 
their results, revealed that PRICE, SIZE has a negative association with spread. 
[Table 5.3 around here] 
 
In Table (5.4), the regression is expanding by testing the association between CG-
sub indices and bid-ask spread. The results showed a significantly negative 
relationship between BPPI, AAI, and bid-ask spread which means that both board 
practice, accountability and audit sub-indices have a major role in mitigating 
information asymmetry in the period before the crisis (with  R2 value of 0.6895). 
Contrarily to the expectations, BCII has non-significant effect on information 
asymmetry.  This result is in line with previous results of Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2007), who examined the influence of some CG mechanisms on information 
asymmetry and found, between other things, that board activity is negatively 
related with bid-ask spread. In addition, the current results support the findings of 
Elbadry et al. (2013) who found a negative association between board activity and 
information asymmetry in the context of UK in the period from 2003 to 2006, 
which is in the pre-crisis period. This result provides evidence that better board 
quality has an effect in mitigating information asymmetry, at least in the period 
prior to the crisis. 
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Model 2 in Table (5.4) shows that during crisis period only AAI has a negative 
relationship with bid-ask spread; this means that both BCII and BPPI have no 
effect on information asymmetry during this period (R2 value in model 2 
therefore is lower with a value of 0.6658). This finding supports the results of 
Cormier et al. (2010) that showed that formal monitoring mechanisms, such as 
audit committee characteristics including audit committee size, reduce 
information asymmetry.  Therefore, based on the results of both tables (5.3) and 
(5.4), it is found that there is a significant difference in the effect of CG and CG 
sub-indices on information asymmetry from the pre-crisis to during crisis period 
where most of the effect is found in the pre-crisis period.  
[Table 5.4 around here] 
 
5.4.3 Regression Results of the Relationship between Block Ownership and 
Information Asymmetry  
 
Tables (5.5) and (5.6) report the results of the regression between block ownership 
and bid-ask spread. Table (5.5) reports the result of this relationship in both 
periods; the regression results showed a negative relationship between block 
ownership and bid-ask spread in the period before the crisis but it is a non-
significant relationship. A non-significant negative effect of block ownership on 
bid-ask spread means that block shareholders do not play the active role expected 
from them in doing effective monitoring of management and, consequently, 
mitigating the asymmetric information (Hope et al., 2009).  However, during the 
crisis period, it turned to be a positive and significant relationship, which provides 
support for the second hypothesis. This result provides support to the stream of 
prior literature that underlined an increase in information asymmetry due to the 
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increase of ownership concentration (Heflin and Shaw, 2000; Jacoby and Zheng, 
2010). This result indicates that block ownership during crisis period may take 
advantage of their position and worsen information problem and, consequently, 
escalate information asymmetry (Heflin and Shaw, 2000). Block shareholders 
may behave in a way that protects their wealth; therefore, they may extort firm 
resources for their own benefits. This means that during the crisis period block 
shareholders choose to expropriate and this, in turn, affects information 
asymmetry. 
 
Table (5.6) reports the results of the previous relationship by considering various 
categories of block ownership and its effect on bid-ask spread; Model (1) showed 
that in the pre-crisis period, only insider block ownership has a significant 
negative relationship with bid-ask spread and at the same time it showed 
insignificant negative association between block shareholdings by institutional 
investors, block shareholdings by other shareholders, and bid-ask spread (the 
value of R2 of model 1 is 0.7087 which is higher than R2 in model 2).  This 
negative relationship between insider block ownership and spread is inconsistent 
with previous studies of Ginglinger and Hamon (2007), Gjerde et al. (2013), 
Heflin and Shaw (2000), Jiang et al. (2011) who indicated that an increase in 
insider block ownership would result in an increase in bid-ask spread. According 
to Jensen and Meckling (1976), insiders, who have private information, may use it 
in an opportunistic manner; they may behave in a way that benefits them but 
might not necessarily benefit other shareholders. However, this unexpected result 
can explain why an increase in insider ownership may result in the alliance of the 
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interests of both owners and management (Morck et al., 1988). Therefore, where 
insiders are also shareholders, their incentive to monitor is an increasing function 
of their stake and results in a decrease in information asymmetry (Levesque et al., 
2010). Thus, it also supports the results of McConnell and Servaes (1990) that 
showed that insiders would work to mitigate information asymmetry as their 
ownership increase. Furthermore, it is expected that in a developed country like 
UK, there are more legal restrictions on the insiders’ ability to gain private control 
benefit and this in turn reduces their motivation to hold back information from 
shareholders (Leuz et al., 2003). In addition, they are more inhibited to trade on 
such information (Huang and Xu, 2009). 
 
While during the crisis period, the relationship between different categories of 
block ownership and bid-ask turned to be positive relationships, but it is only 
significant for both institutional block ownership and other block ownership. This 
result reveals that there is no evidence of an influence of insider block ownership 
on bid-ask spread during this period. The above-mentioned positive relationship 
between institutional block ownership adds more support to prior literature that 
showed block ownership by institutional investors to have a significant positive 
association with information asymmetry (Jiang et al., 2011, Brockman and Yan, 
2009 and Rubin, 2007). Therefore, during the crisis period, these institutional and 
other block shareholders are perceived by market maker as having more private 
information. 
[Table 5.5 and 5.6 around here] 
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5.4.4 Regression Results of the Interaction Effect of Block Ownership with 
CG  
Having noted that during the crisis period, block ownership had a positive 
relationship with bid-ask spread, therefore, CG is considered if it could mitigate 
such a relationship. In so doing, the analysis is extended by adding the interaction 
variable of CG with block ownership (CG_SCORE*BLOCK). If CG has an 
effect, then it is expected that this positive association between block ownership 
and information asymmetry to be lessened due to this variable. Table (5.7) 
represents the results of the interactive effect; the result indicates a non-significant 
negative association between the interactive variable and bid-ask spread, it also 
shows that the value of R2 has increased to 0.6886 than the value of R2 in model 
2 in table 5.5. The results mean that CG did not play a role in attenuating the 
positive relationship that had been mentioned before. This result is consistent with 
the result of Byun et al. (2011) who found that internal CG did not play a role in 
mitigating this effect of block ownership. 
 
Also, having noted in table (5.6) that both institutional block and other block 
ownership had a positive associated with bid-ask spread, the previous regression 
is extended to include the interaction terms of CG with INSTITUTIONAL 
(CG_SCORE*INSTIUTIONAL) and CG with OTHER (CG*OTHER). Table 
(5.8) reports the results of this regression; an insignificant negative relationship 
between CG_SCORE*INSITUTIONAL and bid-ask spread is found but, on the 
other hand, a significant negative relationship between CG*OTHER and bid-ask 
spread is reported (the value of R2 has increased to 0.6924 which is higher than 
the R2 in model 2 table 5.6). Both the results in table (5.7) and (5.8) indicate that 
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CG did not play an active role during crisis period in mitigating the positive 
relationship between block ownership and bid-ask spread; it only provides weak 
evidence on its role in mitigating the asymmetry caused by other block ownership. 
[Table 5.7 and 5.8 around here] 
 
5.4.5 Additional Test (The influence of Different Categories of Institutional 
Block Shareholders on Information Asymmetry) 
 
An additional test is done to examine the relationship  between various categories 
of institutional block ownership on information asymmetry; this additional test 
would give more insight about the role played by the two different categories of 
institutional block ownership in affecting bid-ask spread in both period.  
Therefore, institutional block ownership is classified into two types as mentioned 
before in chapter 3; BLOCK 1 and BLOCK 2.   
 
The result indicates consistency with the original result that there is a non-
significant negative association between each category of institutional block 
ownership and bid-ask spread in the period before the financial crisis (Table 5.9, 
Model 1).  However, during the crisis period, it gives a slightly different result; it 
indicates that both types of institutional block ownership have positive 
relationship with bid-ask spread, but only BLOCK 2 has a significant relationship 
(Table 5.9, Model 2). This result means that the influence of institutional block 
ownership on bid-ask spread came mostly from BLOCK2. This indicates that 
pension fund and insurance company (BLOCK 1) have a weaker impact on 
increasing spread than do other institutional block shareholders. Therefore, it can 
be argued that other institutional block shareholders (BLOCK2) is thought to have 
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more information advantage than BLOCK1 who may concentrate more on 
monitoring of management.  
[Table 5.9 around here] 
 
The following table summarises the results of the empirical regressions compared 
with the previous research hypothesises; it summarises the main research 
hypothesises and presents the main findings of the current paper. 
 
Table (5.10) Research Hypothesises and Findings 
Variable  Hypothesis  Expected 
Sign 
Pre-Crisis During-
Crisis 
CG_SCORE Hypothesis 1: There is a 
significant negative 
association between CG 
score and information 
asymmetry  
Negative 
relationship 
with bid-ask 
spread 
Significant 
negative 
relationship 
Non-
significant 
negative 
relationship 
Block 
ownership 
Hypothesis 2: There is a 
significant positive 
relationship between 
block ownership and 
information asymmetry. 
Positive 
relationship 
with bid-ask 
spread 
Non-
significant 
negative 
relationship 
Significant 
positive 
relationship 
Interaction 
between 
Block 
ownership 
and CG 
Hypothesis 3: There is a 
significant negative 
relationship between the 
interaction variable of 
(CG and block 
ownership) and 
information asymmetry. 
 
Negative 
relationship 
with bid-ask 
spread 
Not tested 
due to the 
insignificant 
relationship 
between 
block 
ownership 
and bid-ask 
spread. 
Non-
significant 
Negative 
relationship  
 
Based on the research hypothesis and findings, it can be argued that H1 is 
accepted only in the pre-crisis period, while during the crisis period, it is rejected 
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which means that CG failed to have a significant impact during the crisis period in 
reducing information asymmetry.  With respect to H2, it is accepted during the 
crisis period where the findings prove a significant positive relationship between 
block ownership and bid-ask spread; however, in the pre-crisis, no evidence is 
found for this relationship. Finally, for hypothesis H3 it is rejected in the crisis 
period where CG is found to have no influence on attenuating the positive 
relationship between block ownership and information asymmetry. The next 
section provides the robustness check of the research findings followed by 
summary and conclusion in the final section. 
 
5.4.6 Robustness Checks 
In this section, the strength of the results is checked; by further investigation of 
the relationship between CG and information asymmetry. First, an extra variable 
that may be related to information asymmetry is included; leverage is added in the 
regression. Previous studies indicated that leverage is correlated with bid-ask 
spread (Anglin et al., 2011). Amihud and Mendelson (2008), for example, 
indicated that the higher the leverage, the more information asymmetry that will 
result in an increase in bid-ask spread. Again, a similar result is found, indicating 
that the coefficient on CG did not change and is still significant and negative in 
the pre-crisis period. (Table 5.11, Model1). This means that this omitted variable 
is unlikely to explain the results.  
 
The second test is done by using another measure instead of the turnover ratio; a 
negative relationship is found between trading volumes and bid-ask spreads (Stoll, 
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1978); therefore, trading volume is used instead of turnover ratio. The result 
showed that trading volume (VOLUME) is negatively associated with bid-ask 
spread, Lei et al. (2013) and Roulstone (2003) found negative relationship 
between VOLUME and spread. Therefore, using another measure of trading 
activity did not change the relationship (Table 5.11, model 2).  
 
An additional test is done by including one more extra variable – volatility – in 
the regression in the pre-crisis period measured by the standard deviation of daily 
stock return (Byun et al., 2011; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007; Lei et al., 2013). 
Again using an extra control variable does not change the relation between CG 
and spread (see table 5.11, Model 3). These robustness checks discussed above 
provide consistent results and increase confidence in the information asymmetry– 
governance relationship.   
[Table 5.11 around here] 
 
5.5  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The main purpose of this paper was to study the effect of CG on information 
asymmetry. Both CG index and sub-indices are employed to measure CG quality 
of a sample UK listed company – FTSE 350 non-financial UK listed firms – in 
both the pre-crisis period and during the crisis period from 2005 to 2009.  This 
paper also aimed to examine the effect of block ownership on information 
asymmetry and moreover the role played by CG in alleviating the negative impact 
of block ownership is considered. The empirical results of this paper revealed that 
CG plays an active role in reducing information asymmetry only in the pre-crisis 
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period; a negative relationship between CG and information asymmetry is found. 
Therefore, consistent with prior literature, these results indicated that with the 
increase in CG quality, there will be better information environment and hence 
lower information asymmetry. Thus, in general, the current findings imply that the 
importance of CG in providing sufficient information to investors that enabled 
them to take the right investment decision in the pre-crisis period. However, based 
on the result that indicates insignificant relation between CG and information 
asymmetry during crisis, it can be argued that CG does not play the role expected 
from it in the crisis period.  Moreover, results for sub-indices of CG provide 
further support for the negative governance – information asymmetry relationship; 
the current study also provides the evidence that internal CG mechanisms are 
important factors in mitigating information asymmetry; both board practice and 
process index and accountability and audit index are found to be important 
mechanisms in reducing information asymmetry in the pre-crisis period.   
 
While during crisis, there is no observed effect of CG in mitigating this 
information asymmetry. In addition, accountability and audit index proves to be 
the only sub-index that shows an effect in reducing information asymmetry during 
the crisis period. This means that accountability and audit index is important in 
both the pre-crisis period and during the crisis period in reducing information 
asymmetry; it can be argued that accountability and audit index is an index that is 
directly related to the disclosure of information and, therefore, it has a more 
significant impact on reducing information asymmetry in both periods. 
Charoenwong et al. (2011) found that between different CG dimensions only the 
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transparency and disclosure dimension had a significant negative effect on 
adverse selection.   
 
To sum up, it can be argued that CG does not play the role expected from it in the 
crisis period. More specifically, board composition and independence index is 
found to have no effect on reducing information asymmetry before and during 
crisis. This finding is not what was expected from this major CG mechanisms; it 
was expected from board to have a major effect on lowering information 
asymmetry. This is inconsistent with Levesque et al. (2010) who found that 
monitoring by outside directors on the board results in a decrease in information 
asymmetry. Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) underlined the importance of 
board of directors as the main form of the internal control mechanisms that is 
needed to monitor management. Therefore, this current result should have 
implication for regulatory bodies regarding the independence and the composition 
of the board which should be on top of any CG reforms because board 
independence should have an important effect to improve information disclosure 
to investors and thus helps to diminish information risk.  Therefore, CG reforms 
should ensure high degree of board independence.  
 
Regarding the effect of block ownership on information asymmetry, the findings 
indicated that block shareholders were not actively involved in monitoring 
management and behaved in a way that was expected form them in the pre-crisis 
period.  A non-significant negative effect of block ownership on bid-ask spread is 
found. On the other hand, the findings also showed a statistical significant positive 
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effect of block ownership on information asymmetry during the crisis period; 
suggesting that block shareholders benefit from their information advantage 
during crisis period which in turn worsen the information asymmetry problem. 
This suggests that block shareholders engage more in their private benefits rather 
than engaging in efficient monitoring. The results also show insignificant effect of 
both institutional and other block ownership in reducing bid-ask spread in the 
period preceding the crisis.  In addition, during the same period a significant 
negative effect of insiders block ownership on bid-ask spread was noticed. 
However, these results changed in the crisis period, showing a positive association 
between institutional block ownership and bid-ask spread and also the same 
positive association is found for other block ownership. However, the results in 
the same period revealed a non-significant effect of insider block ownership on 
information asymmetry. Therefore, during the crisis period these institutional and 
other block shareholders are perceived by as having more private information. 
 
Regarding the responsibility of CG to attenuate the positive association between 
block ownership and information asymmetry, it was expected that CG will help in 
alleviating the negative effect of ownership concentration. However, the results of 
this study did not provide evidence; CG did not alleviate the negative effect of 
either the block ownership in total or the negative effect of both institutional and 
other block ownership during the crisis period. Therefore, it can be argued that 
CG did not do the appropriate monitoring job expected during crisis period.  
Therefore, block ownership may affect management to withhold information and 
reduce public disclosure; they may also use their private information, this in turn 
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increase information asymmetry problem.  It was expected that firms in UK with 
strong shareholders rights make greater efforts to provide more disclosure to 
investors and this leads to reduced information asymmetry. However, this study 
provides the evidence that internal CG is not enough to reduce the negative 
impact of block ownership. Therefore, future research should consider external 
CG mechanisms in reducing the negative impact of ownership concentration. This 
result implies that understanding block ownership and problems associated with it 
constitutes a requirement for designing an effective mechanism for the protection 
of investors and at the same time for promoting market assurance. 
 
Based on the result of the current study, it can be argued that CG did not perform 
the role required as it is expected; CG should play an important role when they are 
needed more which is during financial crisis periods; during this unstable period, 
CG is needed more to control agency problems and hence reduce information 
asymmetry; this is done through monitoring management, more disclosure, and 
more improvement in firm’s information environment.  This indicates that CG 
needs to be reformed, especially those CG sub-indices that cover board 
independence, composition, and practice which prove to have no effect in 
reducing bid-ask spread. Therefore, reforming CG mechanisms is a necessary step 
which should be taken and which may result in reinforced if needed to provide 
more control and hence to maximise its role in reducing agency problems. This 
current result indicates that these voluntary CG recommendations (comply or 
explain) alone cannot solve the agency problem and there should be more 
regulatory actions. 
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The results of this paper have important implications for regulators about the 
improvement needed for CG which will help companies prevent future financial 
crises. There is a need for more hard work of market regulators to promote CG 
reform; on this basis, regulators might choose to focus more directly on CG 
mechanisms that fail to have an impact on reducing information asymmetry, 
especially during the crisis period.  The current results provide a preliminary 
indicator of where future regulations should be focused. This in turn should give 
investors more trust in the financial markets, especially that the latest financial 
crisis and scandals had damaged this confidence. This result also indicates for the 
regulators that even in a strong regulatory environment, like UK, the effectiveness 
of governance mechanisms should be tested regularly to assess any potential 
improvements that are needed (Gisbert and Navallas, 2013). Furthermore, the 
current result also implies that policies have to be developed in a way that 
encourages block shareholders, especially institutional block shareholders to 
engage more in monitoring management and to improve disclosure and 
transparency instead of engaging in private benefits.  
 
Based on the findings of the current paper, a number of research 
recommendations are offered. First, as the current study covers the pre and during 
crisis period, it would be potentially interesting to look at the importance of 
governance structures in lowering information asymmetry in post-financial crisis 
period, especially that the financial crisis has affected the capital market. It would 
be interesting to recognize if the current results especially those obtained during 
crisis period hold over time or are specific only for the crisis period. Therefore, 
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other research that is based on the analysis of a longer period is important to 
highlight the effect of the improvement in CG following the crisis-period in 
mitigating information asymmetry. Second, it would be interesting if future 
research extended the current research and examined the interaction between 
certain aspects of CG and block ownership in curbing information asymmetry 
such as the interaction between independent directors and block shareholdings in 
affecting information asymmetry, and at the same time using alternative proxies 
for information asymmetry. Third, it will be of great interest if future research 
could take into consideration the role of legal and regulatory regimes in reducing 
information asymmetry during the period of financial crisis.  La Porta et al. (1998) 
revealed the importance of the external role played by the regulatory systems in 
protecting shareholders.  Considering this issue will intensify our understanding 
of the effect of external mechanisms in solving agency problems during crisis 
periods. So it is important to study the role of this mechanism during the crisis in 
reducing information asymmetry and also the interaction between these 
mechanisms and internal CG in mitigating information asymmetry is an appealing 
topic to be considered in future research.  
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Tables 
Table (5.1): Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics on the overall sample for each year from 2005 to 2009 and also for the pre-crisis and during-crisis periods for 
the dependent, independent and control variables. SPREAD is average of daily bid-ask spread; CG_SCORE is the governance score; BCII is the Score 
of board composition and independence index; BPPI is the score of board process and practice index; AAI is the score of accountability and audit index; 
BLOCK is the percentage of shares held by shareholders with no less than three percent of equity ownership and INSTITUTIONAL is the percentage of 
block ownership by institutional investors, INSIDER is the percentage of block ownership by insiders and OTHER is the percentage of block ownership 
by others;  SIZE is Natural log of total assets; PRICE is measured by the log of annual stock price; TURN  is the turnover ratio in a year (the number of 
shares traded over the year, divided by the number of shares outstanding). 
 
Variables Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005)  
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2006)  
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2007) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2008) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2009) 
Mean (Median) 
(Std. Dev.)  
(2005 to 2007) 
Mean (Median) 
(Std. Dev.) (2008 to 
2009) 
SPREAD .7278 
(.4049) 
(.7867) 
.4555 
(.3047) 
(.4250) 
.2347 
(.1833) 
(.1661) 
.2229 
(.1932) 
(.1355) 
.2573 
(.2269) 
(.1715) 
.4727 
(.2802) 
(.5614) 
.24013 
(.2006) 
(.1552) 
CG_SCORE 0.7999 
(0.815) 
(.099) 
0.8086 
(0.821) 
(.099) 
0.8228 
(0.833 ) 
(.092) 
0.8345 
(0.85) 
(.088) 
0.8436 
(0.863) 
(.087) 
0.8140 
(0.821) 
(.097) 
0.8391 
(0.857) 
(.088) 
BCII .2326 
(.2381) 
(.0638) 
.2336 
(.2381) 
(.0648) 
.2404 
(.2381) 
(.0610) 
.2435 
(.2381) 
(.0609) 
.2483 
(.2381) 
(.0595) 
.2355 
(.2381) 
(.0632) 
.2459 
(.2381) 
(.0601) 
BPPI .2958 
(.3030) 
(.0383) 
.2993 
(.3030) 
(.0369) 
.3028 
(.3030) 
(.0371) 
.3078 
(.3030) 
(.0310) 
.3082 
(.3030) 
(.0315) 
.2993 
(.3030) 
(.0374) 
.3080 
(.3030) 
(.0312) 
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Table (5.1) Continued 
 
AAI .2715 
(.29167) 
(.0426) 
.2757 
(.29167) 
(.0396) 
.2796 
(.29167) 
(.0382) 
.2832 
(.29167) 
(.0372) 
.2871 
(.29167) 
(.0357) 
.2756 
(.29167) 
(.0402) 
.2852 
(.29167) 
(.0364) 
BLOCK  32.32 
(29.8) 
(16.78) 
32.56 
(30.88) 
( 17.02) 
36.49 
(34.73) 
(17.10) 
38.26 
(37.4) 
(18.45) 
38.17 
(37.1) 
(17.08) 
33.81 
( 31.58) 
(17.04) 
38.21 
(37.25) 
(17.75) 
INSTITUTIONAL 23.76 
(22.7) 
(13.53) 
24.70 
(22.68) 
(14.72) 
28.33 
(27.5) 
(15.19) 
28.91 
(26.75) 
(16.02) 
29.34 
(26.97) 
(15.81) 
25.60 
(24.33) 
(14.60) 
29.13 
(26.85) 
(15.89) 
INSIDER 1.94 
(0) 
(7.37) 
1.85 
(0) 
(7.36) 
2.01 
(0) 
(7.43) 
1.97 
(0) 
(7.35) 
1.90 
(0) 
(7.00) 
1.940 
(0) 
(7.37) 
1.942 
(0) 
(7.16) 
OTHER 6.61 
(0) 
(14.23) 
6.01 
(0) 
(13.39) 
6.17 
(0) 
(13.78) 
7.38 
(0) 
(14.72) 
6.93 
(0) 
(14.54) 
6.26 
(0) 
(13.77) 
7.16 
(0) 
(14.60) 
SIZE 21.41 
(21.22) 
(1.377) 
21.61 
(21.46) 
(1.406) 
21.62 
(21.46) 
(1.409) 
21.16 
(21.06) 
(1.407) 
21.27 
(21.10) 
(1.384) 
21.55 
(21.38) 
(1.397) 
21.21 
(  21.07) 
(1.394) 
PRICE 5.148 
(3.80 ) 
(5.356) 
6.533 
(4.335) 
(6.391) 
8.378 
(6.28) 
(7.611) 
7.289 
(4.753) 
(7.394) 
5.665 
(3.533) 
(6.044) 
6.701 
(4.702) 
(6.645) 
6.477 
(4.161) 
(6.789) 
TURN 2.17 
(1.61) 
(2.67) 
2.12 
(1.75) 
(2.23) 
2.45 
(1.82) 
(3.78)  
2.46 
(1.85) 
(2.85) 
1.90 
(1.44) 
(1.87) 
2.25 
(1.68) 
(2.97) 
2.18 
(1.65) 
(2.42) 
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Table (5.2) 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
 
This table presents the Pearson’s correlation matrix for the independent variables used in the empirical analysis for the period before and during 
the crisis. All variables are fully defined in Table (5.1). 
Variables CG _SCORE BCII BPPI AAI BLOCK SIZE TURN PRICE 
Pre-crisis         
CG _SCORE 1.0000        
BCII 0.6665*** 1.0000       
BPPI 0.5515*** 0.1699*** 1.0000      
AAI 0.5938*** 0.1841*** 0.2140*** 1.0000     
BLOCK -0.0645 -0.1658*** -0.1144** -0.0383 1.0000    
SIZE 0.0685 0.0187 0.0926* 0.0954* -0.2746*** 1.0000   
TURN 0.1710*** 0.2012*** 0.1350*** 0.0914* -0.0247 0.1201** 1.0000  
PRICE -0.0157 0.0113 0.0067 0.0266  -0.1104 0.2389*** -0.1556*** 1.0000 
 
During-crisis         
CG_SCORE 1.0000        
BCII 0.6810*** 1.0000       
BPPI 0.5660*** 0.2005*** 1.0000      
AAI 0.5567*** 0.1126* 0.1575*** 1.0000     
BLOCK -0.0390 -0.0161 -0.1309** -0.1087* 1.0000    
SIZE -0.0678   -0.1052* -0.0413 0.0267 -0.3041*** 1.0000   
TURN 0.1438** 0.2133 *** 0.0639 0.0330 0.1005* 0.0288 1.0000  
PRICE -0.1222** -0.1453** 0.0122 -0.0167  -0.2526*** 0.2270  *** -0.1111* 1.0000 
     ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
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Table (5.3) 
 Regression result of the impact of CG-Score on bid-ask spread in both pre 
and during crisis period 
 
This table presents the regression results of information asymmetry and Corporate 
Governance score. Model 1 presents the results of the regression in the pre-crisis period 
while Model 2 presents the results during crisis period. All variables are fully defined in 
table (5.1). These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics which are in parentheses. It 
depends on the used regression fixed effect (t-statistics) or random effect (z-statistics). 
***, ** and * denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Variables 
SPREAD/pre-crisis 
Model (1) 
SPREAD /during 
crisis  
Model (2) 
 intercept .7819(3.73)***   -.3065(-2.78)***  
CG_SCORE -.3837(-2.43)**   -.0196(-0.29) 
SIZE -1.040(-4.13)***   -.5476(-9.79)*** 
PRICE -1.468(-9.59)***  -.3997(-10.60)*** 
TURN -.17617 (-3.07)*** -.0167(-0.59) 
 
R2 0.6878   0.6650 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
hausman test/ Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.3332 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Random effects 
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Table (5.4) 
 Regression result of the impact of CG-sub indices on bid-ask spread in both 
pre and during crisis period 
 
This table presents the regression results of information asymmetry and CG sub-indices. 
Model 1 presents the results of the regression in the pre-crisis period while Model 2 
presents the results during crisis period. All variables are fully defined in table (5.1).  
These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics which are in parentheses. It depends on 
the used regression fixed effect (t-statistics) or random effect (z-statistics).  ***, ** and * 
denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Variables 
SPREAD/pre-
crisis 
Model(1) 
SPREAD /during 
crisis  
Model(2) 
 intercept .2128(4.45)***   -.3347(-7.79)***  
BCII -.0727(-0.97) .0207(0.67) 
BPPI -.1240(-1.69)* -.0013(-0.04) 
 AAI -.1338(-1.79)* -.0841(-2.43)** 
SIZE -.9964(-4.08)***   -.5388(-9.79)*** 
PRICE -1.466(-9.67)***  -.4033(-11.20)*** 
TURN -.1736(-3.02)*** -.0148(-0.52) 
 
R2 0.6895 0.6658 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
hausman test/ Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.3976 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Random effects 
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Table (5.5) 
Regression result of the impact of block ownership on bid-ask spread in both 
pre and during crisis period 
 
This table presents the regression results of information asymmetry and block ownership. 
Model 1 presents the results of the regression in the pre-crisis period while Model 2 
presents the results during crisis period. All variables are fully defined in table (5.1). 
These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics which are in parentheses. It depends on 
the used regression fixed effect (t-statistics) or random effect (z-statistics).   ***, ** and * 
denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Variables SPREAD/pre-
crisis 
Model (1) 
SPREAD /during 
crisis  
Model (2) 
 intercept 1.062(3.2)***   -.6627(-4.27)***  
CG_SCORE -.3865(-2.43)**   .0055(0.09) 
BLOCK -.2084(-1.31) .2167(3.12)*** 
SIZE -1.060(-4.36)***   -.5239(-9.95)*** 
PRICE -1.469(-9.75)***  -.3751(-10.02)*** 
TURN -.1792(-3.19)*** -.0167(-0.61) 
 
R2 0.6922 0.6870   
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
hausman test/ Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.2359 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Random effects 
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Table (5.6) 
Regression result of the impact of different types of block ownership on bid-
ask spread in both pre and during crisis period 
 
This table presents the regression results of information asymmetry and different types of 
block ownership. Model 1 presents the results of the regression in the pre-crisis period 
while Model 2 presents the results during crisis period. All variables are fully defined in 
table (5.1).  These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics which are in parentheses. It 
depends on the used regression fixed effect (t-statistics) or random effect (z-statistics).  
***, ** and * denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Variables SPREAD/pre-crisis 
Model (1) 
SPREAD /during crisis  
Model (2) 
 intercept .7823(3.78)***   -.3412(-3.12)***  
CG_SCORE -.3678 (-2.38)**   -.0121(-0.18) 
INSTITUIONAL -.1157(-1.63) .0775(2.28)** 
INSIDER -.5693(-4.23)*** .0627 (1.02) 
OTHER -.0034(-0.04) .1107(3.28)*** 
SIZE -1.078(-4.40)***   -.5207(-9.25)*** 
PRICE -1.515(-10.30)***  -.3794(-10.26)*** 
TURN -.1901(-3.50)*** -.0193(-0.68) 
 
R2 0.7087 0.6875 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
hausman test/ Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.2393 
Method of estimation Fixed effects Random effects 
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Table (5.7) 
 Regression result of the impact the interaction between ownership and CG 
on bid-ask spread during crisis period 
 
This table presents the regression results of the interactive effect of CG and block 
ownership on information asymmetry. All variables are fully defined in table (5.1). This 
model provides z-statistics which is in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Variables SPREAD /during crisis 
Model(1) 
 intercept -.8173(-3.10)***  
CG_SCORE    .1152(0.66) 
BLOCK .3266(2.04)** 
CG_SCORE *BLOCK -.0782(-0.71) 
SIZE -.5250(-9.97)*** 
PRICE -.3766(-10.01)*** 
TURN -.0172(-0.63) 
 
R2 0.6886 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
hausman test/ Prob > chi2  0.2470 
Method of estimation Random effects 
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Table (5.8) 
 Regression result of the impact the interaction between the types of block 
ownership and CG on bid-ask spread during crisis period 
 
This table presents the regression results of the interactive effect of CG and two types of 
block ownership on information asymmetry. All variables are fully defined in Table (5.1).  
This model provides z-statistics which is in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Variables SPREAD /during crisis 
Model(1) 
 intercept -.3578 (-3.36)***  
CG_SCORE -.0012(-0.02) 
INSTITUIONAL .0889(1.08) 
INSIDER .0642(1.04) 
OTHER .2845 (2.65)*** 
CG_SCORE * INSTITUIONAL -.0090(-0.18) 
CG_SCORE * OTHER -.1145 (-1.87)* 
SIZE -.5248 (-9.32)*** 
PRICE -.3801(-10.38)*** 
TURN -.0201(-0.72) 
 
R2 0.6924 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
hausman test/ Prob > chi2  0.2476 
Method of estimation Random effects 
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Table (5.9) 
 An additional regression result of the impact of different types of 
institutional block ownership on bid-ask spread in both pre and during crisis 
period 
This table presents the regression results of information asymmetry and different types of 
block ownership. Block institutional investors is classified into BLOCK1 and BLOCK 2. 
Model 1 presents the results of the regression in the pre-crisis period while Model 2 
presents the results during crisis period. All variables are fully defined in table (5.1). 
These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics which are in parentheses. It depends on 
the used regression fixed effect (t-statistics) or random effect (z-statistics).  ***, ** and * 
denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Variables SPREAD/pre-crisis 
Model(1) 
SPREAD /during crisis  
Model(2) 
 intercept 0.7771 (3.79)***   -.3342 (-3.07)***  
CG_SCORE -.3639(-2.38)**   -.0168(-0.25) 
BLOCK1 -.0596 (-0.94) .0289(1.05) 
BLOCK2 -.1068(-1.52) .0714(2.16) ** 
INSIDER -.5829(-4.01)*** .0586(0.94) 
OTHER -.0092 (-0.11) .1082(3.29)*** 
SIZE -1.079 (-4.34)***   -.5221(-9.40)*** 
PRICE -1.515(-10.24)***  -.3800 (-10.29)*** 
TURN -.1903(-3.49)*** -.0198(-0.71) 
 
R2 0.7089 0.6866 
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
hausman test/ Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.2944 
Method of estimation Fixed  effects 
 
Random effects 
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Table (5.11): Robustness Checks 
 
This table presents the results of robustness checks. Model 1 gives the fixed effect 
regression results when LEVERAGE is added as an additional independent variable. 
Model 2 gives the fixed effect regression results when using trading volume instead of 
turnover ratio. Model 3 gives the fixed effect regression results when VOLATILITY is 
added as an additional independent variable. All variables are fully defined in Table (5.1).  
T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote respectively significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels. 
 
Variables SPREAD 
Pre-crisis 
Model(1) 
SPREAD  
Pre-crisis  
Model(2) 
SPREAD 
Pre-crisis 
Model(3) 
 intercept .7528(3.57)***   .7960(3.76)***  .7090(3.50)*** 
CG_SCORE -.3792(-2.39)**   -.3837(-2.42)** -.3942(-2.57) 
SIZE -1.287(-4.00)***   -.9320 (-3.88)*** -1.053(-4.18) *** 
PRICE -1.413(-8.80)***  -1.458(-9.56)*** -1.314(-7.60)*** 
TURN 
VOLUME 
-.1684(-3.13)*** 
 
 
-.544(-2.96)*** 
-.1803(-2.90) *** 
LEVERAGE .1726(1.56)   
VOLTALITY   -.1731(-2.08)** 
 
R2 0.6957 0.6920 0.6985   
Observations 
Groups 
278 
139 
278 
139 
278 
139 
hausman test/ Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Method of estimation Fixed  effects 
 
Fixed  effects 
 
Fixed  effects 
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Chapter Six:  
Conclusion 
 
The primary theme of this thesis, which connects the three essays, is Corporate 
Governance (CG). The thesis consists of three related but different papers on CG 
effectiveness in UK. In this thesis, CG in both periods before and during crisis is 
examined in terms of its effect on attracting block shareholders (essay one), its 
role in reducing agency cost and improving firm performance (essay two), and its 
effect on reducing information asymmetry (essay three). It provides an insight into 
CG in UK before the financial crisis 2005- 2007 and during the crisis period 
2008-2009 and hence provides more understanding of the changing role of CG 
and its effectiveness during this turbulent period. 
 
In the first essay, block shareholders are of particular importance because they can 
engage in corporate monitoring, have the potential to reduce the agency problem, 
and improve corporate performance. Therefore, in essay one the effect of CG on 
block shareholdings of listed non-financial firms in the UK from 2005 to 2009 is 
examined. Moreover, whether this relationship has changed before and during the 
recent financial crisis is also investigated.  The study reveals a significant positive 
relationship between CG and total block shareholdings for the period from 2005 
to 2009. It is also found that board composition and independence are the only CG 
sub-index that affects total block shareholdings. Moreover, the results show that 
only institutional block shareholders consider CG to be an important part of their 
investment decisions. Further analysis suggests that different sub-indices of CG 
appear to affect different types of block shareholdings.  The results also provide 
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evidence that the relationship between CG and block shareholdings changes from 
insignificant before the financial crisis to significant during the financial crisis, 
suggesting that block shareholders believe CG was particularly important during 
times of financial trouble. Overall, the results underline the significance of CG to 
block shareholders’ investment decisions. This means that firms with good CG 
mechanisms tend to be more attractive to block shareholders. Collectively, the 
above evidence suggests that firms need to maintain and sustain good CG mainly 
board independence to enlarge its shareholder base and raise new capital. It 
further suggests that Companies’ efforts to improve CG practice will increase 
their ability to be attractive to shareholders and this should enable further growth. 
 
In the second essay, the focus was on examining whether there is a difference of 
the effect of CG on performance of UK non-financial firms before and during the 
financial crisis. Therefore, in this study, two main questions were raised: the first, 
does CG act as an effective mechanism in improving firm performance?  And, the 
second, if so; does agency cost mediate the effect of CG on firm performance? 
The second essay therefore sought to not only fills the gap in the literature about 
the effect of CG on firm performance during crisis period in UK, but also to 
empirically examine the mediating role of agency cost before and during the crisis 
period. By using a sample of 139 non-financial firms from the FTSE 350, the 
results, consistent with agency theory, found a significant positive relation 
between CG and firm performance in the pre-crisis period. In addition, the 
Accountability and Audit Index (AAI) was found to be the only CG-sub-index 
that appeared to affect firm performance in the pre-crisis period, thus indicating 
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an important role for accountability in the pre-crisis period.  Overall, the result 
provides the evidence that agency cost completely mediate the relationship 
between CG and firm performance. However, during the crisis period, no 
evidence is found of the effect of CG on both agency cost and performance. 
Therefore, it can be argued, based on these results, that the previous argument that 
CG failure contributed to the financial crisis is rejected. At the same time, 
however, it was expected from CG to play a major role during this turbulent time 
in reducing agency cost and improving firm performance.  
 
The third essay, as indicated before, is devoted to information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry has been under focus in a great deal of the finance 
literature. The current essay, therefore, examined the effect of CG on the level of 
information asymmetry. The essay sought to examine the effect of CG in reducing 
information asymmetry as measured by bid-ask spread in both before and during 
crisis. Also, the effect of block ownership on bid-ask spread was examined.  
Moreover, this essay investigated whether CG helps to alleviate the negative 
impact of block ownership by examining the effect of the interaction between 
block ownership and CG on bid-ask spread. Using a sample of 139 FTSE 350 
non-financial companies, the results indicate the important role of CG in reducing 
information asymmetry only in the pre-crisis period. However, contrary to the 
expected role of CG during crisis period, CG was found to have no effect on 
mitigating information asymmetry.  Further results revealed that both board 
practice and process index and accountability and audit index were effective in 
reducing information asymmetry in the pre-crisis period. However, during the 
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crisis period, only accountability and audit index appeared to have a significant 
negative impact on information asymmetry. In addition, block ownership was 
found to have a significantly positive relationship with bid-ask spread in the crisis 
period, but no effect was found in the pre-crisis. It was also found that different 
types of block ownership have different effects on bid-ask spread. It was found 
that insider block ownerships have a negative impact on bid-ask spread in the pre-
crisis period.  However, during crisis period both institutional block shareholdings 
and other block shareholdings were found to have a significant positive effect on 
bid-ask spread, this implies that they are perceived as having private information. 
This means in particular that block shareholders can influence the extent of 
disclosure to maximise their private benefits and this in turn increase information 
asymmetry problem.  More interestingly, the result showed that there is no role 
for CG in reducing the negative impact of both total block ownership and 
different types of block ownership during crisis period. Overall, the findings point 
to the fact that block shareholders during crisis period are more able or better 
positioned to take advantage of their private information. In turn, this implies the 
failure of CG mechanisms during this unstable condition in mitigating 
information asymmetry.   
 
To sum up, CG has been a very significant issue during the recent years, 
especially after the blame directed at CG for being one of the causes for the recent 
financial crisis. In essay one, CG proved to be important in attracting block 
shareholders during the crisis period, which implies the need for good CG to 
rebuild investors’ trust during unstable periods. This means in particular that 
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where there is a good CG, investors are more likely to make rational investments 
decisions based on companies’ CG especially in unstable conditions. However, 
CG does not appear to have any effect in attracting block shareholders in the pre-
crisis period indicating that block shareholders consider CG in their investment 
decision only in crisis period rather than in normal times.  In essay two and three, 
although CG proved to be effective in mitigating information asymmetry, 
reducing agency cost, and improving firm performance in the period prior to the 
crisis, no evidence was found during crisis period. This implies that CG failed to 
affect agency problems or firm performance. Hence, essays two and three 
contributed to the prior literature by shedding light on the role of CG in reducing 
agency problem and improving performance. The combined empirical results of 
essays two and three provided the evidence of the effectiveness of CG in solving 
agency problem and hence reducing information asymmetry and agency cost that 
in turn improve firm performance in the pre-crisis period only.  
 
Thus, as the overall results indicated that block shareholders consider CG to be 
more important during crisis period, in order to attract more shareholders and 
increase shareholders base, there is a need for more reforms of CG during 
financial crises. Such reforms will enable companies with good CG to improve 
firm performance and improve the information environment, and in turn, this will 
rebuild investors’ trust in financial markets. The findings point specifically to an 
important issue which is the need to re-evaluate CG not only in stable periods but 
also during turbulent times with a view to assessing its ability to perform well in 
such different conditions.  Finally, the findings direct the attention to ownership 
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concentration as an important CG mechanism. Therefore, understanding the 
investment preferences of block shareholders is important for firms aiming to 
increase their shareholder base and benefit from monitoring by block 
shareholders.  Therefore, companies should follow the recommendations of 
walker report (2009) which give more attention to institutional shareholders: 
communication and engagement. “There should be a dialogue with shareholders 
based on the mutual understanding of objectives. The Board as a whole has 
responsibility for ensuring that a satisfactory dialogue with shareholders takes 
place” (Walker report, p 82). In the same vein, understanding the problem 
associated with block ownership will also help in designing an effective system 
for investor protection which in turn will promote market confidence.  
 
The three studies which greatly contribute to the existing literature by taking into 
consideration some significant and novel questions and by recommending 
pathways for potential research, they also have important regulatory implications. 
Most importantly; they draw more attention to the issue of CG effectiveness and 
the role of block ownership in listed UK companies especially during crisis 
period. The results of essay one therefore have implications for companies; they 
are useful for management of listed companies in managing relationships with 
block shareholders. By doing this companies will comply with the 
recommendation of the walker reports with regard to its relation with major 
shareholders.  
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Moreover, the findings of the research, therefore, will have regulatory 
implications from different angles. First, the non-significant effect of CG on 
agency cost, information asymmetry, and firm performance during crisis period 
indicates the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of CG in solving agency problems 
and enhancing shareholders interest. This will have significant implications for 
regulators and policy-makers; specifically, regulators and policy makers should 
draw on these results to revise the regulations of CG that will help and support 
companies in their efforts to improve CG practices and, mainly, board 
effectiveness. These empirical results suggest the need for more imaginative and 
innovative improvements in CG as far as regulators are concerned. Regulators 
should also draw on these results to revise some of the regulations of CG and to 
formulate appropriate CG control mechanisms to protect the interest of 
shareholders. The walker report 2009 in the same vein provided recommendation 
regarding the function and performance of the board of directors.  This, in turn, 
will help and support companies in their efforts to improve CG practices and 
attract more shareholders.   
 
Second, the significant positive effect of block ownership on information 
asymmetry requires careful consideration and more regulatory improvements in 
different areas of CG especially with regard to disclosure, which in turn will 
ensure higher protection for shareholders. In the same vein, policies have to be 
developed in a way that encourages block shareholders to improve disclosure and 
transparency instead of using their private information to exacerbate the 
information asymmetry problem.  Indeed, it is open to regulators to choose to 
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focus more directly on CG mechanisms that currently fail to have the desired 
effect in reducing information asymmetry.  
 
Finally, these results also indicate for the regulators that even in a strong 
regulatory environment, like UK, the effectiveness of governance mechanisms 
should be tested regularly to assess any potential improvements that are needed 
(Gisbert and Navallas, 2013). 
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